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Abstract 
 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) was signed into law on November 12, 1999. 
This act is regarded as the most influential deregulation for the U.S. financial services 
industry in the past one-century. The purpose of this study is to determine and analyze the 
wealth effects of the GLBA on U.S. and foreign banks and insurance companies. 
This dissertation is composed of four separate essays. In the first two chapters I 
investigate the wealth effects of the GLBA on domestic banks and insurance companies. I 
find that Money Center Banks followed by Super Regional Banks benefit most from this 
deregulation. I also find that banks with Section 20 investment subsidiaries benefit more 
than rest of the industry. For all types of banks exposure to systematic risk reduces 
following the enactment of the GLBA. In cross sectional analysis I find that banks size 
and change in exposure to systematic risk can explain the wealth effects at firm level. 
In the domestic insurance industry, property/casualty and life insurance 
companies have the highest wealth effect. Exposure to systematic risk also reduces for all 
types of insurance companies following the enactment of the GLBA. From cross 
sectional analysis I find that diversification opportunities and safeguards against 
excessive risk taking create value for property/casualty and all other (except life) 
insurance companies. I also test merger related hypothesis. The result shows that poor 
performing firms and larger firms gain more form this deregulation.  
 xv
In the third and fourth chapter I investigate the wealth effects of the GLBA on 
international banks and foreign insurance companies. I find that the events leading to the 
passage of the GLBA have significant negative wealth effects (spill-over effects) on the 
portfolios of banks and insurance companies for most of the developed countries I 
analyze. These effects are not same for any two countries. Most importantly I find that 
reduction in diversification opportunities for international banks and foreign insurance 
companies in the U.S. market can explain the wealth effects at firm level from the GLBA. 
 xvi
 1 
 CHAPTER I: 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This study examines the impact of the Financial Services Modernization Act of 
1999 (also known as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA)) on the stockholder returns 
of banking and insurance industry, domestically and internationally. It also examines the 
factors that can explain the cross sectional variation of returns. On November 12, 1999, 
President Clinton signed the GLBA into law. This law officially ends the Depression era 
Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, that prohibitis commercial banks from entering investment 
banking, and ends the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, which prohibits commercial 
banks from insurance underwriting. It allows banks, brokerage firms, and insurance 
companies to merge. In addition, newly created Financial Holding Companies (FHC) 
may engage in a wider range of activities, including insurance underwriting, securities 
activity, merchant banking, and real estate development. Existing banks can extend 
insurance and investment activity using their subsidiaries.  
The GLBA is the most sweeping deregulation of the U.S. financial services 
industry in the last century. To comprehend the impact, one should look at the major 
change brought in by the major provisions. Since the passage of law, a total of 591 FHC 
were created (as of November 30, 2001). The FHC is the centerpiece of the GLBA. Once 
a financial firm obtains the FHC designation, it can house a complete family of financial 
activities. The Glass-Steagall Act is said to have limited the financial institutions’ ability 
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to pursue economies of scope1, while it is argued that GLBA has created opportunities for 
domestic as well as international financial intermediaries. 
1.1 History of Regulation in the US Financial Services Industry from 
Glass-Steagall to Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Thousands of banks failed in the years (1930-1933) following the stock market 
crash of 1929; as a result, it seems natural to make a connection between bank runs and 
bank involvement in the securities business. The Glass-Steagall Act was enacted to 
protect consumers and the economy from a conflict of interest of banking conglomerates 
in the security business. It created a highly regimented financial industry, in which 
commercial banks were limited to lending and deposit gathering. Thrifts were mortgage 
lenders, investment banks served as underwriters and brokers of both stock and bonds, 
and insurance firms were providers of actuarial products. Congress left the framework to 
encourage the state prohibitions on branch banking. It also established the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and raised minimum capital requirements for 
national banks. The Bank Holding Company Act (BHC) of 1956, on the other hand, 
prohibited banking firms from non-banking activities; as such, it closed bank 
involvement in the insurance business. 
At the state level, the deregulation of depression era laws started in Maine when it 
permitted out of state branching. At the national level, deregulation began in 1980 when 
Congress allowed banks to offer competitive interest rates on deposits. The Garn-St. 
Germain Act of 1982 allowed banks to enter cross state boundaries to acquire troubled 
banks. In 1983, the Federal Reserve allowed Bank Holding Companies (BHC) to acquire 
                     
1 Benston 1996, and Rajan 1996 
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discount security brokers. Ultimately, in 1987, the Federal Reserve allowed BHCs to 
underwrite certain ‘bank ineligible’ securities through the Section 20 investment 
subsidiary with a cap on the revenue from ‘ineligible’ activities to be 5%. The Federal 
Reserve increased the revenue limit from ‘ineligible’ activities twice, once in 1989 (to 
10%) and the last time in 1997 (to 25%). Due to the restriction on revenue, only the 
largest of the banks (only 40) had a full line of investment banking. The 1994 Riegle-
Neale Banking and Branching Efficiency Act removed constraints on bank holding 
company acquisitions across state lines, and also permitted banks to branch interstate if 
permitted by state law. 
Other federal authorities also allowed banks to get involved in securities services. 
For example, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) in 1996 allowed 
subsidiaries of national banks to offer a wider range of securities activities under some 
restrictions. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in 1984 ruled that non-
member banks are not subject to Glass-Steagall restrictions, and in 1987 it further 
amended the previous ruling by eliminating the operational separation between banks and 
their subsidiaries. The present effort of financial modernization began in 1995 when 
Representative Jim Leach became the chair of the House Banking Committee.  Leach 
first introduced the financial services modernization bill in Congress. The last attempt to 
repeal the Glass-Steagall was in 1998 when the bill was blocked on the Community 
Reinvestment Act (CRA) provision.  
1.2 GLBA and the Domestic Financial Services Industry 
The centerpiece created by the GLB is the Financial Holding Company (FHC). 
BHCs and foreign banks that meet certain criteria can become a FHC.  All depository 
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institutions must be well managed and well capitalized to become a FHC. If the FHC or 
foreign bank fails to meet any such standards after they became FHC, they have 180 days 
to correct it or the Federal Reserve (FED) may order the company to divest or terminate 
its financial activities or depository subsidiaries. No declaration to become FHC is 
effective under the GLBA unless each of its depository subsidiaries has at least a 
satisfactory or better rating under the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA).  If any of the 
FHC’s depository subsidiaries falls short of a satisfactory CRA rating, the FED may ask 
the company not to acquire any other company or get involved in any additional financial 
activity. The act authorizes the FHCs to engage in a wider range of activity under the 
extended power granted by the GLBA. These activities may be financial in nature like 
securities underwriting and dealing, insurance agency and underwriting activities, and 
merchant banking activities. The FED may also allow additional activities after 
consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury (it may be non-financial activity 
complementary to financial activity as long as it does not pose substantial risk to the 
depository institute). The FHC does not need prior permission from the FED to acquire a 
financial company, but it has to notify the FED within 30 days of doing such. 
The GLBA authorizes extended powers to banks. Well-capitalized banks can 
underwrite and deal in municipal revenue bonds. Financial subsidiaries of a national bank 
may engage in activities that are not permitted of national banks. However, a financial 
subsidiary of the national bank may not engage as a principal in underwriting insurance, 
providing or issuing annuities, nor is it allowed to engage in real estate development or 
investment, merchant banking or complementary activities that are allowed to affiliates 
of the FHC. Under the new law national banks may continue to engage in insurance 
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activities from any region with a population of five thousand or less. National banks are 
also required to have prior OCC permission to conduct activities through the financial 
subsidiary. State member banks can own or control a subsidiary engaging in all the 
activities allowed to the financial subsidiary of a national bank conditional on compliance 
with the same regulations as national banks. State banks may also engage as principals in 
activities not allowed to national banks conditional on the approval of the FDIC.   
 
Umbrella Supervisor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
               
 
 
Activities Supervisors 
FED 
Banking 
Activities 
Securities 
Activity Insurance Activity 
FHC 
FDIC, FED & OCC 
(Primary Bank 
Regulators. 
Securities Exchange 
Commission CFTC 
State Insurance 
Commissioners 
 
Fig 1: Supervisory Structure of FHCs under GLBA. 
 
The FED is going to serve as the overall supervisor of the FHCs and traditional 
regulators will oversee their business activities (banking, investment and insurance). The 
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act contains several new regulations concerning the privacy of customer financial 
information. The GLBA requires the financial institution to provide the potential 
customer with their policies and practices regarding the collection and disclosure of non-
public personal information to their affiliates and third parties. They are also required to 
update the customers regarding their policy at least annually. The act prohibits the 
disclosure of non-public private information to a non-affiliated third party without the 
approval of the customer and allows the customer to opt out from any such agreement. 
Financial institutions are generally prohibited under the law from disclosing non-public 
private consumer information to third party marketing programs, including telemarketing 
and direct mail programs.  
Under the act, any insured depository institution with $250 million or more in 
aggregate assets would be subject to a routine CRA examination. An institution will be 
examined for compliance with the CRA once every 5 years if it is given an ‘outstanding’ 
rating in the most recent CRA examination and once every four years if it is given a 
‘satisfactory’ rating. Any institution that comes under the jurisdiction of the CRA must 
submit a report to the federal agency concerning the use of CRA related money and 
resources during the previous year. 
1.3 GLBA and Foreign Financial Institutions 
Under GLBA, international banks can engage in commercial banking, merchant 
banking and insurance in ways consistent with their business strategies. If the 
international bank becomes a Financial Holding Company (FHC) there is no limit to the 
revenue generated by its insurance activity, merchant banking activity or investment 
banking activity. To qualify for the FHC it must notify the Federal Reserve about the 
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activities in which it will engage and make certain required certifications to it. In order to 
become a FHC, its depository institution must be well capitalized and well managed and 
no insured institutions within the FHC can have less than satisfactory rating in 
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA).  
International banks have to decide whether they should keep its current structure 
and continue to engage in current activities or engage in other and newer activities now 
permitted under the new regulation. If the international banks engage in the traditional 
commercial banking in US via a branch or agency it may still do so without changing the 
structure. But if the US branch or agency engages in certain securities, merchant banking 
or investment banking activities in the US, the operation has to be ceased unless they are 
grandfathered2. Under the new regulation, the activity and not the entity determines the 
primary supervisory authority.  
Most international banks that were engaged in significant insurance activities did 
so through a domestic bank or an insurance subsidiary of a domestic bank. Now the 
international banks have to operate via an existing licensed insurance subsidiary or 
establish new subsidiary and obtain license from state insurance department where it 
wants to sell the insurance to take full advantage of the opportunity provided by the new 
regulation. 
Most of the international banks carry out their investment or merchant banking 
activities in US through Section 20 investment subsidiary. These banks can continue to 
engage in these activities so long as they are grandfathered, but they can’t engage in new 
activities. Some of the international banks in the US engage in investment banking 
                     
2 Grandfathered means the bank may continue to engage in the activity because it did so before the 
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through domestic banks and trust companies. These operations have to be terminated as 
the new law requires the international bank to engage in these activities through a US 
registered broker dealer. 
In order to engage in any activity in US, an international bank has to be well 
capitalized and well managed by the standards set by FED. The Federal Reserve will 
review the worldwide operation of international banks to determine whether they can 
engage in commercial banking or any other activities in the US at all.  
1.4 Literature Review 
1.4.1 Literature on the impact of GLBA on domestic Financial Institutions 
Hendershott, Lee, and Tompkins (2002) investigate the market response of the 
GLBA on the three major industries. While they did not find any market response for the 
commercial banks, they did however find a significantly positive wealth effect for the 
insurance and the brokerage industries only on one event. They argue that loopholes in 
the laws have long allowed banks to have a “fairly substantial presence in other sectors” 
as a reason to why there is no wealth effect for the commercial banks. For all 3 industries 
they find that not only does firm size matter but also that for commercial banks 
profitability can explain the cross-sectional variation in return. Similarly, Carow and 
Heron (2002) find that while brokerage firms and insurance companies benefit from the 
GLBA, banks do not. They also find negative returns for foreign banks, thrifts, and 
finance companies; larger non-depository firms have higher returns. Akhigbe and Whyte 
(2001), on the other hand, find that all three industries benefit from the provisions of 
GLBA and that larger and well-capitalized banks benefit more from this law. Brokerage 
                                                             
restrictions became law. New activities are not covered by the grandfather provision. 
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firms benefit regardless of size, but the gains are inversely related to capital position. 
Insurance companies benefit regardless of size and capitalization. Barth, Brumbaugh, and 
Wilcox (2000) argue that GLBA is just ratifying the "Status Quo” rather than being 
revolutionary, and that this law goes more in favor of the big banks and big financial 
institutions. 
1.4.2 Literature on studies investigating major deregulations before GLBA 
There are several studies that look at the major deregulations leading up to the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. Cornett, Ors and Tehranian (2002) examine the performance 
of commercial banks around the establishment of a Section 20 subsidiary. They find that 
Section 20 activities undertaken by commercial banks result in increased industry-
adjusted operating cash flow return on assets, due mainly to revenues from non-
commercial banking activities. The initial alliances of commercial banks and investment 
banks via the establishment of Section 20 subsidiaries have been beneficial to 
commercial bank performance and allowed commercial banks to diversify their activities 
with increased performance relative to the risk being undertaken. Cyree (2000) also finds 
similar results for increased investment banking powers for commercial banks, when the 
revenue limit for investment subsidiaries increased from 10% to 25%. He also finds that 
the larger banks benefit more than smaller banks. Ely and Robinson (1998) analyze the 
wealth effect on banking and security firms in the event of an increase in the revenue 
limit on bank security subsidiaries from 10% to 25%. They tried to predict the impact of 
the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act would have on these two industries. They find that 
the expansion has a positive wealth effect around the announcement for most of the 
individual investment banks. This study also finds that this expansion has a positive 
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wealth effect for the banks, especially for the firms that already have a security 
subsidiary. Boyd, Graham, and Hewitt (1993) investigate the effect of bank holding 
company (BHC) mergers with non-bank financial firms using simulated data and find 
that BHC mergers with life and property/casualty insurance companies reduced risk. 
Irrespective of using market or accounting data they reach the same conclusion. Gande, 
Puri, and Saunders (1999) examine the competitive effects of commercial bank entry into 
the corporate debt underwriting market. They find that the underwriting spread and ex-
ante yields have declined significantly with bank entry. The effect is strongest among the 
low-rated smaller debt issues of which banks have underwritten a relatively greater share. 
They show that bank entry decreased market concentrations. Puri (1996) examines the 
question: ‘When commercial banks make loans to firms and also underwrite securities, 
does this hamper or enhances their role as certifiers of firm value?’ She finds that 
investors are willing to pay higher prices for securities underwritten by banks rather than 
investment houses. 
1.4.3 Literature on Size, Profitability and Diversification Benefits 
Size is important for exploiting merger opportunities.  For example, Hawawini, 
and Swary (1990) find that acquirers are significantly larger than targets.  Calem (1994) 
finds that after bank holding company branching reforms, large banks acquired small 
banks. In addition, Cheng, Gup, and Wall (1989), and Palia (1993) find that larger 
acquiring firms add more to target bank value.   
There is evidence that poorly performing firms become potential targets for 
mergers. BarNiv and Hathorn (1997) find that timely mergers in the insurance industry 
serve as an alternative to insolvency in 20% to 46% of the mergers considered in their 
 11 
study. Similarly Whiting (1997) argues that banking organizations with higher ROEs 
(Return on Equity) or ROAs (Return on Asset) are more likely to purchase insurers that 
have lower ROE or ROA. Swary (1986) shows that target banks with higher capital ratios 
than their bidder banks have greater abnormal returns. Thus, it seems that abolishing 
cross-industry merger barriers will create wealth effects for poorly performing firms. 
The GLBA may create diversification benefits for the financial services industry 
by removing merger barriers.  Wall, Reichert and Mohanty (1993) investigate whether 
combinations of bank and non-bank firms can reduce a banking organizations’ operating 
risk. They conclude that the best opportunity for diversification gains is for banks to 
merge with firms engaged in some aspects of the insurance industry.  Boyd, Graham and 
Hewitt (1993), using simulated data, find that bank holding company (BHC) mergers 
with life and property/casualty insurance companies reduce risk.   
1.4.4 Literature on international spillover effects 
There is evidence in the literature of international spill over effects that predict 
that the impact of GLBA will not be limited to the U.S. financial services industry. 
Bruner and Simms (1987) examine the reaction of the U.S. banks to the Mexico’s loan 
crisis find that the U.S. banks reacts negatively to the news. Musumerci and Sinkey 
(1990) find that Brazil’s announcement of a debt moratorium in 1987 had negative 
impact on the U.S. money center banks. Madura, Whyte and McDaniel (1991) find that 
Citicorp’s announcement of significant increase in loan-loss reserve in 1987 had a 
significant negative impact on British banks. In all of the above cases the exposure of 
banks to the less developed countries are identified as the reason for the negative 
reactions. 
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1.4.5 Cross boarder consolidation and risk expected return tradeoffs 
The available empirical research suggests that at least some types of cross-
boarder consolidation can improve the risk-expected return tradeoffs. The literature on 
commercial banks in the U.S. generally find that larger, more geographically diversified 
institutions tend to have better risk expected return tradeoffs (e.g. Macllister and 
McManus (1993), Hughes, Lang, Mester, and Moon (1996, 1999), Hughes and Mester 
(1998) and Demsetz and Strahan (1997)), while Cummins and Weiss (2000) find that 
international diversification can improve risk expected return tradeoff and profit 
efficiency for insurance industry. 
1.4.6 Literature on the determinants of foreign bank presence, activity and growth  
Grosse and Goldberg (1991) investigate the foreign banking activity in the United 
States by their country of origin. Their results show that foreign investment (FDI and 
foreign portfolio investment) into United States, bilateral trade, size of each country’s 
banking sector (demand deposit and Time deposit) are positively correlated with that 
country’s bank presence in the U.S. Hultman and McGee (1989) find that foreign 
presence of US bank subsidiaries are directly related to FDI, exchange rate, and inversely 
related to P/E ratios. They find that the growth of foreign bank branches and agencies in 
the U.S. is directly related to FDI, exchange rate and the passage of International 
Banking Act (IBA) of 1978. Goldberg and Saunders (1981) show that important 
determinants in foreign banks’ growth in the US are size of interest differentials between 
U.S. and foreign deposits and loan, the falling P/E ratio for US bank stocks, increased 
size of FDI, the persistent depreciation in the dollar and the expectation that the IBA of 
1978 would have a restrictive affect on foreign bank activity in the US. Seth et al. (1998) 
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show that one of the major determinants of financial institutions growth abroad has been 
the parallel growth of foreign direct investment and foreign trade by globally oriented 
multinational corporations from the institution’s home country.   
1.5 Methodology 
In this paper we use both market return and balance sheet information of banks to 
test the above hypotheses. The stock price reaction of regulatory changes is estimated 
using the Seemingly Unrelated Regression Model of Zellner (1962). A similar method is 
used in other studies3.  
We use an extension of the standard market model. Lag values of the market 
index are used in our model to address the possible nonsynchronous trading effect. We 
use dummy variables to identify the major events that led to the passage of the GLBA. 
The dummy variable is equal to 1 over the event window and zero otherwise. The 
coefficient estimate associated with the dummy variable measures the impact of the event 
on the portfolio return. We employ the three factors model used in the banking literature4.  
Schwert (1981) argues that individual asset returns of firms in the same industry 
measured over a common time period are contemporaneously correlated because the 
firms will react similarly to any unanticipated event. So, in events such as regulatory 
changes, the residuals will not be ‘iid’ (identically and independently distributed). If 
there is a contemporaneous correlation among the disturbances across equations but not 
correlated over time, the SUR (Seemingly Unrelated Regression) model estimates will be 
                     
3 Schipper and Thompson (1983), Binder (1985a,b, and 1988), Rose (1985), Smith, Bradley and Jarrell 
(1986), Cornett and Tehranian (1989,1990), Hendershott, Lee and Tompkins (2000). 
4 Wetmore and Brick (1994) and Choi, Elyasiani and Kopecky (1992) 
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more efficient then the OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) estimates. Thus, we use SUR to 
estimate the following models. 
1.5.1 Overall Impact of The Regulation 
We estimate the following model in order to test for the winners and losers in the 
banking industry:  
     (1) 1 2 2 1 3 4 2 5 1
6
* *
*
it i i i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t it
R D Rm Rm Rm Rm D Rm D
Rm D Rf Rr DG e
α α β β β β β
β δ κ γ
− − − −′= + + + + + +
+ + + + +
 
Here, Rit = return on portfolio i (=1,2,3) on day t (T=daily observations from 
January 1998 to December 2000). Rmt = Return on CRSP value weighted index at time t. 
αi = the intercept coefficient for portfolio i. βi1-βi3 = market risk coefficient for portfolio i. 
βi4-βi6 = measures the change in the exposure to systematic risk. δi = foreign exchange 
risk coefficient for portfolio i. κi = the interest rate risk coefficient for portfolio i. Dt = 
dummy variable which is equal to 1 in every event window and zero otherwise. eit = the 
random disturbances. D is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 after the enactment of the 
regulation (after 11/21/99). DG is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 over every event 
window and zero otherwise. γi captures the average impact of the regulation on portfolio 
i. 
1.5.2 Impact of Individual Events on Portfolios 
In order to test for hypotheses surrounding the events we estimate the following 
model: 
1 2 2 1 3 4 2 5 1
6
1
* *
*
it i i i t i t i t i t i t
K
i t i t i t ik kt it
k
R D Rm Rm Rm Rm D Rm D
Rm D Rf Rr D e
α α β β β β β
β δ κ γ
− − − −
=
′= + + + + + +
+ + + + ∑ +      (2)  
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Here, Dkt is the dummy variable which is equal to one on event window k and 
zero otherwise, so γik captures the average impact of kth announcement on portfolio i. 
Following Green (1997), the above model in matrix form can be written as: 
1 1
1 2
0 ... ... 0
0 ... ... 0
... ...... ... ... ... ...
... ...... ... ... ... ...
0 0 ... ... mm
R eX
R eX
eXR
β
                    =                    
 
 

 
+
]
T
T

     (3) 
Here each element of matrix or vector has T observations and are the 
regressors i.e. α, αD, Rm
X
t-2, Rmt-1, Rmt, Rmt-2*D, Rmt-1*D, Rmt*D, Rft, Rrt, Dkt. Let  
[ 1 2 ... ... me e eε ′ ′ ′=           (4) 
The assumption regarding the error term is: 
E[ε] =0 
E[εε’] =0 
E[eitejs’] =σij; if t=s and 0 otherwise. 
The disturbance formulation is therefore, 
E[etej’] =σijIT 
[ ]
11 12 1
21 22 2
1 2
...
... ...
... ... ... ... ...
... ... ... ... ...
... ...
T T m
T T m
m T m T mm T
I I I
I I I
E V
I I I
σ σ σ
σ σ σ
εε
σ σ σ
   ′ = =     
    (5)  
Now Let, 
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      (6) 
Substituting Σ in equation 5 we get, 
V I= Σ⊗  
1 1V − −= Σ ⊗          (7) 
So the GLS (Generalized Least Squares) estimator of SUR is, 
1 1 1 1 1 1ˆ [ ] [ ( ) ] (X V X X V R X I X X I Rβ − − − − − −′ ′ ′ ′= = Σ ⊗ Σ ⊗    (8) 
1.5.3 Specification test 
We present a simple specification test to verify our extended model. Specification 
tests in this case involve testing for correlation across portfolios; this is the same as 
testing the hypothesis that the off-diagonal elements of S (variance-covariance matrix) 
are zero. There are two such specification tests in the literature: the Likelihood Ratio 
(LR) test and the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test. The statistics in both cases are χ2 
distributed. Berndt and Savin (1977) demonstrate that the following inequality holds:  
LM ≤ LR          
between these statistics. Since we have the same asymptotic distribution, the LM 
test rejects the null hypothesis less often than the LR test. We will use the LR test to 
check for the diagonality of the variance-covariance matrix. Excluding the diagonal 
elements, there are 1/2m∗(m-1) unknown parameters in S and these can be arranged in 
vector θ. The null hypothesis that we will test is: 
H:θ = 0           
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This test is based on the following statistics 
|]ˆ|logˆlog[ 2
1
∑−∑=
− i
m
i
LR T σλ
σˆ Teii /′
       (9)
 where 2i  is e from the individual least squares regressions and is the 
maximum likelihood estimator S. This statistic has a limiting χ
∑ˆ
2 distribution with 
1/2m∗(m-1) degrees of freedom under the null hypothesis. 
1.6 Data Preparation and Event Selection 
1.6.1 Firm Selection 
For the first two chapters I use the SIC classification from COMPUSTAT 
(Research Insight) to identify the commercial banks (SIC 6021 and 6022) and insurance 
companies (Life insurance. (SIC 6311), Property/Casualty insurance (SIC 6331), Other 
types of insurance (SIC 6321, 6351 6361) to create our portfolios. The return information 
for this study comes from the CRSP tape, while the balance sheet information comes 
from COMPUSTAT. We require these firms to have no missing trading data for at least 3 
years, over the period January 1998 to December 2000. In order to match firms from 
COMPUSTAT and CRSP we omitted all firms with exchange codes 4 to 10, since CRSP 
only has return information of firms traded either on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ. 
We required the firms to have balance sheet information from 1997 to 1999. We use 
return information of the sample firms from January 1998 to December 2000 to estimate 
each of our models. 
For the third paper I use daily common stock return data over a period from 
January 1998 to December 2000. Daily stock return and the balance sheet information for 
large banks from Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Spain, 
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Switzerland, and the UK are obtained from DataStream database and BankScope 
database. The total sample consists of 215 international banks and 45 large U.S. banks 
(over 10 billion dollar total asset in 1998). Return information for the U.S. companies are 
obtained form CRSP database.  
For the fourth paper I use daily common stock return data over a period from 
January 1998 to December 2000. Daily stock return and balance sheet information for 
major insurance companies from Austria, Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Spain, Switzerland, and the UK are obtained from Datastream database. The 
total sample consists of 83 foreign insurance companies and 31 major U.S. insurance 
firms.  Return information for the U.S. companies are obtained form CRSP database.  
1.6.2 Macro Financial Variables 
Data for the two macro-economic variables used in our study is obtained from the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System5. For foreign exchange we used the 
Major Country Index6 from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The 
return is calculated using the following formula7: 
1
1
t t
t
t
F FRf
F
−
−
−=          (10) 
                     
5 All the information is available online from http://www.federalreserve.gov 
 
6 The major currencies index is a weighted average of the foreign exchange values of the U.S. dollar 
against a subset of currencies in the broad index that circulate widely outside the country of issue. The 
weights are derived from those in the broad index. 
 
7 Same as that used by Wetmore and Brick (1994). 
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Here, Ft is the value of the Major Country Index at time t. To be consistent with 
the literature,8 we use the one-year T-bill rate as a proxy for the interest rate. Interest rate 
returns are computed using the following formula9: 
1
1
t t
t
t
R RRr
R
−
−
−=                      (11) 
Here, Rt is the interest rate on one year t-bill at time t. Actual returns are used 
because there is no difference in the results regardless of whether interest rates are 
anticipated10; also, we do not orthogonalize the indices11.  
1.6.3 Selected Events and Expected Industry Reaction to the Events 
We analyze all the major events in the passage of GLBA. We include in our 
analysis events that have “material change” as defined by Schipper and Thompson 
(1983). In total there are 13 different events that we investigate between November 1998 
and November 1999. We identify these events from the Wall Street Journal and Lexis-
Nexis wire service. Table 1 specifies these events and event dates.  
The first event is news of Senator Alfonse D’Amoto’s loss of his New York re-
election on November 3, 1998 and the news of Senator Gramm’s succession to Senate 
Banking Committee chair on November 4, 1998. This event is important for the banking 
industry because Senator Gramm favored the banking industry throughout the 1998 
session, when the bill was discussed in the Senate. It is clear that if he becomes the chair 
                     
8 Kane and Unal (1998), Flannery and James (1984), and Wetmore and Brick (1994). 
9 Same as that used by Wetmore and Brick (1994). 
10 Flannery and James (1984). 
11 Giliberto (1985) argues that orthogonalizing the indices results in biased estimators. Moreover not 
apparent which index is the driving index and which is the driven one., Kane and Unal (1998) argue that it 
is  
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of the Senate Banking Committee any proposed act is likely to go more in favor of the 
banking industry. 
Table 1: Time line of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. 
Note: The first column ‘Date’ is the event date. If the event occurred after the trading closed for a day then 
that the next trading day is the event date. Event Window is defined as Event Date, -1 day and +1 day. The 
second column 'Event' describes the main event.  
Date Event 
11/4/98 
 
 
1/8/99 
 
2/17/99 
 
4/12/99 
 
4/28/99 
 
 
5/4/99 
 
05/06/99 – 
Midnight 
 
7/1/99 
 
10/15/99 
 
10/22/99 
 
11/02/99 
 
 
11/4/99 
 
11/12/99 
1. (i) Senator Alfonse D’Amato lost his re-election bid (11/03/98 –night). (ii) Senator 
Gramm to take over as a chair of Senate Banking Committee. (11/04/98). 
 
2. Financial Services Reform Bill is reintroduced in Congress. 
 
3. Draft bill was unveiled in the Senate. 
 
4. Senator Gramm meets with Senate Minority leader to work on the bill. 
 
5. Senate Banking Committee formally files the Financial Services Modernization Act in the 
Senate. 
 
6. Clinton raises the privacy issue to be included in the bill. 
 
7. Senate passes S. 900. Senate version of the Bill is passed. 
 
 
8. House version of the bill was passed. 
 
9. Federal Reserve and Treasury announce agreement on the regulation. 
 
10. Gramm makes deal with White House on CRA. 
 
11. Joint House Conference report signed by the majority of the conferees, clearing the way 
for the votes in both the House and the Senate. 
 
12. Senate passes the bill (90-8) and House passes the bill (362-57). 
 
13. President Clinton signs the bill into law. 
 
As a result we expect the banking industry to have a positive price reaction to this 
news. The Financial Services Reform Bill is introduced in congress on January 8, 1999; 
this is our second event. A similar bill has been blocked in the Senate over the 
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) issue; we expect a moderate reaction to this event. 
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The third event on our list is the unveiling of the draft bill in the Senate on February 17, 
1999. At this time the FED and Treasury are divided between who should have ultimate 
control over the banking industry (OCC or FED) and what should be the structure under 
which banks should diversify; i.e., should it be a Bank Holding Company (BHC) 
structure or should the banks diversify using subsidiaries. After three days of hearings, 
most of the legislators are in favor of giving overall control to the FED and BHC 
structure (this became known as the FED’s view of modernization). This structure is 
more in favor of the banking industry because they have already been successful in the 
BHC structure, so we expect a positive reaction for the banking industry. The insurance 
industry may have a positive reaction to this announcement because it opens the 
opportunity for bank-insurance mergers that would not have been available if the other 
structure of bank operation diversification were accepted. The fourth major event is the 
news of Senator Gramm’s meeting with the Senate minority leader on April 4, 1999. 
Senator Gramm and Senator Sarbanes (a ranking member of Senate Banking Committee) 
have a difference in opinion over the CRA issue. This event may have a positive impact 
on banking industry. On April 28, 1999, the Senate Banking Committee formally files the 
Financial Services Modernization Act in the Senate. We expect moderate reaction for 
banking industry on this event, because this version of the bill favors banks. On May 4, 
1999, President Clinton suggests that the privacy protection provision for consumers 
should be included in the bill. The basic principal of his proposal is that people should 
have the right to decide whether information about them, held by banks, insurance firms 
or securities companies, should be shared or sold. We expect this event to have a 
negative impact on all the sectors because; if this provision is included into the bill, then 
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it will restrict the scope economies for all sectors. The seventh event is the Senate passing 
the S. 900 (Senate version of the bill) on May 6, 1999. This version includes the privacy 
provision. This bill has been discussed in the Senate for a long time, so there are no 
surprises in this bill; we expect moderate or no reaction on this event. The next major 
event (eighth event) is the passing of the House version of the bill on July 1, 1999. This 
bill may create negative reactions because the consumer privacy protection provision 
included in this bill is even stronger than that of the Senate version of the bill. The FED 
and Treasury agree upon the structure of regulation on October 15, 1999. Since the 
negotiations between them have been going on for some time before this announcement, 
we expect moderate or no reaction to this announcement. On October 22, 1999, Senate 
Banking Committee Chair Senator Gramm agrees with the White House, that one version 
of the CRA that will be included in the bill. The version of CRA provision that is 
included in the bill is more relaxed than the 1977 version of the bill; now banks will be 
subject to CRA scrutiny once every four years instead of 18 months to three years. So we 
expect positive moderate or no reaction on the part of banks. But we expect a 
significantly positive reaction from insurance and securities firms because this 
announcement removes major obstacles to the passage of the Financial Services 
Modernization Act. A Joint House conference report signed by the majority of the 
members on November 2, 1999 is our eleventh event. We expect moderate or no reaction 
on this event across the industry. On November 4, 1999, the Senate and the House passed 
the Financial Services Modernization bill. All the provisions that go into this bill are 
already known so it may not have any reaction. The final event that we analyze is the 
occasion of the President’s signature of the bill on November 12, 1999. We expect major 
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gains in stock price for the whole industry on this event, mainly because this law has 
been in limbo for a long time;12 finally passing of this overdue bill is great news for the 
whole industry. 
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 Chapter II  
 The Wealth and Risk Effects of Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
(GLBA) on the U.S. Banking Industry 
 
2.1 Abstract 
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) of 1999 marks the end of Depression era 
regulations like the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 and Bank Holding Company Act of 1956. 
These acts have restricted banks from securities and insurance underwriting business. 
This paper examines the impact of the GLBA on the banking industry. We find that the 
banking industry has a welfare gain from this law. We investigate two different 
categorizations of the banking industry. We find that Money Center banks followed by 
the Super Regional banks benefited most from this deregulation. On the other hand, 
banks that had Section 20 investments subsidiaries gained more than other banks in the 
second category.  The results also show that the exposure to systematic risk for different 
categories of banks decreased after the passage of this law, which implies that the GLBA 
is fairly successful in containing the risk that accompanied the act and also created 
diversification opportunities. For Money Center banks, Super Regional Banks, banks 
with a section 20 subsidiary and banks with a new financial subsidiary, a shift in the 
exposure to systematic risk can explain the overall cross sectional variation in return 
from the deregulation. In both categorizations we find that larger banks gained more, 
while the overall explanatory power of profitability is not conclusive.
  
 28 
2.2  Introduction 
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) of 1999 (also known as Financial Services 
Modernization Act) starts a new era for the financial services industry in the U.S.A. This 
law marks the end of depression era laws: Glass-Steagall (1933) and Bank Holding 
Company Act (1956). The Glass-Steagall Act separated commercial banks and 
investment banks. The Bank Holding Company Act separated commercial banks from 
insurance underwriting. The modernization of the US financial services industry began in 
1983 when the Federal Reserve allowed Bank Holding Companies (BHC) to acquire 
discount security brokers. The GLBA is the final piece of legislation that repealed 
depression era laws and allows one line of business to enter or merge with another line of 
business.  
What will be the impact of the law on the banking industry? Some argue that the 
impact will be phenomenal1; others argue it will only be marginal2. However, if there is 
any change in expected economic profit it should immediately be reflected in the stock 
price of firms in that industry3. Our focus in this study is the impact of the GLBA on the 
Banking Industry. Hogan (2001) argues that this law is “in its essence banking industry 
legislation.” Akhigbe and Whyte (2001) find that the announcements that lead to the 
passage of the GLBA create positive wealth effects for the banking industry. Herdershott, 
Lee and Tompkins (2000), on the other hand, find no significant impact on the banking 
industry. Both, however, find that larger banks gain more than smaller ones.  
                     
1 John D. Hogan, 2001. 
2 Barth, Brumbaugh and Wilcox, 2000. 
3 Fama and MacBeth (1973). 
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The GLBA allows banks, brokerage and the insurance companies to merge. In 
addition, newly created Financial Holding Companies (FHC) may engage in a wide range 
of activities, including insurance underwriting, securities activity, merchant banking, and 
real state development. Banks can extend insurance and securities activity using a new 
type of subsidiary known as a Financial Subsidiary (FS). We examine the impact of this 
landmark legislation on the banking industry. Specifically we evaluate empirically: a. 
how the market values of the banking industry change at the time of various 
announcements during the passage of the GLBA; b. whether the bank’s expertise and 
prior access to securities activities through Section 20 subsidiaries give this industry an 
edge in competition in a more integrated financial services industry; c. how the risk 
behavior of the banking industry change in response to the passage of the GLBA; d. what 
important characteristics of the banking industry cause increases in their market values 
resulting from the passage of the GLBA; e. whether the “too big to fail” doctrine applies 
to the banking industry due to the passage of the GLBA. 
Several studies have investigated the GLBA. Barth, Brumbaugh and Wilcox 
(2000) investigate the major provisions of the act. They argue that the act is ratifying the 
"Status-Quo”4 rather than being revolutionary, and that this act favors big banks (‘broad 
banking companies’). Akhigbe and Whyte (2001) examine the events leading up to and 
the passage of the Financial Services Modernization Act on the stock returns of banks, 
brokerage firms, and insurance companies. They find that the impact is positive for all 
institutions. Bank gains are positively related to size and capitalization. Brokerage firms 
and insurance companies gain regardless of their size. Insurance firms gain regardless of 
                     
4 They said, "ratifying and extending changes that had already being made, rather than as revolutionary". 
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their capital position, but brokerage firms’ gains are inversely related to their capital 
position. Carow and Heron (2002), on the other hand, find that investment and insurance 
companies benefit from the GLBA and that banks do not benefit. They also find negative 
returns for foreign banks, thrifts and finance companies. Larger non-depository firms 
have higher returns from this law. 
There are several studies that look at the major deregulations leading up to the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. Cornett, Ors and Tehranian (2002) examine the performance 
of commercial banks around the establishment of a Section 20 subsidiary. They find that 
Section 20 activities undertaken by commercial banks result in increased industry-
adjusted operating cash flow return on assets, due mainly to revenues from non-
commercial banking activities. The initial alliances of commercial banks and investment 
banks via the establishment of Section 20 subsidiaries have been beneficial to 
commercial bank performance, and allowed commercial banks to diversify their activities 
with increased performance relative to the risk being undertaken. Cyree (2000) also finds 
similar results for increased investment banking powers for commercial banks, when the 
revenue limit for investment subsidiaries increased from 10% to 25%. He also finds that 
the larger banks benefit more than smaller banks. Ely and Robinson (1998) analyze the 
wealth effect on banking and security firms in the event of an increase in the revenue 
limit on bank security subsidiaries from 10% to 25%. They tried to predict the impact the 
repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act would have on these two industries. They find that the 
expansion has a positive wealth effect around the announcement for most of the 
individual investment banks. This study also finds that this expansion has a positive 
wealth effect for the banks, especially for the firms that already have a security 
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subsidiary. Boyd, Graham and Hewitt (1993) investigate the effect of bank holding 
company (BHC) mergers with non-bank financial firms using simulated data and find 
that BHC mergers with life and property/casualty insurance companies reduced risk. 
Irrespective of using market or accounting data they reach the same conclusion. Gande, 
Puri and Saunders (1999) examine the competitive effects of commercial bank entry into 
the corporate debt underwriting market. They find that the underwriting spread and ex-
ante yields have declined significantly with bank entry. The effect is strongest among the 
low-rated smaller debt issues of which banks have underwritten a relatively greater share. 
They show that bank entry decreased market concentrations. Puri (1996) examines the 
question of when commercial banks make loans to firms and also underwrite securities, 
does this hamper or enhance their role as certifiers of firm value? She finds that investors 
are willing to pay higher prices for securities underwritten by banks rather than 
investment houses. 
Our study improves upon previous studies in a number of ways.  First, we 
examine the banking industry thoroughly as the GLBA is expected to impact the banking 
industry the most. Officially, the GLBA rule-making powers are split between the 
Federal Reserve (FED) and the Treasury, but the FED, the Treasury, and the Comptroller 
of the Currency (OCC) share general oversight duties. The tug of wars among the three 
regulatory authorities and the banking lobby has injected uncertainty into the financial 
services industry, the resolution of which may depend on protracted negotiations between 
regulators and Congress. The banking lobby, for example, frustrated by the conservative 
regulatory rulings, has tried to persuade Congress to reconsider the GLBA and enforce a 
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more liberal interpretation.5 We expect BHCs with Section 20 subsidiaries to experience 
increases in market value mainly due to the dominance of first-mover advantage effects, 
“too big to fail” guarantee effects, and possibly positive acquirer effects similar to those 
documented by Kane (2000). Indeed, Kane (2000) shows that giant U.S. banking 
organizations gain value from becoming larger. Our results show that banks with prior 
Section 20 subsidiaries that converted into a FHC benefited the most from the GLBA. 
Therefore, the banking industry in a way has internalized the potential uncertainty 
created by the regulatory dialectic by adjusting their organizational structure.  
Second, the GLBA is expected to benefit the financial services industry by 
promoting financial innovations, lowering capital costs and increasing international 
competitiveness. The real question is whether defacto deregulation has made the Glass-
Steagall Act effectively redundant or not. Those who argue that there will be no impact 
from the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act state that, prior to enactment of the GLBA, the 
financial services industry had discovered many ways to circumvent their barriers, and 
the impact of which has already been impounded in the stock prices. In addition, they 
argue that the anticipation of the GLBA may have initiated many developments, such as 
the merger between Citicorp and Travelers in April 1998, possibly signaling that 
regulators would allow similar types of mergers in the future. However, we argue that 
events leading to the passage of the GLBA should have significant impact on the banking 
industry. The GLBA provides more flexibility for cross-industry mergers than existed 
prior to its passage. Moreover, the twenty years battle of enacting this legislation hung in 
                     
5 Schmitt (2001); Gensler (2000); Meyer (2000); Leach (2000). 
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the balance until the very end, and its passage removed uncertainty regarding the 
regulatory framework that will govern the future evolution of the financial industry. 
Third, it has been argued that positive wealth effects accrue to banks that are 
believed to be “too big to fail”. The GLBA allows large banks to expand further to 
enhance their “too big too fail” guarantee. In order to examine differential impacts on 
different segments of the banking industry, we divide our sample into Money Center 
Banks, Super Regional Banks, and other banks. We also investigate firm specific 
characteristics to test whether bigger banks gain more on various events leading to the 
passage of the GLBA.  
Finally, consolidation that is expected to result from the repeal of the Glass-
Steagall Act may reduce the number of firms in the financial services industry, but at the 
same time, might create more competition for insurance and securities firms and threaten 
their future profitability. The regulatory concern is to what extent the GLBA might 
increase the risk of the U.S. financial industry. We argue that the banking industry 
reduces their risk by diversifying their activities in the securities and insurance business. 
We find that the passage of the GLBA reduces the systematic risk of the banking 
industry. This result is important for the regulator’s policy making and shareholders’ 
investment decisions. 
The rest of the study is organized as follows: the first section provides historical 
overview, describes the relevant parts of the law that might affect the banking industry in 
brief. Section two describes the major deregulations that came before the GLBA, the 
GLBA and introduces the major hypotheses. Section three describes the methodology; 
section four describes the data and lists the major events. Section five presents the 
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empirical results. Section six describes the cross-sectional analysis and the final section 
concludes. 
2.3 Law and Hypotheses 
2.3.1 The Law6  
The centerpiece created by the GLB is the Financial Holding Company (FHC). 
BHCs and foreign banks that meet certain criteria can become a FHC.  All depository 
institutions must be well managed and well capitalized to become a FHC. If the FHC or 
foreign bank fails to meet any such standards after they became FHC, they have 180 days 
to correct it or the Federal Reserve (FED) may order the company to divest or terminate 
its financial activities or depository subsidiaries. No declaration to become FHC is 
effective under the GLBA unless each of its depository subsidiaries has at least a 
satisfactory or better rating under the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA).  If any of the 
FHC’s depository subsidiaries falls short of a satisfactory CRA rating, the FED may ask 
the company not to acquire any other company or get involved in any additional financial 
activity. The act authorizes the FHCs to engage in a wider range of activity under the 
extended power granted by the GLBA. These activities may be financial in nature like 
securities underwriting and dealing, insurance agency and underwriting activities, and 
merchant banking activities. The FED may also allow additional activities after 
consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury (it may be non-financial activity 
complementary to financial activity as long as it does not pose substantial risk to the 
depository institute). The FHC does not need prior permission from the FED to acquire a 
financial company, but it has to notify the FED within 30 days of doing such.  
                     
6 Most of the information comes from ‘Overview of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley’ from the Federal Reserve 
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The GLBA authorizes extended powers to banks. Well-capitalized banks can 
underwrite and deal in municipal revenue bonds. Financial subsidiaries of a national bank 
may engage in activities that are not permitted of national banks. However, a financial 
subsidiary of the national bank may not engage as a principal in underwriting insurance, 
providing or issuing annuities, engaging in real estate development or investment, 
merchant banking or complementary activities that are allowed to affiliates of the FHC. 
Under the new law, national banks may continue to engage in insurance activities from a 
place with a population of five thousand or less. National banks are also required to have 
prior OCC permission to conduct activities through the financial subsidiary. State 
member banks can own or control a subsidiary engaging in all the activities allowed to 
the financial subsidiary of a national bank conditional on compliance with the same 
regulations as national banks. State banks may also engage as principals in activities not 
allowed to national banks conditional on the approval of the FDIC.   
The FED is going to serve as the overall supervisor of the FHCs and traditional 
regulators will oversee their business activities (banking, investment and insurance). The 
act contains several new regulations concerning the privacy of customer financial 
information. The GLBA requires the financial institution to provide the potential 
customer with their policies and practices regarding the collection and disclosure of non-
public personal information to their affiliates and third parties. They are also required to 
update the customers regarding their policy at least annually. The act prohibits the 
disclosure of non-public private information to a non-affiliated third party without the 
approval of the customer and affords the customer the option to opt out from any such 
                                                             
Banks of San Francisco. 
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agreement. Financial institutions are generally prohibited under the law from disclosing 
non-public private consumer information to third party marketing programs, including 
telemarketing and direct mail programs.  
Under the act, any insured depository institution with $250 million or more in 
aggregate assets would be subject to a routine CRA examination. An institution will be 
examined for compliance with the CRA once every 5 years if it is given an ‘outstanding’ 
rating in the most recent CRA examination and once every four years if it is given a 
‘satisfactory’ rating. Any institution that comes under the jurisdiction of the CRA must 
submit a report to the federal agency concerning the use of CRA related money and 
resources during the previous year.  
2.3.2 Hypotheses 
We formulate the following hypotheses regarding the impact of the GLBA on the 
Banking industry. 
Hypothesis 1: The Banking industry benefits from the GLBA. 
It is argued that regulations destroy value while deregulation creates value. 
Benston (1996) and Rajan (1996) have shown that the Glass-Steagall Act had limited 
financial institutions’ ability to pursue economies of scope, thereby destroying value. For 
banks, scope economies are the most likely source of profitability. For example, a bank 
can reuse information for which it has already paid a certain fixed cost across a range of 
financial services where the bank decides to extend their business. Banks can also use 
their existing technology, personnel and delivery channels to distribute securities and 
insurance products with their traditional activities at relatively low marginal cost. A part 
of these economies may come from overhead in administration, back office information 
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and information technologies over a wider base of financial services. On the other hand, 
Saunders and Smirlock (1987) note that bank customers provide a natural customer base 
for brokerage firms. Synergies may also arise, as many consumers may prefer to obtain 
all their financial services needs from a single firm rather than from several different 
firms, as Herring and Santomero (1990) argue. Studies7 have found that deregulations 
that allowed product line diversification contributed toward increased revenue and 
overall risk adjusted performance enhancement for banks. So, the GLBA opens window 
of opportunity for banks and should thereby benefit the industry. 
Hypothesis 2: Money Center Banks and Super Regional Banks gain more from 
the GLBA. 
Deregulation will certainly put banks into situations where they will have cheaper 
diversification opportunities. A broad banking firm may have lower profit variances 
compared to a bank with traditional banking operations. Broad banking firms like Money 
Center Banks and Super Regional Banks will be affected less when firms bypass banks 
and raise capital directly from the capital market, because any decline in lending activity 
will be offset by securities activity. Cyree (2000) shows that large banks are more 
benefited than smaller banks to deregulations that eased bank involvement in the 
securities business. Puri (1996), in addition, finds that investors are willing to pay higher 
prices for securities underwritten by banks rather than investment houses. Thus, banks 
certainly have an edge in the securities business and big banks are the best positioned to 
harness the benefit.  
                     
7 Cornett, Ors and Tehranian (2002), Cyree (2000). 
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On the other hand, 50% to 65% (depending on the method of calculation) of all 
banking organizations in the U.S.A. sell insurance products of one kind or another8. 
Money Center Banks and Super Regional Banks now have the opportunity to enter the 
insurance underwriting business more aggressively than before, as the GLBA will allow 
banks to merge with or acquire insurance businesses. Only with these banks we expect to 
see a full line of insurance operations. Akhigbe and Whyte (2001) similarly argue that 
“….benefits are more likely to accrue to large, Money Center Banks that are better 
positioned to capitalize on the new opportunities.”  
Hypothesis 3:  Banks that had Section 20 subsidiaries benefit more than banks 
that did not have such subsidiaries. 
Puri (1996) argues that people are willing to pay a premium for corporate debts 
underwritten by banks over those underwritten by the investment houses. Under the 
GLBA the revenue limit for the investment subsidiary of the banking firms increases 
from the pre-act 25% to 45% of the consolidated entity. The financial subsidiaries of the 
national banks can get involved in activities that are ‘financial in nature or incidental to 
financial activity’, but they are prohibited from insurance underwriting and annuity 
issuance. Under section 92 of the National Banking Act, national banks are permitted to 
conduct insurance agency activities in offices of national banks located in a place of less 
than five thousand people. Since the subsidiary of the national banks are not subject to 
this geographical constraint, we expect that national banks transfer their insurance 
agency activity to their financial subsidiary.   
 
                     
8 LaRocco, Larry, 1999. 
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The revenue limit increase would certainly mean an increased income opportunity 
for banks and a way of stabilizing the variance of the revenue. Banks that already had 
experience of how to go about non-traditional banking activity will be more benefited 
from this law. Thus, we expect that banks that had Section 20 subsidiaries will gain more.  
Hypothesis 4: The GLBA reduces exposure to systematic risk across the banking 
industry. 
The GLBA may create diversification benefits for the financial services industry 
by removing merger barriers.  Wall, Reichert and Mohanty (1993) investigate whether 
combinations of bank and non-bank firms can reduce a bank’s operating risk and 
conclude that the best opportunity for diversification gains is for bank to merge with 
firms engaged in some aspects of the insurance industry.  Boyd, Graham and Hewitt 
(1993), using simulated data, find bank holding company (BHC) mergers with life and 
property/causality insurance companies reduce risk (systematic).  
The GLBA also reduces risk by providing safeguards against excessive risk 
taking.  Under the GLBA certain activities are forbidden, while other activities are 
restricted to the subsidiaries.  The GLBA establishes financial health criteria for 
expanding business into other sectors, assigns the FED the responsibilities of FHC 
supervision and regulation and gives the FED access to risk data across the entire 
organization.9  The GLBA has provisions to use market signals to discipline institutions.  
The GLBA also emphasized on market based measures to contain excessive risk taking 
behavior. For example it assigns the FED studies of the feasibility and appropriateness of 
requiring large banks to issue subordinated debt that will be rated by major rating agency. 
                     
9 Feldman, Lyon and Willardson (2000) summarize legal aspects of the FSMA. 
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If these bond ratings falls below investment grade then new expansion projects cannot be 
undertaken.  
The merger opportunity created by the GLBA will benefit some lines of insurance 
business more than others. Johnston and Madura (2000) points out that banks will be 
interested in the cross selling of insurance products that complement banking products; 
for example, mortgage and mortgage insurance, auto financing and auto insurance.  
Saunders and Walter (1994), on the other hand, conclude that greater synergistic gains 
are available for a combination of banks and life insurers than from combinations of 
banks and property/causality insurers. 
Hypothesis 5:  The GLBA is more favorable towards larger banks. 
Size is regarded as an important factor in the financial institution literature. Barth 
et al (2000) and Akhigbe and Whyte (2001) argue that the GLBA benefit larger banking 
institutions. We argue that even after controlling for all industry specific characteristics 
the big firms will be the biggest beneficiaries of this law.  
2.4 Methodology 
In this paper we use both market return and balance sheet information of banks to 
test the above hypotheses. The stock price reaction of regulatory changes is estimated 
using the Seemingly Unrelated Regression Model of Zellner (1962). A similar method is 
used in other studies10.  
                     
10 Schipper and Thompson (1983), Binder (1985a,b, and 1988), Rose (1985), Smith, Bradley and Jarrell 
(1986), Cornett and Tehranian (1989,1990), Hendershott, Lee and Tompkins (2000). 
  
 41 
Table 1: Money Center Banks and Super Regional Banks* 
 
Money Center Banks Super Regional Banks  
BankAmerica 
Bank One Corp. 
Bankers Trust 
Chase Manhattan 
Citigroup 
J.P. Morgan 
BankBoston Corp 
Bank of New York Co. 
First Union Corp 
Republic NY Corp 
State Street Corp 
 
*Source: Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) in its quarterly statistical release 
December 31, 1998.  
 
We use two different sets of portfolios to test our first five hypotheses. The first 
set of portfolios includes Money Center Banks, Super Regional Banks11 (a list of these 
banks are presented in table 1) and other banks that meet our sampling criterion. The 
second set of portfolios consists of banks that had a Section 20 subsidiary prior to the 
GLBA and banks that now have a financial subsidiary but did not before the GLBA. The 
list of banks with a Section 20 subsidiary and banks that now have a financial subsidiary 
are presented in table 2. All the information about the banks with a Section 20 subsidiary 
and banks that now have a new Financial Subsidiary are obtained from the Federal 
Reserve Bulletins and web site. 
 
We use an extension of the standard market model. Lag values of the market 
index are used in our model to address the possible nonsynchronous trading effect. We 
use dummy variables to identify the major events that led to the passage of the GLBA. 
The dummy variable is equal to 1 over the event window and zero otherwise. The 
                     
11 The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) in its quarterly statistical release 
publishes the name of Money Center Banks and Other large banks (which is used in the literature as Super 
regional Banks). In this study we use the banks categorized as Money Center Banks and Super Regional 
Banks as of December 31, 1998 in FFIEC statistical release.  This is presented in table 1. 
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coefficient estimate associated with the dummy variable measures the impact of the event 
on the portfolio return. We use the three factors model used in the banking literature12.  
Table 2: Banks with a Section 20 subsidiary and banks that now have a Financial 
Subsidiary but never had a Section 20 subsidiary. 
 
Banks that had Section 20 subsidiary before
the GLBA 
Banks that never had Section 20 subsidiary 
but now have  Financial Subsidiary 
MARINE MIDLAND BKS INC CULLEN/FROST BANKERS, INC. 
SOVRAN FINANCIAL CORP FIFTH THIRD BANCORP 
MANUFACTURERS HANOVER CORP FIRST SECURITY BANCORP 
SECURITY PACIFIC CORP FIRST STATE BANCSHARES, INC. 
LIBERTY NATIONAL BANCORP INC HIBERNIA CORPORATION 
FIRST CHICAGO CORP INTERNATIONAL BANCSHARES CORP. 
BANK SOUTH CORP NBT BANCORP INC. 
FIRST INTERSTATE BANCORP REGIONS FINANCIAL CORP. 
DAUPHIN DEPOSIT CORP SOUTHTRUST CORPORATION 
BARNETT BANKS INC STATE STREET CORPORATION 
FIRST OF AMERICA BANK CORP U.S. BANCORP 
CORESTATES FINANCIAL CORP UMPQUA HOLDINGS CORPORATION 
BANKAMERICA CORP WACHOVIA CORPORATION 
CRESTAR FINANCIAL CORP WELLS FARGO & COMPANY 
BANKERS TRUST CORP   
BANKBOSTON CORP   
REPUBLIC NEW YORK CORP   
B B & T CORP   
B O K FINANCIAL CORP   
BANK NEW YORK INC   
BANK ONE CORP   
CHASE MANHATTAN CORP NEW   
CHEMICAL FINANCIAL CORP   
CITIGROUP INC   
COMMERCE BANCORP INC NJ   
FIRST UNION CORP   
FLEETBOSTON FINANCIAL CORP   
HUNTINGTON BANCSHARES INC   
KEYCORP NEW   
MELLON FINANCIAL CORP   
MORGAN J P & CO INC   
NATIONAL CITY CORP   
P N C FINANCIAL SERVICES GRP INC   
SUNTRUST BANKS INC   
SYNOVUS FINANCIAL CORP   
 Source: Federal Reserve, December 1999. 
 
                     
12 Wetmore and Brick (1994) and Choi, Elyasiani and Kopecky (1992) 
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Schwert (1981) argues that individual asset returns of firms in the same industry 
measured over a common time period are contemporaneously correlated because the 
firms will react similarly to any unanticipated event. So, in events such as regulatory 
changes, the residuals will not be ‘iid’ (identically and independently distributed). If 
there is a contemporaneous correlation among the disturbances across equations but not 
correlated over time, the SUR (Seemingly Unrelated Regression) model estimates will be 
more efficient then the OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) estimates. Thus, we use the SUR 
to estimate the following models. 
2.4.1 Overall Impact of the Law 
We estimate the following model in order to test for the winners and losers in the 
banking industry.  
 
      (1) 1 2 2 1 3 4 2 5 1
6
* *
*
it i i i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t it
R D Rm Rm Rm Rm D Rm D
Rm D Rf Rr DG e
α α β β β β β
β δ κ γ
− − − −′= + + + + + +
+ + + + +
 
Here, Rit = return on portfolio i (=1,2,3) on day t (T=2780 daily observations from 
January 1990 to December 2000). Rmt = Return on CRSP value weighted index at time t. 
αi = the intercept coefficient for portfolio i. βi1-βi3 = market risk coefficient for portfolio i. 
βi4-βi6 = measures the change in the exposure to systematic risk. δi = foreign exchange 
risk coefficient for portfolio i. κi = the interest rate risk coefficient for portfolio i. Dt = 
dummy variable which is equal to 1 in every event window and zero otherwise. eit = the 
random disturbances. D is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 after the enactment of the 
regulation (after 11/21/99). DG is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 over every event 
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window and zero otherwise. γi captures the average impact of the regulation on portfolio 
i. 
2.4.2 Impact of Individual Events on Portfolios 
In order to test for hypotheses surrounding the events we estimate the following 
model. 
 
1 2 2 1 3
4 2 5 1 6
1
* * *
it i i i t i t i t
K
i t i t i t i t i t ik kt it
k
R D Rm Rm Rm
Rm D Rm D Rm D Rf Rr D e
α α β β β
β β β δ κ γ
− −
− − =
′= + + + +
+ + + + + + ∑ +       (2)  
Here, Dkt is the dummy variable which is equal to one on event window k and 
zero otherwise, so γik captures the average impact of kth announcement on portfolio i. 
 
2.4.3 Specification test 
We present a simple specification test to verify our extended model. Specification 
tests in this case involve testing for correlation across portfolios; this is the same as 
testing the hypothesis that the off-diagonal elements of S (variance-covariance matrix) 
are zero. There are two such specification tests in the literature, the Likelihood Ratio 
(LR) test and the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test. The statistics in both cases are χ2 
distributed. Berndt and Savin (1977) demonstrate that the following inequality holds:  
 
LM ≤ LR          (3) 
 
between these statistics. Since we have the same asymptotic distribution, the LM 
test rejects less often than the LR test. We will use the LR test to check for the 
diagonality of the variance-covariance matrix. Excluding the diagonal elements, there are 
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1/2m∗(m-1) unknown parameters in S and these can be arranged in vector θ. The null 
hypothesis that we will test is: 
 
H:θ = 0          (4) 
 
This test is based on the following statistics 
 
|]ˆ|logˆlog[ 2
1
∑−∑=
− i
m
i
LR T σλ         (5) 
where  is e from the individual least squares regressions and is the 
maximum likelihood estimator S. This statistic has a limiting χ
2ˆ iσ Teii /′ ∑ˆ
2 distribution with 
1/2m∗(m-1) degrees of freedom under the null hypothesis. 
2.4.4 Testable Hypotheses 
In addition to the major hypotheses that are presented in the previous section, we 
also test for the following hypotheses based on the portfolio model. They are13: 
Hypothesis 6: γ1k = γ2k = γ3k (i.e. abnormal returns for each portfolio is jointly 
equal on each event window k.) 
Hypothesis 7:  (i.e. all abnormal returns for each portfolio i are 
jointly equal). 
1 2 ...γ γ γ= = =i i 13i
2.5 Data and Event Selection 
2.5.1 Firm Selection 
We use the SIC classification from COMPUSTAT (Research Insight) to identify 
the commercial banks (SIC 6021 and 6022) to create our portfolios. The return 
information for this study comes from the CRSP tape, while the balance sheet 
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information comes from COMPUSTAT. We require these firms to have no missing 
trading for at least 3 years, from January 1998 to December 2000. In order to match firms 
from COMPUSTAT and CRSP we omitted all firms with exchange codes 4 to 10, since 
CRSP only has return information of firms traded either on the NYSE, AMEX or 
NASDAQ. We required the firms to have balance sheet information from 1997 to 1999. 
Our final sample that match these criterions is presented in table 3; panel A presents our 
first set of banking portfolios and panel B which presents our second set of portfolios. 
 
Table3.  The number of firms in each of the portfolios and sub portfolios. 
Panel A Panel B 
Sub-Industry 
Portfolios 
No. Of 
Firms 
 Sub-Industry Portfolios No. Of 
Firms 
a. Money Center 
Banks 
3   a. Banks with a Section 20 subsidiary. 17 
b. Super Regional 
Banks 
4   b. Banks that never had a Section 20 but   
now have a Financial Subsidiary. 
13 
c. All Other banks 336   c. All Other banks. 313 
Total Banks 343   Total Banks 343 
 
We use return information of the sample firms from January 1998 to December 
2000 to estimate each of our models.  
2.5.2 Macro variables 
Data for the two macro-economic variables used in our study is obtained from the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System14. For foreign exchange we used the 
Major Country Index15 from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The 
return is calculated using the following formula16: 
                                                             
13 Similar hypotheses were tested by Binder (1985a) and Cornett and Tehranian (1990). 
14 All the information is available online from http://www.federalreserve.gov 
 
15 The major currencies index is a weighted average of the foreign exchange values of the U.S. dollar 
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1
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−=          (6) 
Here, Ft is the value of the Major Country Index at time t. To be consistent with 
the literature,17 we use the one-year T-bill rate as a proxy for the interest rate. Interest rate 
returns are computed using the following formula18: 
1
1
t t
t
t
R RRr
R
−
−
−=                      (7) 
Here, Rt is the interest rate on one year t-bill at time t. Actual returns are used 
because there is no difference in the results regardless of whether interest rates are 
anticipated19; also, we do not orthogonalize the indices20.  
2.5.3 Event Selection 
The selection of events in a regulatory event is much more difficult than standard 
studies that concern corporate announcements, as argued by Binder (1985a).  We use 
LexisNexis wire service to retrieve all news regarding the GLBA. Our search period 
started November 1, 1998 (Senator Gramm took over as chair of The Senate Banking 
Committee) and extended to November 12, 1999 (president Clinton signed the bill into 
law). Our basic search resulted in more than 600 different news items from the 
LexisNexis database. In table 4 we summarize the important events and dates.  
 
                                                             
against a subset of currencies in the broad index that circulate widely outside the country of issue. The 
weights are derived from those in the broad index. 
 
16 Same as that used by Wetmore and Brick (1994). 
17 Kane and Unal (1998), Flannery and James (1984), and Wetmore and Brick (1994). 
18 Same as that used by Wetmore and Brick (1994). 
19 Flannery and James (1984). 
20 Giliberto (1985) argues that orthogonalizing the indices results in biased estimators. Moreover not 
apparent which index is the driving index and which is the driven one., Kane and Unal (1998) argue that it 
is  
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Table 4: Timeline of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. 
Note: The first column ‘Date’ is the event date. If the event occurred after the trading closed for a day then 
that the next trading day is the event date. Event Window is defined as Event Date, -1 day and +1 day. The 
second column 'Event' describes the main event.  
Date Event 
11/4/98 
 
 
1/8/99 
 
2/17/99 
 
4/12/99 
 
4/28/99 
 
 
5/4/99 
 
05/06/99 – 
Midnight 
 
7/1/99 
 
10/15/99 
 
10/22/99 
 
11/02/99 
 
 
11/4/99 
 
11/12/99 
1. (i) Senator Alfonse D’Amato lost his re-election bid (11/03/98 –night). (ii) Senator 
Gramm to take over as a chair of Senate Banking Committee. (11/04/98). 
 
2. Financial Services Reform Bill is reintroduced in Congress. 
 
3. Draft bill was unveiled in the Senate. 
 
4. Senator Gramm meets with Senate Minority leader to work on the bill. 
 
5. Senate Banking Committee formally files the Financial Services Modernization Act in the 
Senate. 
 
6. Clinton raises the privacy issue to be included in the bill. 
 
7. Senate passes S. 900. Senate version of the Bill is passed. 
 
 
8. House version of the bill was passed. 
 
9. Federal Reserve and Treasury announce agreement on the regulation. 
 
10. Gramm makes deal with White House on CRA. 
 
11. Joint House Conference report signed by the majority of the conferees, clearing the way 
for the votes in both the House and the Senate. 
 
12. Senate passes the bill (90-8) and House passes the bill (362-57). 
 
13. President Clinton signs the bill into law. 
  
 49 
Table 5: Estimation of Overall impact of the law. 
In this table we estimate the overall impact of the law using the model presented by equation 1.  
* * *R Rm Rm Rm Rm D Rm D Rm D Rr Rf DG eα β β β β β= + + + + + + + + +1 2 2 1 3 4 2 5 1 6it i i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t itβ δ κ γ− − − − +  
The model is estimated using the SUR methodology. DG is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 over all the events and zero otherwise so the coefficient of DG, 
i.e. γ captures the overall impact of GLB and D is the dummy which is equal to 1 after the enactment of the regulation (11/12/99) and zero otherwise.  
  Panel A: Panel B: 
  
Money Center Banks 
Super Regional 
Banks All other Banks 
Banks with a Section 
20 subsidiary 
Banks with a 
Financial Subsidiary 
that never had a 
Section 20 subsidiary All other Banks 
Parameter Estimate  t-stat Estimate t-stat  Estimate   t-stat Estimate   t-stat Estimate   t-stat Estimate   t-stat 
α 0.000  -0.693 0.000  0.294 0.000  1.050 0.000  -0.066 0.000  1.233 0.000  0.497 
α∗D 0.000  0.088 0.001  0.686 0.000  0.691 0.000  0.733 0.000  0.643 0.000  0.138 
β1 -0.044                
            
            
            
-1.402 -0.023 -0.774 -0.020 -1.091 -0.038 -1.543 -0.042 * -1.685 -0.006 -0.301
β2 -0.036  -1.130 -0.017  -0.569 0.027  1.476 -0.056 ** -2.295 -0.017  -0.691 0.095 *** 5.126 
β3 1.307 *** 41.425 1.193 *** 40.544 0.911 *** 49.243 1.170 *** 47.843 1.077 *** 42.756 0.844 *** 45.684
β4 -0.171 *** -2.828 -0.192 *** -3.407 -0.164 *** -4.615 -0.188 *** -3.988 -0.132 *** -2.733 -0.169 *** -4.781
β5 -0.154 ** -2.554 -0.122 ** -2.164 -0.206 *** -5.809 -0.129 *** -2.750 -0.209 *** -4.324 -0.232 *** -6.553 
β6 -0.529 *** -8.743 -0.454 *** -8.027 -0.260 *** -7.311 -0.442 *** -9.414 -0.470 *** -9.710 -0.151 *** -4.247
γ 0.008 *** 3.670 0.005 ** 2.452 0.004 *** 2.844 0.006 *** 3.389 0.004 ** 2.445 0.004 *** 3.339 
δ 0.057  0.911 0.024  0.416 0.053  1.436 0.036  0.736 0.031  0.625 0.078 ** 
  
2.124 
κ -0.085 ***           -3.398 -0.078 *** -3.300 -0.047 *** -3.167 -0.088 *** -4.541 -0.077 *** -3.812 -0.021 -1.400
R2 0.431     0.421     0.531     0.506     0.445     0.509     
N 3     4     336     17     13     313     
***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
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2.6 Empirical Results 
2.6.1 Overall impact of the law 
Table 5 presents the results from estimation of overall impact of the law. The 
results for this estimation of our first set of portfolios is presented in panel A. Money 
Center Banks have the highest gain from this law of 0.80% (average abnormal return), 
which is significant at the 1% level, Super Regional Banks have a gain of 0.50%, which 
is also significant at the 1% level. The portfolio of all other banks had a gain of 0.4% 
(significant at the 1% level). These results support our second hypothesis that the big 
banking firms have more to gain from the GLBA. We also test whether the overall impact 
of the act for any two portfolios are equal. These results are presented in panel A of table 
6. These are all Wald tests and based on the model presented by equation 4. In all three 
pairs of Wald tests we find that the null hypothesis in which the economic impact on any 
two portfolios are equal are rejected at the 1% level.  
Panel B of table 5 presents the overall impact on the second classification of 
banking portfolios. We find that banks that have a Section 20 subsidiary have a higher 
overall gain (a cumulative average abnormal return of 0.60%). These results support our 
third hypothesis that banks experienced with non-banking activities (banks with the 
Section 20 investment subsidiary), benefit more due to the passage of the law. We also 
test whether the overall impact of the law for any two portfolios is equal. These results 
are presented in panel B of table 6. In all the three pair tests, we find that the null 
hypothesis in which the economic impact on any two portfolios are equal are rejected.  
  
 51 
Table 6. Test of the hypothesis that all abnormal returns for each portfolio are jointly 
equal to zero. 
 
Column 2 of this table presents the Wald test for Hypothesis 10, which measures the significance of 
portfolio returns for all 13 announcements jointly. The underlying distribution is a χ2 with 1 degree of 
freedom.  
    Wald test 
  Null Hypothesis χ2(1) 
1. Money Center Banks and Super Regional Banks have the same impact due to this law. 6.567** 
2. M
th
oney Center Banks and portfolio of all the other banks have the same impact due to 
is law. 9.670*** Pa
ne
l A
 
3. Super Regional Banks and portfolio of all the other banks have the same impact due to 
this law. 5.150** 
1. Banks with a Section 20 subsidiary and Banks with a Financial subsidiary that never had 
a Section 20 subsidiary have the same impact due to this law. 5.273** 
2. B
due t
anks with a Section 20 subsidiary and portfolio of all other banks have the same impact 
o this law. 9.067*** Pa
ne
l B
 
3. Banks with a Financial Subsidiary that never has a Section 20 subsidiary and portfolio of 
all other banks have the same impact due to this law. 5.904** 
***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 
2.6.2 Impact of the Act on Systematic Risk 
Table 5 shows that the shift in the exposure to systematic risk is negative and 
significant for all portfolios in both the categories. This confirms our fifth hypothesis that 
the diversification opportunity and measures to restrict excessive risk taking have 
reduced the exposure to systematic risk.   
2.6.3 Other Hypotheses 
The main advantage of using the SUR (Seemingly Unrelated Regression) 
methodology is the ability to do joint hypothesis testing since heteroscedasticity across 
equations and contemporaneous dependence of the disturbances are explicitly 
incorporated into the hypothesis test. The following hypothesis tests are based on the 
estimation of the model presented in equation 2. 
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Table 7: Estimation of modified Market model with 3 portfolio of banking industry and 
test of hypothesis 6 
Panel A of the following table presents the estimation results of the following model: 
1 2 2 1 3 4 2 5 1 6
1
* * *
K
it i i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t ik kt it
k
R Rm Rm Rm Rm D Rm D Rm D Rr Rf D eα β β β β β β δ κ γ− − − − == + + + + + + + + + ∑ +
 for portfolios of Money Center Banks, Super Regional Banks and all other banks in our sample. The 
model is estimated using SUR. Dkt is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 over the event windows, and 
the estimate of coefficient of the dummy i.e. γik presents the estimate of the cumulative average abnormal 
return of the kth event. Rm represents the return of market index, δi is foreign exchange risk coefficient for 
portfolio i and κi is the interest rate risk coefficient for portfolio i. D is a dummy variable which is equal to 
1 after the enactment of the regulation (11/12/99) and zero otherwise. Panel B presents the test of the 
hypothesis that the events have symmetric impact across the industry. 
      Panel A   Panel B 
     Money Center Banks Super Regional Banks All Other Banks  Wald test 
  Parameter  Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat  χ2(3) 
α   0.000 -0.680 0.000 0.296 0.000 1.038     
α ∗  0.000 0.084 0.001 0.689 0.000 0.699    
β1  -0.049 -1.558 -0.022 -0.754 -0.020 -1.087    
β2  -0.037 -1.174 -0.016 -0.541 0.030 1.610    
β3  1.305*** 41.429 1.192*** 40.515 0.912*** 49.341    
β4  -0.166*** -2.745 -0.193*** -3.420 -0.164*** -4.620    
β5  -0.152** -2.533 -0.123** -2.181 -0.208*** -5.891    
β6  -0.528*** -8.745 -0.452*** -8.017 -0.261*** -7.364    
δ  0.054 0.861 0.021 0.364 0.050 1.370    
M
od
el
 P
ar
am
et
er
s 
κ   -0.089*** -3.528 -0.078*** -3.325 -0.047*** -3.177     
γ1  0.019*** 2.618 0.016** 2.388 0.008* 1.780  8.098** 
γ2  0.024*** 3.251 -0.002 -0.290 -0.005 -1.071  27.811*** 
γ3  0.015** 2.017 0.009 1.317 0.009** 2.032  5.177 
γ4  -0.001 -0.070 0.005 0.784 0.009** 2.093  7.866** 
γ5  0.012* 1.691 0.021*** 3.096 0.012*** 2.709  10.483*** 
γ6  -0.004 -0.424 -0.010 -1.219 0.000 0.070  3.116 
γ7  -0.003 -0.322 0.008 0.936 -0.002 -0.333  3.119 
γ8  -0.001 -0.177 0.001 0.112 -0.004 -0.992  2.300 
γ9  0.000 0.045 -0.001 -0.190 0.002 0.495  0.815 
γ10  0.017** 2.338 -0.001 -0.089 0.005 1.159  9.249** 
γ11  0.007 0.742 -0.003 -0.323 0.005 0.930  3.025 
γ12  0.009 1.028 0.010 1.218 0.003 0.661  1.810 
Ev
en
t p
ar
am
et
er
s 
γ13   0.001 0.184 0.006 0.843 0.002 0.526   0.875 
R2   0.434   0.425   0.534        
N   3   4   336       
***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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Panel A of Table 7 presents the SUR estimation results, cumulative average 
abnormal return and corresponding t-statistics for each of the 13 events for the three 
portfolios. It also presents model parameter estimates; market betas (current and lag), 
foreign exchange risk coefficients (δ) and interest rate risk coefficients (κ). Panel B 
presents the results of hypothesis 6 for our first classification of banking firms. 
Five events produced significant cumulative average abnormal returns for the 
Money Center Banks. The news of Senator Gramm taking over as Senate Banking 
Committee Chair on November 4, 1998 created an average abnormal return of 1.9%. 
When the Financial Services Reform bill was reintroduced in Congress on January 8, 
1999, Money Center Banks experienced an average abnormal return of 2.4% (significant 
at the 1% level). Moreover, when the draft of the bill was unveiled in the Congress, 
Money Center Banks had a 1.5% average abnormal return. The fourth event was when 
the Senate Banking Committee formally filed the Financial Services Modernization Act 
with Congress on April 12, 1999, and there was a 1.2% average abnormal return. The 
fifth event occurred is when Senator Gramm made a deal with the White House on the 
CRA provision on October 22, 1999, which virtually removed the last big hurdle to the 
passage of the GLBA, and the average abnormal return (AR) on this event was 1.1% and 
significant at the 10% level.  
On the other hand, Super Regional Banks only had significant stock market 
reactions on two different occasions. The first of these events was the news of Senator 
Alfonse D’Amoto’s loss of his New York re-election on November 3, 1998 coupled with 
the news of Senator Gramm’s appointment as Senate Banking Committee chair on 
November 4, 1998. These events together produced an abnormal return of 1.6%. The 
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second event was when the Senate Banking Committee formally filed the Financial 
Services Modernization Act with Congress on April 12, 1999, and there was a 2.1% 
average abnormal return.  
In addition to the events where Super Regional Banks have significant stock 
market reactions, the portfolio of all other banks have significant cumulative average 
abnormal returns on 2 additional occasions. First, when the draft bill was unveiled in the 
Senate on February 17, 1999 there was only a 0.9% abnormal return, which is significant 
at the 5% level. Second, when Senator Gramm met with the minority leaders to work on 
the bill, there was a reaction of 1.2%.  
Panel B of Table 7 presents the Wald test for Hypothesis 7 for each of the 
announcements. This hypothesis tests whether the information produced during the kth 
event window has the same impact over all three portfolios. The null hypothesis is: 
H0:γik =0 ∀ i 
 
As reported in the table, in events 1, 2, 4, 5 and 10 the χ2 test statistics are 8.098, 
27.811, 7.866, 10.483, and 9.249 respectively, which rejects the null hypotheses. This 
means that over these five events windows, the impact of the announcement is 
asymmetric across the three portfolios. 
For our second set of portfolios, the SUR estimation results, cumulative average 
abnormal return and corresponding t-statistics for each of the 13 events for the three 
portfolios are presented in Table 8.  
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Table 8: Estimation of modified Market model with 3 portfolio of banking industry and 
test of hypothesis 6 
Panel A of the following table presents the estimation results of the following model: 
1 2 2 1 3 4 2 5 1 6
1
* * *
K
it i i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t ik kt it
k
R Rm Rm Rm Rm D Rm D Rm D Rr Rf D eα β β β β β β δ κ γ− − − − == + + + + + + + + + ∑ +
for portfolios of banks that had a Section 20 subsidiary, banks that now have the new Financial Subsidiary 
and all other banks in our sample. The model is estimated using SUR. Dkt is a dummy variable which is 
equal to 1 over the event windows, and the estimate of the coefficient of the dummy, i.e. γik, presents the 
estimate of the cumulative average abnormal return of the kth event. Rm represents the return of market 
index, . δi is foreign exchange risk coefficient for portfolio i and κi is the interest rate risk coefficient for 
portfolio i. D is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 after the enactment of the regulation (11/12/99) and 
zero otherwise. Panel B presents the test of the hypothesis that the events have symmetric impact across the 
industry. 
      Panel A   Panel B 
  
   
Banks that had a Section 20 
subsidiary 
Banks that never has a 
Section 20 but have a 
section 4K4E subsidiary All Other Banks   
Wald test 
  
Parameter  
Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat   χ2(3) 
α   0.000 -0.063 0.000 1.209 0.000 0.508     
α  0.000 0.734 0.000 0.657 0.000 0.136    
β1  -0.039 -1.591 -0.039 -1.566 -0.009 -0.465    
β2  -0.055** -2.278 -0.012 -0.460 0.095*** 5.124    
β3  1.170*** 47.840 1.078*** 42.848 0.844*** 45.684    
β4  -0.186*** -3.960 -0.135*** -2.796 -0.166*** -4.695    
β5  -0.129*** -2.758 -0.214*** -4.452 -0.232*** -6.564    
β6  -0.442*** -9.429 -0.471*** -9.760 -0.151*** -4.253    
δ  0.034 0.694 0.026 0.513 0.076** 2.065    
M
od
el
 P
ar
am
et
er
s 
κ   -0.090*** -4.586 -0.077*** -3.862 -0.022 -1.467     
γ1  0.015*** 2.621 0.014** 2.388 0.008* 1.831   7.521* 
γ2  0.003 0.542 -0.008 -1.350 0.007* 1.717   15.056*** 
γ3  0.009 1.573 0.015*** 2.717 0.009** 2.104   8.132** 
γ4  0.010* 1.692 0.003 0.576 0.004 0.816   3.794 
γ5  0.016*** 2.863 0.013** 2.277 0.009** 2.182   8.301** 
γ6  -0.002 -0.308 0.001 0.194 -0.004 -0.702   1.348 
γ7  -0.001 -0.188 0.001 0.164 -0.002 -0.307   0.392 
γ8  0.000 -0.076 -0.008 -1.412 -0.002 -0.501   3.810 
γ9  0.002 0.301 0.005 0.820 -0.001 -0.196   1.732 
γ01  0.004 0.718 0.007 1.214 0.009** 2.201   6.471* 
γ11  0.005 0.716 0.001 0.113 0.006 1.074   1.965 
γ21  0.010 1.441 0.001 0.070 0.004 0.768   4.000 
Ev
en
t p
ar
am
et
er
s 
γ31   0.001 0.123 0.004 0.741 0.003 0.741   1.341 
R2  0.508155   0.448447   0.511568        
N   17   13   313       
***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 
  
 56 
It also presents model parameter estimates for the market betas (current and lag), 
foreign exchange risk coefficient (δ) and interest rate risk coefficient (κ). Panel B 
presents the results of hypothesis 6 
Banks that had a Section 20 subsidiary have highly significant abnormal return 
(1% level) on two different occasions. First is the news of Senator Alfonse D’Amoto’s 
loss of his New York re-election on November 3, 1998, coupled with the news of Senator 
Gramm’s succession to become Senate Banking Committee chair on November 4, 1998 
and when the Senate Banking Committee formally files the Financial Services 
Modernization Act in the Senate on April 28, 1999.  These banks had a moderate reaction 
to the news that Senator Gramm will meet with the minority leaders to work on the bill.  
On the other hand, banks with a new Financial Subsidiary have highly significant 
abnormal returns on three different events. These events are events 1, 3, and 5. The 
cumulative average abnormal returns on these events are 1.4%, 1.5%, and 1.3%. 
The portfolio of all other banks in this category has significant cumulative 
average abnormal returns on six different occasions. The first of these events was the 
news of Senator Alfonse D’Amoto’s loss of his New York re-election on November 3, 
1998 coupled with the news of Senator Gramm’s succession to become Senate Banking 
Committee chair on November 4, 1998 that has an average return of 0.8%. When the 
Financial Services Reform Bill was reintroduced in Congress on January 8, 1999, it has 
an average return of 0.7%. The third event was when the draft bill was unveiled in 
Congress on February 17, 1999 and it created an average abnormal return of 0.9%. The 
fourth event was when the Senate Banking Committee formally filed the Financial 
Services Modernization Act in the Senate; it created an average return of 0.9%. The fifth 
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event was when Senator Gramm made a deal with the White House on the CRA 
(Community Reinvestment Act) virtually removing the large big hurdle to the GLBA on 
October 22, 1999 and it created an average abnormal return of 0.9% for the portfolio.  
The null hypothesis that the events have created symmetric impact on these 
portfolios is rejected at five different counts, events 1, 2, 3, 5 and 10. This hypothesis is 
tested using a Wald test. The underlying distribution is χ2(3). This result is presented in 
Panel B of Table 8. 
Table 9: Test of the hypothesis that all the announcements have same impact on the 
portfolios of the banking industry. 
 
Column 2 of this table presents the Wald test for Hypothesis 7 which measures the significance of portfolio 
returns for all 13 announcements jointly. The underlying distribution is a χ2 with 13 degrees of freedom.  
    Wald test 
  Null Hypothesis  χ2(13) 
All abnormal returns for Money Center Banks are jointly 
 to zero. equal 31.473*** 
Al
equal
l abnormal returns for Super Regional Banks are jointly 
 to zero. 22.387** Pa
ne
l A
 
All abnormal returns for portfolio of all other banks are 
jointly equal to zero. 24.341** 
All abnormal returns for Banks with a Section 20 
diary are jointly equal to zero. subsi 23.854** 
Al
are joi
l abnormal returns for Banks with a Financial Subsidiary 
ntly equal to zero. 25.156** Pa
ne
l B
 
All abnormal returns for portfolio of all other banks are 
jointly equal to zero. 23.900** 
***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 
Here we test whether every announcement has the same impact on the same 
portfolio. We use the Wald test for this hypothesis test. The underlying distribution is χ2 
with 13 degrees of freedom. The results for our first category of portfolios is presented in 
Panel A and the results for the second set of portfolios are presented in Panel B of Table 
9. The results for all six portfolios show that the null hypothesis is rejected. It implies 
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that the events leading to the passage of the GLBA had different impacts on the different 
portfolios. 
 
2.6.4 Specification Tests 
The result of the specification test for our portfolio model shows that the null 
hypothesis H:θ =0 is rejected at the 1% level for two different portfolio categories. This 
means that the variance covariance matrix is non-diagonal. Statistically this means that 
SUR is the correct model to choose as opposed to the OLS.  
 
2.7 Cross Sectional Analysis 
 
2.7.1 Methodology 
The goal of the cross-sectional models is to identify firm specific characteristics 
that can help us explain the cross sectional variation in abnormal return.  
2.7.1.1 Average Abnormal Return (AR) 
In order to identify the firm specific characteristics, we first need to generate the 
AR for each firm over each of the event windows of interest. To do this we use the exact 
same model used for the portfolio study. Formally the model is: 
 
1 2 2 1 3 4 2 5 1
6
1
* *
*
it i i i t i t i t i t i t
K
i t i t i t ik kt it
k
R D Rm Rm Rm Rm D Rm D
Rm D Rf Rr D e
α α β β β β β
β δ κ γ
− − − −
=
′= + + + + + +
+ + + + ∑ +            (8) 
Here, Dkt is the dummy variable that equals 1 on each of the event windows and 
zero otherwise. We also generate these ARs using a dummy that is equal to 1 for every 
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event window and zero otherwise to measure the overall average return, using the 
following model: 
 
1 2 2 1 3 4 2 5 1
6
* *
*
it i i i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t it
R D Rm Rm Rm Rm D Rm D
Rm D Rf Rr DG e
α α β β β β β
β δ κ γ
− − − −′= + + + + + +
+ + + + +  (9) 
   
We also generate the βi4-βi6 that we use in the cross-sectional regression. 
 
2.7.2 Cross-sectional Model  
In order to further investigate the characteristics of winner and losers in the 
banking industry, we estimate an Ordinary Least Square (OLS) model where the 
dependent variable is the AR estimated using equation 8 or equation 9 (depending on 
whether we are investigating an individual event or overall impact). We analyze an 
individual event if two or more portfolios of any category have a significant return on 
that event. The dependent variables are SIZE, ROA and shift in exposure to systematic 
risk. We use the following models for our cross-sectional analysis: 
 
) )
) )
) )
( (
( (
( (
i SIZE SIZExMONEY SIZExSUPER
ROA ROAxMONEY ROAxSUPER
RISK RISKxMONEY RISKxSUPER
AR SIZE SIZExMONEY SIZExSUPER
ROA ROAxMONEY ROAxSUPER
RISK RISKxMONEY RISKxSUPER
θ θ θ θ
θ θ θ
ξθ θ θ
= +
+ + +
+ + +
+ +
+
        (10) 
 
20 4
20 4
20 4
20) 4 )
20) 4 )
20) 4 )
( (
( (
( (
i SIZE SIZExSEC SIZExSEC K
ROA ROAxSEC ROAxSEC K
RISK RISKxSEC RISKxSEC K
AR SIZE SIZExSEC SIZExSEC K
ROA ROAxSEC ROAxSEC K
RISK RISKxSEC RISKxSEC K
θ θ θ θ
θ θ θ
ξθ θ θ
= +
+ + +
+ + +
+ +
+
                       (11) 
 
Here, SIZE is measured taking the log of the book value of assets. It is expected 
that the bigger banks are going to have the best opportunity to exploit the economies of 
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scope that the GLBA has to offer. Deregulation and court rulings (example: Section 20 
subsidiary provision or rulings concerning the banks right to sell insurance products) that 
deregulated the financial services industry mostly benefited the larger firms. Thus we 
expect that SIZE should be positive and significant.  
Return on Assets (ROA) is a measure of overall performance and we expect that 
better performing banks are the best positioned to expand their business in this new 
deregulated era. We expect this variable to be positive and significant.  We also expect 
that the change in the exposure to systematic risk will be negative implying that the 
regulation has created diversification opportunities and also the regulation against 
excessive risk taking has made the industry less prone to bankruptcy.  
 
2.7.3 Empirical Results 
Table 10 presents the estimation results of equation 11 (for our first category of 
portfolios). We examine 3 different events and the overall impact in Table 10. For all 3 
events and for overall impact, we find that the intercept is negative and significant. The 
cross dummy between Money Center banks and the change in exposure to systematic risk 
is highly significant and positive for events 1 and 5; for overall impact for this category 
of banks, the exposure to systematic risk has increased, while in event 3 it decreased.  
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Table 10: Cross sectional determinants of the impact for Money Center Banks, Super 
Regional Banks and All other banks in the sample. 
Cross-section regression for Money Center Banks, Super Regional Banks and all the other banks in our 
sample. The table shows the estimation result of the following model: 
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i SIZE SIZExMONEY SIZExSUPER
ROA ROAxMONEY ROAxSUPER
RISK RISKxMONEY RISKxSUPER
AR SIZE SIZExMONEY SIZExSUPER
ROA ROAxMONEY ROAxSUPER
RISK RISKxMONEY RISKxSUPER
 
Here AR is the average abnormal returns and θRiak is the change in the exposure to systematic risk are generated from equation 8 and 
equation 9. MONEY and SUPER are dummy variables, which are equal to 1 if the bank is a Money Center Bank or if it is a Super 
Regional Bank, and zero otherwise. SIZE is measured taking the log of the book value of asset; ROA is return on Asset. θSIZE is the 
coefficient estimate of SIZE for all other firms, while θSIZExMONEY is the difference in coefficient estimate of SIZE variable for all other 
firms with Money Center Banks and θSIZExSUPER is the difference in coefficient estimate of SIZE variable for all other firms with Super 
Regional Banks. The coefficient estimates for ROA and RISK are defined likewise.  
 
  Panel A Panel B 
  Event 1 Event 3 Event 5 Overall Impact 
θ -0.371*** -0.356*** -0.557*** -0.004* 
θRISK 0.074 0.021 -0.011 0.001 
θ RISK x money 23.058*** -2.611*** 14.159*** 0.169*** 
θ  RISK x super 0.094 -0.849*** -0.856 -0.010*** 
θ SIZE 0.0569*** 0.050*** 0.0777*** 0.001*** 
θ SIZE x money 0.207*** -0.031*** 0.101*** 0.001*** 
θ SIZE x super 0.049 0.001 -0.018 -0.001* 
θ ROA 0.008 0.014 0.081* -0.003 
θ ROA x money 12.141*** -1.027*** 7.515*** 0.090*** 
θ ROA x super -0.252 -0.316*** 0.020 0.001 
R2 0.083 0.095 0.150 0.174 
F 3.329*** 3.885*** 6.520*** 7.820*** 
 
***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 
  
The change in exposure to systematic risk for Super Regional banks is negative 
and highly significant in event 3 and for overall impact. The change in exposure to 
systematic risk is not significant for the reference group (for all other banks in this 
category). Size is positive and significant for the reference group in the three events and 
for overall impact.  The cross dummy between Money Center banks and size is highly 
significant and positive in all cases except for event 3. The cross dummy between Money 
Center banks and ROA is highly significant and positive in all the cases except for event 
3. Profitability is moderately significant in event 5 for the reference group and the cross 
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dummy between Super Regional banks and ROA is highly significant but negative in 
event 3. Thus, SIZE, change in exposure to systematic risk, and overall performance can 
explain the cross sectional wealth effects.  
Table 11: Cross sectional determinants of the impact for banks with Section 20 
subsidiary, banks that now have newly created Financial Subsidiary and all other banks 
in our sample. 
Cross-section regression for banks with Section 20 subsidiary, banks that now have newly created 
Financial Subsidiary and all other banks in our sample. The table shows the estimation result of the 
following model: 
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ROA ROAxSEC ROAxSEC K
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AR SIZE SIZExSEC SIZExSEC K
ROA ROAxSEC ROAxSEC K
RISK RISKxSEC RISKxSEC K
 
Here AR is the average abnormal returns and θRiak is the change in the exposure to systematic risk 
generated from equation 8 and equation 9. SEC20 and SEC4k are dummy variables, which are equal to 1 if 
the bank has a Section 20 subsidiary or a new FS respectively, and zero otherwise. SIZE is measured 
taking the log of the book value of asset; ROA is the return on assets. θSIZE is the coefficient estimate of 
SIZE for all other firms, while θSIZExsec20 is the difference in coefficient estimate of SIZE variable for all 
other firms with banks that has sec 20 subsidiary and θSIZExsec4k is the difference in coefficient estimate of 
SIZE variable for all other firms with banks that has a sec 4k subsidiary. The coefficient estimates for ROA 
and RISK are defined likewise.  
 
  Panel A Panel B 
  Event 1 Event 3 Event 5 Overall Impact 
θ -0.355*** -0.346*** -0.544*** -0.004 
θRISK 0.125 0.048 -0.012 0.002 
θ RISK x sec20 -0.179 -0.527* -0.619*** -0.007** 
θ RISK x sec4k -0.409 -0.285 0.188 -0.003* 
θSIZE 0.055*** 0.049*** 0.075*** 0.001*** 
θSIZE x sec20 0.038*** -0.006 -0.013 0.000 
θSIZE x sec4k -0.063* 0.015 0.026 -0.001** 
θROA 0.003 0.014 0.086** -0.003 
θROA x sec20 -0.279*** -0.085 -0.024 0.000 
θROA x sec4k 0.530* -0.128 -0.182 0.005** 
R2 0.097 0.095 0.150 0.183 
F 3.979*** 3.876*** 6.527*** 8.265*** 
***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 
Table 11 presents the estimation results of equation 12 (for our second category 
of portfolios). We examined 3 different events and the overall impact in Table 11. For all 
3 events the intercept is negative and significant. The change in exposure to systematic 
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risk is insignificant for the reference group (banks that do not have either a Section 20 
subsidiary or a new financial subsidiary), but is negative and significant for the cross 
dummy between banks with a Section 20 subsidiary in events 3 and 5, and for overall 
impact. The cross dummy for banks with a new financial subsidiary and the change in 
exposure to systematic risk is negative and significant for overall impact. Size is positive 
and significant for the reference group. The cross dummy between banks with a new 
financial subsidiary and size is negative and significant in event 1 and for overall impact. 
 Profitability is significant in event 5 for the reference group. For this categorization, we 
can also generalize that mainly SIZE, but also the change in exposure to systematic risk 
and overall performance can explain the cross sectional wealth effects.  
 
2.8 Conclusion 
In this paper we investigate the impact of announcements that led to the passage 
of the GLBA on the banking industry. We investigate the impact on this traditional 
classification of banks like Money Center and Super Regional Banks. The results show 
that Money Center Banks have the highest wealth effect followed by Super Regional 
Banks. Due to the explicit measures taken by the GLBA and due to the diversification 
opportunities, the exposure to systematic risk has reduced substantially for these two 
categories of banks, as well as for the rest of the industry. 
We also investigate the non-traditional classification of banks such as banks that 
had a Section 20 subsidiary and banks that now have a new Financial Subsidiary. Our 
results show that in this classification banks that had a Section 20 subsidiary were the 
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biggest gainer and the change in exposure to systematic risk is also negative and 
significant for all the categories of banks in this classification. 
In the cross-section regression we find that larger firms are the most benefited 
from this law, which is consistent with previous studies. However, the relation between 
performance and wealth effect  is not conclusive like some of the previous studies. The 
most important contribution of this study is that we show how a change in exposure to 
systematic risk can explain cross-sectional variation for Money Center banks, Super 
Regional Banks, banks with a Section 20 subsidiary and banks with a new financial 
subsidiary, which is significantly different from their reference group. 
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 Chapter III 
 
 Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999: Market 
Assessment of Winners and Losers in the Insurance Industry 
 
3.1 Abstract 
This paper investigates the impact of the Financial Services Modernization Act 
(GLBA) of 1999 on the insurance industry. We identify six events that have a differential 
impact across the business lines of the insurance industry. The overall impact of the 
GLBA across the business lines in the insurance industry is positive and the impact on 
each business line is significantly different. Firms in property/casualty and life insurance 
gain more than the rest of the firms in the insurance industry. Exposure to systematic risk 
is reduced after the GLBA and this can explain the cross-sectional variation of the wealth 
effect. In cross-sectional analysis we also find, consistent with merger literature, that 
larger and poorly performing firms benefit from the cross-industry merger opportunities 
under the GLBA. 
3.2 Introduction 
The Financial Services Modernization Act also known as Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act (GLBA) of 1999 is the most sweeping deregulation of the U.S. financial services 
industry in the last century.  The GLBA repeals both the depression era Glass-Steagall act 
of 1933, which separated banking and securities activities, and the Bank Holding 
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Company Act of 1956 that prohibited bank holding companies from engaging in 
insurance related activities.  Conventional wisdom suggests that while deregulation 
creates overall shareholder value, the wealth effects of regulatory change are unevenly 
distributed.  We focus on the prediction that shareholders benefit from risk reduction 
under the GLBA due to regulatory changes and newly created merger opportunities 
across financial services. 
Research in this area borrows from the Mergers and Acquisitions literature to 
identify potential winners and losers as the GLBA allows for mergers between firms in 
different sectors of the financial services industry.1  Larger firms will likely benefit from 
the GLBA as they have more available resources to acquire firms across industries and 
achieve economies of scope.  Poorly performing firms will become the likely targets, as 
these poorly managed firms can be purchased at a discount.  Deregulation affords firms 
the opportunity to diversify across financial sectors. Within the insurance industry those 
product lines that are easily cross-marketed will be more attractive merger targets.   
Current research finds that the GLBA does not have a uniform effect on the 
financial services industry.  Studies consistently find that the GLBA positively affects 
shareholder value in the insurance industry; however, depending on the sample size and 
number of events investigated, the results for other financial services industries are 
mixed.  Carow and Heron (2002) find that only the insurance industry gains from this 
law.  Akhigbe and Whyte (2001) find that all the sectors of the Financial Services 
Industry (FSI) benefit from this law, while Hendershott, Lee, and Tompkins (2002) 
conclude that this law doesn’t impact the banking industry.  Larger banks with experience 
                                                 
1 Jensen and Ruback (1983) provides a survey of this literature. 
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in the insurance business are likely to expand their business by acquiring insurance 
companies.2  Houston and Ryngaert (1994) find that target firms typically sell at 
premiums and acquiring firms sell at discounts.  Carow (2001b), and Johnston and 
Madura (2000) who investigate the only bank-to-insurance merger (Citicorp and 
Travelers, 1998) find significantly positive returns for insurance companies. 
Size is important for exploiting merger opportunities.  For example, Hawawini 
and Swary (1990) find that acquirers are significantly larger than targets.  Calem (1994) 
finds that after bank holding company branching reforms, large banks acquired small 
banks. In addition, Cheng, Gup and Wall (1989), and Palia (1993) find that larger 
acquiring firms add more to target bank value.   
There is evidence that poorly performing firms become potential targets for 
mergers. BarNiv and Hathorn (1997) find that timely mergers in the insurance industry 
serve as an alternative to insolvency in 20% to 46% of the mergers considered in their 
study. Similarly Whiting (1997) argues that banking organizations with higher ROEs 
(Return on Equity) or ROAs (Return on Asset) are more likely to purchase insurers that 
have lower ROE or ROA. Swary (1986) shows that target banks with higher capital ratios 
than their bidder banks have greater abnormal returns. Thus, it seems that abolishing 
cross-industry merger barriers will create wealth effects for poorly performing firms. 
The GLBA may create diversification benefits for the financial services industry 
by removing merger barriers.  Wall, Reichert and Mohanty (1993) investigate whether 
combinations of bank and non-bank firms can reduce a banking organizations’ operating 
                                                 
 
2 The presence of banking firms in the insurance business before passage of the GLBA is also very strong. 
For example, Wells Fargo runs the seventh largest insurance agency in the U.S.A. and 50% to 65% 
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risk. They conclude that the best opportunity for diversification gains is for banks to 
merge with firms engaged in some aspects of the insurance industry.  Boyd, Graham and 
Hewitt (1993), using simulated data, find that bank holding company (BHC) mergers 
with life and property/casualty insurance companies reduce risk.   
The GLBA also reduces risk by providing safeguards against excessive risk-
taking.  Under the GLBA, certain activities are restricted; while some activities are 
limited to the subsidiaries, the GLBA also establishes financial health criteria for 
expanding business into other sectors, assigns the Federal Reserve Board (FED) to 
supervise and regulate Financial Holding Companies (FHCs) and gives the FED access to 
risk data across the entire organization.3  The GLBA has provisions to use market signals 
to discipline institutions.  Moreover, the GLBA proposes that the FED study the 
feasibility and appropriateness of requiring large banks to issue subordinated debt that 
will be rated by a major rating agency.  Accordingly, if these bond ratings fall below 
investment grade, then new expansion projects cannot be undertaken. 
The merger opportunities created by the GLBA will benefit some lines of 
insurance business more than others. Johnston and Madura (2000) point out that banks 
will be interested in cross-selling of insurance products that closely resemble banking 
products. For example: mortgage and mortgage insurance, auto financing and auto 
insurance.  Saunders and Walter (1994), on the other hand, conclude that greater 
synergistic gains are available for combination of banks and life insurers than from 
combinations of banks and property/casualty insurers.  
                                                                                                                                                 
(depending on the method of calculation) of all banking organizations sell insurance products of one kind 
or another (LaRocco, 1999). 
3 Feldman, Lyon and Willardson (2000) summarize legal aspects of the GLBA. 
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The main contribution of this paper is to empirically examine the diversification 
opportunities made available under the GLBA.  No study to date has investigated whether 
the posited reductions in operating risk and bankruptcy risk, due to diversification 
opportunity and safeguards against excessive risk-taking, can create value for 
stockholders.4  We concentrate on the insurance industry for our analysis because the 
GLBA allows the first opportunity for insurance companies to merge with other types of 
financial services firms and the literature has identified a consistent wealth effect in the 
insurance industry.  We also test the predictions of Johnston and Madura (2000) and 
Saunders and Walter (1994) that life and property insurance make more suitable merger 
candidates than other lines of insurance businesses, thus firms in these lines of insurance 
business will become suitable targets. 
First, we adapted the model used by Blinder (1985), and Cornett and Tehranian 
(1990), which evolves testing the impact of regulatory changes using financial market 
data in a seemingly unrelated regression framework.  We extend these models from a 
one-factor model to a three-factor model that is commonly used in the banking literature.5 
These factors are market exposure, foreign exchange risk exposure and interest rate risk 
exposure.  The foreign exchange risk component is applicable to insurance in general, 
and property/casualty insurance in particular because of the globalization of U.S. 
businesses. Interest rate exposure arises from the mismatch in duration of the assets and 
liabilities of the firms. All financial institutions tend to mismatch their balance sheet 
                                                 
4 Akhigbe and Whyte (2001), investigate whether the risk shifts on the event date and they find no 
evidence of risk shift for either the insurance or banking industry. 
5 Wetmore and Brick (1994) and Choi, Elyasiani and Kopecky (1992). 
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maturities to some degree.6 This risk arises from the difference in timing of rate changes 
and cash flows, and from changes in the shape of the yield curve. 
In our cross-sectional analysis we include: log of book value of total assets to test 
the size related hypothesis, return on equity to test the performance related hypothesis, 
and change in exposure to systematic risk to analyze whether shareholders benefit from 
risk reduction and diversification opportunities. In order to analyze the interaction effect 
we include size, ROE and change in exposure to systematic risk multiplied by business 
line dummies.  We also include the difference in intercept for different business lines in 
the insurance industry. 
In the portfolio analysis we find that shifts in exposure to market beta are negative 
and significant for all the portfolios.  Each of the business line portfolios has a positive 
overall wealth effect. Property/casualty and life insurance portfolios have higher gains 
from the GLBA, and these wealth effects are significantly different from each other. We 
also find that six different events have a statistically different impact across the business 
lines.   
In cross-sectional analysis, we find that firms in the property/casualty insurance 
and all other insurance portfolio (except life insurance firms) benefit from risk reduction 
under the GLBA. Our results also strongly support the general findings of the merger 
literature. We find that larger firms, irrespective of the business line, gain from this 
deregulation. Poorly performing firms in the life and property/casualty insurance 
industries benefit from the GLBA.  
                                                 
6 Anthony Saunders(1998) pp. 120-121. 
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The rest of the study is organized as follows. The second section provides an 
historical overview. Section three introduces major hypotheses and describes the 
methodology. Section four describes the data and lists the major events. Section five 
presents the empirical results. Section six discusses the cross-sectional analysis and a 
final section concludes. 
3.3 History of the GLBA 
Bank entry into the insurance business started in 1985 with the OCC (Office of 
the Comptroller of Currency) ruling that allows banks to sell variable rate annuities. The 
scope of bank activity in the insurance business widened further in 1986, based on 
Section 92 of the National Banking Act. Through this act, the OCC ruled that a national 
bank, or its branch that is located in a place with a population of 5,000 or less, may sell 
insurance to existing and potential customers, located anywhere. In 1990, the OCC 
permitted banks to sell fixed rate annuities.  
Under the new law (GLBA), insurance remains a state-regulated business (the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act remains in place). The GLBA repeals sections of the Banking 
Act of 1933, including sections 20 and 32, which prohibit national banks from 
maintaining securities firms and bank officials from sitting on corporate boards of 
insurance companies. It also amends the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 and creates 
a new entity known as a Financial Holding Company (FHC). The FHC is the centerpiece 
of this financial modernization. FHCs may engage in activities that are financial in nature 
including banking, securities, insurance (underwriting as well as sales as an agent), and 
merchant banking. To qualify as an FHC each subsidiary has to be well managed and 
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well capitalized. In addition, the depository subsidiary of the FHCs has to comply with 
the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) rating requirement. 
The GLBA also creates a new type of subsidiary, known as a ‘financial 
subsidiary,’ through which banks can conduct many of the same activities as that of a 
subsidiary of an FHC7. A significant exception is that insurance underwriting may not be 
conducted in a financial subsidiary. However, to own such a financial subsidiary, the 
GLBA requires that the bank and each of its depository subsidiaries be well managed and 
well capitalized.  
The GLBA also repeals Title VI of the Garn-St. Germain Act, which stated that 
the sale or underwriting of insurance is “not closely related” to banking, effectively 
preventing bank holding companies from selling and underwriting insurance. The GLBA 
also preempts anti-affiliation laws. Any attempt by a state to deny a depository institution 
from trying to affiliate with an insurer can also be nullified since states are forbidden 
from discriminating against such entities. Hence, the GLBA allows cross-industry 
mergers that were not previously allowed under the OCC rulings. 
3.4 Hypothesis and Methodology  
3.4.1 Hypotheses 
We examine five hypothesis related to the effect of the passage of the GLBA on 
the insurance industry.   
Hypothesis 1 (Barriers): The relaxation of merger barriers will benefit firms.   
The GLBA creates a unique opportunity for cross-industry mergers within the 
financial services industry. Prior to the GLBA banks were allowed under OCC regulation 
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to enter the insurance business, but mergers between banks and insurance companies 
were prohibited. We argue that the GLBA creates economies of scope for firms in the 
insurance industry by abolishing the merger barrier. Previous studies find a positive 
wealth effect for insurance firms on the announcement of the Citicorp and Travelers 
merger. It may be interpreted that this reaction is in anticipation that the regulators would 
allow more of such mergers in the future.   
Hypothesis 2 (Suitability): More suitable merger targets such as life and 
property/casualty insurance will benefit more. 
Previous studies hypothesize that banks will be interested in merging with firms 
that sell actuarial products, which can be easily marketed with traditional banking 
products and may help them to reduce their operating expenses.  They further argue that 
only a few large banks may choose to underwrite the full line of risk.  Prior research 
suggests that banks will be more interested in life insurance, because greater synergistic 
gains are available for combinations of banks and life insurers than from combinations of 
banks and property/casualty insurers.  Other studies argue that the cross-marketing 
benefits with traditional banking products makes property/casualty insurers more suitable 
as merger targets. In light of this literature we hypothesize that life and/or property 
insurance will benefit more from deregulation. 
Hypothesis 3 (Size): Larger firms have more resources to take advantage of 
merger opportunities, therefore will benefit more. 
The GLBA’s biggest innovation is the FHC. It allows institutions to offer an array 
of services (banking, insurance and brokerage) under one roof. Larger institutions have 
                                                                                                                                                 
7 Broome and Markham, 2001. 
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more resources to exploit this opportunity for scope economies created by the GLBA.  
Furthermore, larger firms in the insurance industry are somewhat insulated from takeover 
pressure from other sectors that we examine.  For example, Carow (2001b) investigates 
the impact of OCC rulings that let banks into the insurance business and finds that 
following the enacting of Section 92 regulation, larger insurance companies had higher 
gains. Thus we expect that larger insurance companies will have a greater wealth effect.  
Hypothesis 4 (Performance): Poorly performing firms are more attractive 
merger targets, therefore having higher wealth effects. 
Two general findings from the merger literature support the argument that poorly 
performing firms in the insurance industry will gain from the GLBA.  First, the literature 
that investigates the relationship between insolvency and mergers in the insurance 
industry find that insolvency is a major motivation on the part of target firms to go into 
the merger.  Thus we expect that the cross-industry merger opportunities created under 
the new regulation will be regarded as good news for the poorly performing firms in the 
insurance industry.  Secondly, prior researchers in the merger literature find evidence that 
better performing firms typically takeover poorly performing firms.  The general 
consensus from the merger literature is that target firms’ shares sell at a premium as a 
result of merger announcements.  So we expect that the GLBA will create wealth effects 
for the poorly performing firms in the insurance industry.  
Hypothesis 5 (Risk Reduction): Cross-industry merger opportunities and 
regulatory changes will reduce risk to stockholders. 
There are several studies that look into the issue of risk that can arise as a result of 
combining commercial banks with insurance companies and securities firms.  Some of 
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these studies suggest that the combination of banking and –insurance firms will reduce 
risk while others argue that some adjustments will be necessary to ensure that banks will 
not take excessive risks.  The GLBA has preventive measures to ensure that new 
financial conglomerates do not take excessive risk or that existing depository institutions 
expand their business into non-traditional services in a manner that threatens their 
financial health. It also requires the use of market signals to discipline firms that take 
excessive risk. Consequently, diversification under the new regulation should not threaten 
the health of the firms in the financial services industry and hence, will create wealth 
effects. 
3.4.2 Portfolio Analysis: 
For our portfolio analysis we create three SIC (Standard Industrial Classification) 
based portfolios. They are: 
1. Life insurance. (SIC 6311) 
2. Property/Casualty insurance. (SIC 6331) 
3. Other types of insurance. (SIC 6321, 6351 6361) 
 
Schwert (1981) argues that individual asset returns of the firms in the same 
industry measured over a common time-period are contemporaneously correlated because 
the firms will react similarly to any unanticipated event. So in events such as regulatory 
changes the residuals will not be independently and identically distributed. If there is a 
contemporaneous correlation among the disturbances across equations but not correlated 
over time, SUR model estimates will be more efficient than Ordinary Least Squares 
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(OLS).  Thus, in order to test for hypotheses surrounding the events we estimate the 
following model using SUR methodology: 
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       (1) 
Here, Rit is the return on portfolio i (i = (1, 2, 3), life insurance, property/casualty 
insurance and all other insurance) on day t and Rmt is the return on the market index at 
day t.8 Dkt is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 over the event window of the kth 
announcement and zero otherwise, γik is the coefficient of a dummy variable that captures 
the impact of the kth event on the ith portfolio. D is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 
after the enactment of the regulation and zero otherwise. Rft represents the return on a 
foreign exchange index on day t, Rrt represents the return on a one-yearT-bill on day t, 
and β’i1, β’i2, and β’i3 capture the shift in exposure to systematic risks between the pre-act 
and post-act period for portfolio i. 
Based on the above model we test two hypotheses. The first statistically tests 
whether all of the announcements analyzed in this paper have a non-zero impact on the 
insurance industry. Formally this test is:   
0 ,γ = ∀ik i                 (2) 
We do not expect that two lines of business in the insurance industry are going to 
have the same impact at each of the announcements. We formally test this using the 
following hypothesis test. 
0γ = ∀ik            (3) 
 
8 Lagged values of market return are used to overcome the effects of nonsynchronous trading in the sample. 
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We modify the above model to estimate the overall gain of each line of business 
from the passage of the GLBA and to test for the winners and losers in the insurance 
industry from this law.  
3 3
3 3
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      (4) 
Here, the coefficient (γi) of the dummy variable DG estimates the overall impact 
of the law on each of the portfolios. This estimation allows us to formally test for 
evidence that no two lines of business in insurance industry have the same overall impact.  
Using the following hypothesis test in conjunction with the point estimation from 
equation 4 of overall impact, allows us to test hypothesis 2. 
,γ γ= ∀i j i j           (5) 
3.4.3 Specification test 
We use a Likelihood Ratio (LR) test as suggested by Berndt and Savin (1977), to 
determine whether SUR estimates are more efficient than OLS estimates for our portfolio 
model.9 
 
9 This test in principal determines whether the off-diagonal elements of the variance covariance matrix (S) 
of error terms are zero or not. Excluding the diagonal elements, there are 1/2m∗(m-1) unknown parameters 
in S that can be arranged in a vector, θ. Here m is the number of equations. The null hypothesis is: 
H0:θ = 0                                                                                         
This test is based on the following statistic: 
2
1
ˆˆ[ log log | |]λ σ
−
= ∑ − ∑mLR i
i
T                                
here  is e from the individual least squares regression and is the maximum likelihood 
estimator of S. This statistic has a limiting χ2 distribution with 1/2m∗(m-1) degrees of freedom under the 
null hypothesis. 
2ˆ iσ Teii /′ ∑ˆ
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3.5 Data and Event Selection 
3.5.1 Firm Selection 
We use the SIC classifications from COMPUSTAT to create our portfolios. The 
return information for this study comes from the CRSP tapes, while the balance sheet 
information comes from COMPUSTAT.  
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of sample. 
  Life Insurance 
Property/Casualty 
Insurance All Other Insurance 
    n = 29 n = 77 n = 34 
Total Asset Value Mean 61767 7757 8071 
(Millions of $) Median 8816 1593 1153 
 Minimum 81 36 16 
 Maximum 463696 150632 122237 
Return on Equity Mean 9.38 6.89 11.79 
 Median 9.72 8.83 12.32 
 Minimum -8.97 -89.34 -10.70 
 Maximum 15.79 28.03 27.15 
 
We require firms have no missing trading data from August 1998 to March 2000. 
In order to match firms from COMPUSTAT and CRSP, we dropped all firms with 
exchange code 4 through 10, since CRSP only has return information for firms trading on 
the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ. We require the firms to have balance sheet 
information for both 1998 and 1999. Our final sample has 140 firms; the descriptive 
statistics are presented in table 1. 
We use returns data for the sample firms from January 1990 to December 2000 to 
estimate of our models.10 Longer estimation windows are used for three reasons. First, 
Congress has debated the deregulation of the financial services industry at least 3 times in 
                                                 
10 We also estimate all the models presented in this paper using data from January 1998 to December 2000, 
as suggested by one of the referees, the major conclusion of the paper remains same. 
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the past decade.11 Second, several deregulations took place in the 90’s.12 Finally, other 
major macroeconomic events took place during the 90’s that may have had an impact on 
the financial services industry. 13  
3.5.2 Macroeconomic variables 
Data for the two macroeconomic variables that we use in our study is obtained 
from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.14 For foreign exchange 
data, we use the Major Currencies Index15. The return is calculated using the following 
formula:16 
-1
-1
-= t tt
t
F FRf
F
            (6) 
To be consistent with previous literature we use the one-year T-bills rate as a 
proxy for the interest rate. 17 Interest rate returns are computed using the formula,18 
                                                 
11 The first time in 1995, Rep. Jim Leach introduced the banking modernization bill. The second time, the 
financial modernization bill died in congress due to strong opposition from the insurance industry. Finally, 
in 1998, the House version of the modernization bill passed but died in the Senate. 
12 Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) allowed thrifts to branch where the choose in 1992. The Riegle-Neal 
Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act sanctioned interstate banking and loosened interstate 
branching in 1994. In 1995, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that banks can sell annuities and in the same 
ruling, the OCC was allowed to grant subsidiary powers to banks. In 1996, the Fed raised the Section 20 
revenue cap from 10 percent to 25 percent, and banks were allowed to merge with large securities 
companies. Some banks immediately took advantage of that to acquire securities firms. OCC’s ’ First 
Union Letter’ further opened national banks insurance power and the Fed eliminated section 20 firewalls in 
1997.  The three existing firewalls that were eliminated in 1997 were the restriction on interlocks between 
the Section 20 subsidiary and its affiliate banks/ thrift, the prohibition on cross-marketing between a bank 
and it’s securities affiliate and the exception to prohibition on the purchase or sale of assets between a bank 
and its securities affiliate. 
13 The U.S. financial industry had been rocked by crises at home, like the LTCM (1998) crisis, and abroad, 
for example, the Asian Crisis (1997) or the Russian Crisis (1998). 
14 All the information is available online from http://www.federalreserve.gov 
15 The major currencies index is a weighted average of the foreign exchange values of the U.S. dollar 
against a subset of currencies in the broad index that circulate widely outside the country of issue. The 
weights are derived from those in the broad index. 
16 From Wetmore and Brick (1994), and Choi, Elyasiani and Kopecky (1992). 
17 See Kane and Unal (1988), Flannery and James (1984), and Wetmore and Brick (1994). 
18 Also from Wetmore and Brick (1994) 
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3.5.3 Event Selection 
Binder (1985b) argues that selection of event dates in regulatory events is much 
more difficult than standard studies that concern corporate announcements. Thirteen 
major events are identified from the Wall Street Journal and Lexis-Nexis wire service. 
Table 2 summarizes the important events.   
Table 2: Time line of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. 
Note: The first column ‘Date’ is the event date. If the event occurred after the trading closed for a day then 
that the next trading day is the event date. Event Window is defined as Event Date, -1 day and +1 day. The 
second column 'Event' describes the main event.  
Date Event 
11/4/98 
 
 
1/8/99 
 
2/17/99 
 
4/12/99 
 
4/28/99 
 
 
5/4/99 
 
05/06/99 – 
Midnight 
 
7/1/99 
 
10/15/99 
 
10/22/99 
 
11/02/99 
 
 
11/4/99 
 
11/12/99 
1. (i) Senator Alfonse D’Amato lost his re-election bid (11/03/98 –night). (ii) Senator Gramm 
to take over as a chair of Senate Banking Committee. (11/04/98). 
 
2. Financial Services Reform Bill is reintroduced in Congress. 
 
3. Draft bill was unveiled in the Senate. 
 
4. Senator Gramm meets with Senate Minority leader to work on the bill. 
 
5. Senate Banking Committee formally files the Financial Services Modernization Act in the 
Senate. 
 
6. Clinton raises the privacy issue to be included in the bill. 
 
7. Senate passes S. 900. Senate version of the Bill is passed. 
 
 
8. House version of the bill was passed. 
 
9. Federal Reserve and Treasury announce agreement on the regulation. 
 
10. Gramm makes deal with White House on CRA. 
 
11. Joint House Conference report signed by the majority of the conferees, clearing the way 
for the votes in both the House and the Senate. 
 
12. Senate passes the bill (90-8) and House passes the bill (362-57). 
 
13. President Clinton signs the bill into law. 
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Table 3: Estimation of Overall impact of the law. 
We estimated the following model to test for the overall impact of the law on each industry: 
3 3
3 3
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Rit is return on portfolio, i(=1,2,3) on day t. Rmt is Return on market index at time t. αi is the intercept 
coefficient for portfolio i. βi1-βi3 are market risk coefficient for portfolio i. β’i1-β’i3 captures the difference 
in the exposure to systematic market risk between pre-act and post-act for portfolio i, δi is foreign exchange 
risk coefficient for portfolio i and κi is the interest rate risk coefficient for portfolio i. Dkt is a dummy 
variable which is equal to 1 on the event windows and zero otherwise, while D is a dummy variable that is 
equal to 1 after the enactment of the regulation and zero otherwise. eit are the random disturbances. In this 
model coefficient of DG s i.e., γi estimates the overall average abnormal return of the law for the ith 
portfolio.  
 
Life Insurance 
Property/Casualty 
Insurance All other Insurance 
Parameter Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat 
α -0.001  -0.306 0.006 ** 2.067 0.005  1.329 
α′ 0.001  1.328 0.002 *** 4.076 0.001 * 1.690 
β1 -0.024  -1.021 0.022  1.208 -0.031  -1.295 
β2 0.010 *** 4.156 0.083 *** 4.572 0.147 *** 6.049 
β3 1.057 *** 44.602 0.796 *** 43.841 0.766 *** 31.576 
β′1 
 
 
0.001  0.027 -0.119 *** -3.382 -0.063  -1.349 
β′2 -0.213 *** -4.663 -0.339 *** -9.699 -0.257 *** -5.494 
β′3 -0.486 *** -10.615 -0.204 *** -5.827 -0.306 *** -6.532 
γ 0.004 ** 2.218 0.006 *** 4.237 0.003 * 1.660 
δ 0.000  0.417 -0.001 ** -2.444 0.000  -1.178 
κ 0.000   -0.296 0.000   0.933 0.000   -0.599 
R2 0.451   0.474   0.307   
N 38     89     42     
***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
 
Table 4: Test that no two industries have same overall impact from the law. 
Column 2 of this table presents the Wald test that two industries have same overall impact from the law. 
The underlying distribution is a χ2 with 2 degrees of freedom.  
Hypothesis χ2(2) 
Overall Impact of the law is same for Life and  
Property/Casualty Industry 17.950*** 
Overall Impact of the law is same for Life and all  
other Industry  6.516** 
Overall Impact of the law is same for Property/Casualty and all  
other Industry  18.033*** 
***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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3.6 Empirical Results 
3.6.1 Overall impact of the law 
Table 3 presents the results from estimation of the overall impact of the law 
(average impact of the law over the 13 event windows). Property/casualty has an average 
abnormal return (AR)19 of 0.6% (significant at 1% level) compared to that of 0.4% 
(significant at 5% level) for life insurance. The portfolio of all other insurance firms has 
an average abnormal return of 0.3% (significant at 10%). We also perform a chi-squared 
test (equation 5) to determine if the point estimates of average returns of any two 
industries are the same. These results are given in Table 4. The first null hypothesis that 
overall impact of the law is the same for the life and property/casualty insurance 
industries is rejected at the 1% level.  The results also indicate that the impact of the law 
is significantly different across the life insurance and all other insurance industries (at the 
5% level), as well as across the property/casualty industry and all other insurance 
industries (at the 1% level). These results lend support to our second hypothesis.20  
3.6.2  Specification Test 
The result of the specification test for our portfolio model shows that the null 
hypothesis H:θ =0 is rejected at the 1% level. This means that the variance-covariance 
matrix is non-diagonal. Statistically that means that SUR is the correct model to choose 
as opposed to the OLS.  
                                                 
19 We call it average abnormal return because it is cumulative abnormal return over 13 events over the 
number of days in the event window (e.g., a 3 day event window over 13 events is the cumulative abnormal 
return over 39 days). We also estimate this model for 2 day [-1,0] event window and the results remain 
similar.  
20 We also estimate the same model using data from January 1998 to December 2000 and perform the same 
χ2 test based on the estimation and reach the same conclusion. 
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3.6.3 Hypotheses based on portfolio analysis 
The main advantage of using the Seemingly Unrelated Regression methodology is 
the ability to do joint hypothesis testing. The following hypothesis tests are based on the 
estimation of the portfolio model (presented in Table 5). Here we will test two different 
hypotheses. 
First we test that all 13 events have zero impact on the insurance industry. This 
test is based on equation 2. This hypothesis examines all events to determine whether the 
average abnormal returns (all 39) are jointly equal to zero. The distribution under the null 
hypothesis is χ2(39). The hypothesis is rejected at the 1% level (calculated value is 85.1). 
Panel A of Table 5 presents the SUR estimation results, average abnormal returns 
and corresponding t-statistics for each of the 13 events for the three portfolios. It also 
presents model parameter estimates for the market betas (current and lagged), shift in 
market betas, foreign exchange risk coefficient (δ) and interest rate risk coefficient (κ).  
We find that current and lagged market betas are positive and significant at the 1% level 
for all three portfolios. The foreign exchange risk coefficient is significant for 
property/casualty insurance. Coefficient of β’3 (the risk shift parameter) is negative and 
significant (at the 1% level) for all lines of insurance business. This implies that exposure 
to systematic risk was reduced after the enactment of GLBA. As discussed earlier this 
shift may have arised from the diversification benefits, from safeguards against excessive 
risk taking, or due to a combination of both these effects. Panel B presents the results of 
the hypothesis test that all the portfolios have the same impact due to an announcement. 
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Table 5: Estimation of a modified market model with 3 sub-portfolios of the insurance 
industry and test of hypothesis that two lines of business is going to have similar impact 
on the same announcements. 
The following table presents the estimation results of portfolio model: 
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Rit is return on portfolio, i on day t. Rmt is Return on market index at time t. αi is the intercept coefficient 
for portfolio i. βi1-βi3 are market risk coefficients for portfolio i. β’i1-β’i3 captures the difference in the 
exposure to systematic market risk between pre-act and post-act for portfolio i, , δi is foreign exchange risk 
coefficient for portfolio i and κi is the interest rate risk coefficient for portfolio i. Dkt is a dummy variable 
which is equal to 1 in the event window of kth announcement and zero otherwise, while D is a dummy 
variable that is equal to 1 after the enactment of the regulation and zero otherwise. eit are the random 
disturbances. In this model the coefficient of Dkt s i.e. γs estimates the AR over the event window. Panel A 
presents the average abnormal return and t-statistics for each of the thirteen events, as well as the model 
parameter estimates for the market betas (current and lag), foreign exchange risk coefficient and interest 
rate risk coefficient. Panel B presents the results of hypothesis that two lines of business have same impact 
on the same announcements. N represents the number of firms in each of the portfolios. 
 Panel A Panel B 
  Life Insurance 
Property/Casualty 
Insurance All other Insurance 
Wald test 
Parameter Estimate   t-stat Estimate   t-stat Estimate   t-stat χ2(3) 
α -0.001  -0.323 0.006  2.098 0.005  1.384   
α′ 0.001  1.333 0.002 *** 4.113 0.001 * 1.725   
β1 -0.021  -0.879 0.026  1.428 -0.032  
 
 
 
-1.301   
β2 0.104 *** 4.379 0.086 *** 4.702 0.149 *** 6.104   
β3 1.055 *** 44.681 0.795 *** 43.899 0.766 *** 31.580   
β′1 -0.002  -0.045 -0.123 *** -3.507 -0.063  -1.344   
β′2 -0.218 *** -4.796 -0.342 *** -9.797 -0.258 *** -5.536   
β′3 -0.484 *** -10.632 -0.204 *** -5.827 -0.305 *** -6.538   
δ 0.000  0.443 0.001 *** -2.465 0.000  
 
-1.231   
κ 0.000   -0.336 0.000   0.885 0.000   -0.616    
γ1 -0.002  -0.374 0.000  -0.079 0.007  
 
 
 
1.142 1.712  
γ2 0.000  -0.061 -0.002  -0.586 -0.014 ** -2.468 6.266 * 
γ3 0.022 *** 3.982 0.011 *** 2.671 0.005  0.950 16.384 *** 
γ4 0.000  0.050 -0.001  
 
 
-0.202 0.006  1.114 1.620  
γ5 -0.007  -1.252 0.010 ** 2.349 0.010  1.717 14.916 *** 
γ6 -0.001  -0.145 0.008  
 
 
1.529 0.004  0.565 3.526  
γ7 0.002  0.325 0.012 ** 2.321 0.002  0.278 6.644 * 
γ8 0.008  1.224 0.000  
 
-0.050 0.000  0.015 2.124  
γ9 0.008  1.492 0.004  0.840 0.000  -0.029 2.361  
γ10 0.013 ** 2.431 0.012 *** 2.749 0.009  1.642 9.530 ** 
γ11 -0.010  -1.496 -0.001  -0.167 0.004  0.637 3.336  
γ12 0.012 * 1.770 0.018 *** 3.497 -0.002  -0.286 14.514 *** 
γ13 -0.005   -0.525 0.006   0.856 0.008   0.837 2.382   
R2 0.456   0.479   0.311     
N 38     89     42         
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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Three events produce significant average abnormal returns (AR) for the life 
insurance industry. When the draft bill is unveiled in Senate on February 17, 1999, life 
insurance has an AR return of 2.2% (significant at the 1% level). When Senator Phill 
Gramm (Chairman of Senate Banking Committee) agreed with the White House on the 
CRA provision on October 22, 1999, the AR is 1.3% and it is significant at the 5% level. 
Finally, when the Senate and House pass the bill, the life insurance portfolio has a 
positive AR of 1.2%, significant at the 10% level. 
The property/casualty insurance industry has significant stock price reactions on 
the same events as that of life insurance. When the draft bill is unveiled, the portfolio of 
life insurance firms  has an AR of 1.1% (significant at 1%), when Senator Gramm agrees 
with the White House on CRA provision the AR is 1.2% (significant at 1%) and when the 
Senate and House pass the bill it has a 1.8% AR (significant at 1%). In addition, the 
property/casualty insurance industry has a significant stock market reaction on two other 
occasions. The first of these is when the Senate Banking Committee formally files the 
Financial Services Modernization Bill to the Senate. On this occasion, the 
property/casualty portfolio has a 1.0% AR, significant at the 5% level. This insurance 
portfolio also has a 1.2% AR (significant at 5%) when the Senate passed Senate version 
of the bill (S. 900).  
The portfolio of other insurance firms has a negative reaction on one event. This 
is when the Financial Services Reform Bill is reintroduced in the Congress. The AR in 
this occasion is  -1.4% (significant at the 5% level). 
Panel B of Table 5 presents the Wald test of the hypothesis presented by equation 
3 for each announcement. This tests the hypothesis that the information produced during 
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the kth event has the same impact over all three portfolios. We find that over six different 
events the impact of the announcement has an asymmetric impact across the three 
portfolios. They are events 2 (Financial Services Bill was re-introduced in Congress), 3 
(Draft Bill is unveiled in Senate.), 5 (Senate banking committee formally files the bill.), 7 
(Senate passes S. 900 (Senate version of the Bill)), 10 (Senator Gramm makes a 
compromise with The White House on the CRA.) and 12 (Senate and House pass the 
bill). 
3.7 Cross Sectional Analysis 
The GLBA creates positive and significant wealth effects for some firms and 
negative but significant effects for others. Other firms may have statistically insignificant 
wealth effects from the passage of the GLBA. The general purpose of a cross-sectional 
analysis is to identify firm-specific characteristics that will help us to single out winners 
and losers from this law. Specifically, our goal is to test for hypothesis 3, 4 and 5. 
In order to identify the firm-specific characteristics, we first need to generate the 
overall AR for each firm. We use equation 4 to generate the wealth effects (i.e. γI for firm 
i gives the right hand side variable). 
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Here θ is the intercept for property/casualty insurance firms, the difference in 
coefficient estimate of intercept for life insurance firms with property/casualty insurance 
firms is θLIFE and the difference in coefficient estimate of intercept for other insurance 
firms with property/casualty insurance firms is θOTHERS. The Size variable is calculated by 
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taking the log of book value of total assets. ROE is a profitability indicator, defined as net 
income after taxes as a percent of book value of equity capital. RISK is the change in 
exposure to systematic risk, which we estimate using equation 4 (β’i3). θSIZE is the 
coefficient estimate of size for property/casualty insurance, while θSIZExLIFE is the 
difference in coefficient estimate of size variable for life insurance firms with 
property/casualty insurance and θSIZExOTHERS is the difference in coefficient estimate of 
size variable for other insurance firms with property/casualty insurance. The coefficient 
estimates for ROE and SHIFT are defined likewise.  
We estimate equation 8 using the OLS method. The result of the estimation is 
presented in table 6; the t-statistics are computed using the formulas suggested by 
MacKinnon and White (1985). We expect SIZE variable to be positive and significant. 
Coefficient for SIZE variable of the reference group (property/casualty insurance) is 
positive and significant at 1% level. While the difference in coefficient estimates of the 
size variable for life insurance firms and other insurance firms from the reference group 
is insignificantly different from zero. Thus we find that, consistent with the hypothesis, 
larger firms in the insurance industry, irrespective of the business line, gain from the 
GLBA.  
Prior merger literature concludes that poorly performing firms become merger 
targets. Previous researcher also predict that banking firms may benefit from mergers 
with life and property/casualty insurance. Thus we expect that poorly performing firms, 
especially the ones in the life and property/casualty insurance business will benefit more. 
The results in Table 6 show that the coefficient estimate of ROE for the reference group 
is negative and significant and the difference in the coefficient estimate for life insurance 
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is insignificantly different from zero.  These results are consistent with the hypothesis. 
But we find that the difference in the coefficient estimate for other insurance firms is 
positive and significant.  
Table 6: Cross-sectional analysis of wealth effect on each firm in the insurance industry. 
The models are: 
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Both models are estimated using OLS. Here ARi is the abnormal return of firm i. ξ is the error term in the 
regression. θ is the intercept for property/casualty insurance firms, the difference in coefficient estimate of 
intercept for life insurance firms with property/casualty insurance firms is θLIFE and for other insurance 
firms with property/casualty insurance firms is θOTHERS. SIZE variable is calculated by taking book value of 
total asset. ROE is a profitability indicator, defined as net income after taxes as a percent of book value of 
equity capital. RISK is the change in exposure to systematic risk, which we estimate using equation 4 (β’i3). 
θSIZE is the coefficient estimate of SIZE for property/casualty insurance, while θSIZExLIFE is the difference in 
coefficient estimate of SIZE variable for life insurance firms with property/casualty insurance and 
θSIZExOTHERS is the difference in coefficient estimate of SIZE variable for other insurance firms with 
property/casualty insurance. The coefficient estimates for ROE and SHIFT are defined likewise.  
Parameter Estimate t-statistic 
θ -0.288 ** -2.587 
θLIFE 0.204  0.997 
θOTHERS 
 
 
 
0.130  0.829 
θSIZE 0.046 *** 3.563 
θSIZE x LIFE -0.026  -1.202 
θSIZE x OTHERS -0.026  -1.333 
θROE -0.003 *** -4.485 
θROE x LIFE 0.009  1.117 
θROE x OTHERS 0.009 *** 4.441 
θRISK -0.177 ** -2.252 
θ RISK x LIFE 0.471 ** 2.356 
θ RISK x OTHERS 0.073  0.545 
R2 0.355     
F 6.209 ***   
 
***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
 
We expect that the merger opportunities will create diversification benefits that 
will reduce the exposure to market risk for the firms in the insurance industry. In 
addition, the GLBA also reduces risk by providing safeguards against excessive risk-
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taking. For both these reasons, we expect that risk reduction will account for a part of the 
wealth effect. We find that for the reference group the coefficient estimate for risk is 
negative and significant but for firms in the life insurance the difference in coefficient 
estimate is positive and significant.  For all other insurance firms the difference in 
estimate is insignificant. So shareholders of property/casualty insurance as well as other 
insurance firms (except life insurance firms) benefit from the diversification and new 
measures included in GLBA which safeguards against excessive risk-taking. 
3.8 Conclusion 
In this paper, we examine the impact of Financial Services Modernization Act of 
1999 on the insurance industry. Our sample includes 140 firms from the insurance 
industry. We analyze 13 different announcement dates that were related to the passage of 
the GLBA. We study several different issues including characterizing the winners and 
losers from the passage of this law at both the industry level and the firm level.   
This study has two major contributions. First, previous studies consistently find 
that the GLBA creates wealth effects for the insurance industry, but none of these studies 
investigate whether some lines of business within the insurance industry may benefit 
more than others. We find that property/casualty and life insurance firms gain more from 
the deregulation compared to other firms in the insurance business. We also show that 
this gain can be explained by their suitability as targets to banking conglomerates. 
Secondly, we show that diversification opportunities and safeguards against excessive 
risk-taking under the GLBA reduces exposure to systematic risk for all business lines in 
the insurance industry and creates value for the shareholders of property/casualty firms 
and the portfolio of other firms (except life insurance firms). 
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In addition we also test a merger related hypothesis. We find strong evidence that 
large firms, irrespective of business lines, gain from the passage of this law. We also find 
that poorly performing firms in both the property/casualty and life insurance industries 
gain from the deregulation.   
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Chapter IV 
 
Implications of Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act for  
International Banking 
 
4.1 Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act (GLBA) on international banks. We find that the banking sectors of most developed 
countries have significant negative spillover effects from the GLBA. We also find that 
the impact of the GLBA on any two countries’ banking sectors is not the same. Most 
importantly we show that exposure to systematic risk with respect to world equity index 
has increased following the passage of the GLBA and this can explain the cross-sectional 
variation of the wealth effects. This result implies that the GLBA reduced diversification 
opportunities for foreign banks by restricting their operations in the U.S., the most 
important banking market. In cross-sectional analysis we also find, consistent with 
previous literature, that wealth effect can be partially explained by country-specific 
dummy variables.  
4.2 Introduction 
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) of 1999 is potentially the most significant 
legislation of the past century because it changes the way financial institutions conduct 
their business in the U.S. However, predictions have been made, in the academic and 
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professional literature, that the GLBA will have a widespread impact on international 
banking as well. Some argue that the GLBA will induce more cross-country mergers 
while others argue that the GLBA will create growth opportunities for international banks 
in the U.S. In a recent study, Carow and Heron (2002) analyze the impact of this 
regulation on ten publicly traded international banks in the U.S. They find that the return 
on a portfolio of international banks trading in the U.S.A is more negative compared to 
that of publicly traded U.S. banks following the passage of the GLBA. Our study 
complements that of Carow and Heron (2002) and broadens it to investigate the impact of 
the GLBA on 215 international banks from 10 developed countries. We also seek to 
answer whether the GLBA has created any diversification opportunities for international 
banks. Finally, we try to predict whether the GLBA will encourage increases in foreign 
bank presence, growth and entry in the United States. 
This study focuses on three important questions; first, does the GLBA create 
growth opportunities for foreign banks in the U.S. It is argued in the literature that this act 
creates significant growth opportunities for international banks and there is a growing 
trend of non-U.S. banks acquiring U.S. banks. Berger et al. (2000) document a trend in 
acquisitions of U.S. firms by non-U.S. firms. By the mid-90s the total value of these 
consolidations was $10 billion and by 1998, more than $12 billion. Historically, any 
increase in the activity of foreign banks in the U.S. has created political pressure on 
regulators to restrict their growth. For example, Goldberg and Saunders (1981) notes that 
rapid growth in foreign banks in the U.S. in the early 70s led to the restriction of multi-
state operations of all foreign banks and subsequently led to the International Banking 
Act of 1978. The second question we address is whether the impact on foreign banks 
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varies across countries, bank size, profitability and presence in the U.S. We investigate 
this question because literature on foreign bank activity in the U.S. predicts that the 
impact of the GLBA will be different from one country to the other and the literature that 
investigate the impact of the GLBA on domestic banks find that size and profitability can 
explain the cross-sectional variation of the wealth effect. 
Finally, we investigate if the GLBA creates diversification opportunities for 
international banks and thereby reduces exposure to systematic risk. Correlations of bank 
earnings presented in Table 1 show very strong diversification opportunities for 
international banks in the U.S., as argued by Berger et al. (2000). We inquire whether the 
GLBA allows international banks to take advantage of this opportunity as suggested by 
Finch, Macdonald and Walker (2000) and thereby reduce the exposure to systematic risk. 
 
Table 1: Correlation of bank earnings between USA and selected G-10 and EU countries 
between 1988 and 1997. 
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Canada 1.000           
Denmark 0.648 1.000          
France -0.344 -0.229 1.000         
Germany 0.129 0.500 -0.513 1.000        
Greece -0.705 -0.279 0.084 0.394 1.000       
Italy -0.391 -0.455 0.803 -0.264 0.170 1.000      
Japan -0.320 -0.563 0.259 0.098 0.202 0.733 1.000     
Spain -0.085 -0.195 0.782 -0.522 0.089 0.498 0.088 1.000    
Switzerland -0.275 -0.246 0.155 0.107 0.309 0.310 0.301 -0.138 1.000   
UK 0.592 0.689 -0.734 0.446 -0.169 -0.854 -0.708 -0.431 -0.426 1.000  
USA 0.413 0.399 -0.880 0.258 -0.329 -0.938 -0.603 -0.702 -0.336 0.811 1.000 
Source: ‘Bank Profitability’: OECD Publications 1999 and 2000. 
 
Our study concentrates on large international banks because the literature on 
international spillover effect predicts that larger banks are affected from international 
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events. In this study we analyze 215 foreign banks from 10 countries, of which are 7 are 
EU member countries (France, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain and the UK) and 
3 are non-EU countries (Canada, Japan and Switzerland). We have also included 45 large 
U.S. banks in this study. We find that most of the foreign banking industries have a 
significant impact from the events leading to the passage of the GLBA. Banking 
industries of 6 (Canada, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Japan, and Spain) out of the 10 
countries that we investigate have a significantly negative impact, while the banking 
industries of France, Italy and the UK are largely unaffected by this regulation. We find 
that the cross-sectional variation in firm specific wealth effect is partly attributable to 
country specific events and attributes during that period.  
The most important contribution of this paper is that we identify that the GLBA 
has increased international banks’ exposure to systematic risk, with respect to a world 
index. The GLBA has reduced the capability of international banks to diversify their 
portfolio by restricting their entry and expansion to the U.S. market.  
The rest of the study is organized as follows: the second section provides a 
literature review. Section three briefly discusses the GLBA and its implication for 
international banks. Section four introduces our major hypotheses. Section five describes 
the methodology, data and lists the major events. Section six presents the empirical 
results and a final section concludes. 
4.3 Literature 
4.3.1 Literature on the impact of GLBA on domestic Financial Institutions 
Hendershott, Lee, and Tompkins (2002) investigate the market response of the 
GLBA on the three major financial industries. They do not find any market response for 
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commercial banks, while they find a significantly positive wealth effect for both the 
insurance and brokerage industries, though only for one event. They argue that loopholes 
in the laws have long allowed banks to have a ‘fairly substantial presence in other 
sectors’ as a reason to why there is no wealth effect for commercial banks. For all three 
industries they find that the size of the firms can explain the cross-sectional variation of 
the wealth effect and for commercial banks they also find that profitability can explain 
the cross-sectional variation in return. Similarly, Carow and Heron (2002) find that 
brokerage firms and insurance companies benefit from the GLBA, but banks do not 
benefit. They also find negative returns for foreign banks, thrifts, and finance companies; 
though larger non-depository firms have higher returns. Akhigbe and Whyte (2001), on 
the other hand, find that all three industries benefit from the provisions of GLBA and that 
larger and well-capitalized banks benefit more from this law. They also find that 
brokerage firms benefit regardless of size, but the gains are inversely related to capital 
position, and insurance companies benefit regardless of size and capitalization. Barth, 
Brumbaugh, and Wilcox (2000) argue that the GLBA is just ratifying the "Status-quo” 
rather than being revolutionary, and that this law is more in favor of larger banks and 
financial institutions. 
4.3.2 Literature on international spillover effects 
There is evidence in the literature of international spillover effects that predict that 
the impact of the GLBA will not be limited to the U.S. financial services industry. Bruner 
and Simms (1987) examine the reaction of U.S. banks to Mexico’s loan crisis and find 
that U.S. banks have negative wealth effect to the news. Musumerci and Sinkey (1990) 
find that Brazil’s announcement of a debt moratorium in 1987 had a negative impact on 
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the U.S. money center banks. Madura, Whyte and McDaniel (1991) find that Citicorp’s 
announcement of a significant increase in loan-loss reserves in 1987 had a significantly 
negative impact on British banks. In all of the above cases the exposure of banks to less 
developed countries are identified as the reason for the negative reactions. 
4.3.3 Cross boarder consolidation and risk expected return tradeoffs 
The available empirical research suggests that at least some types of cross-border 
consolidation can improve the risk-expected return tradeoff. The literature on commercial 
banks in the U.S. generally find that larger, more geographically diversified institutions 
tend to have better risk-expected return tradeoffs (e.g. Macllister and McManus (1993), 
Hughes, Lang, Mester, and Moon (1996, 1999), Hughes and Mester (1998) and Demsetz 
and Strahan (1997)), while Cummins and Weiss (2000) find that international 
diversification can improve both the risk-expected return tradeoff and profit efficiency 
for the insurance industry. 
4.3.4 Literature on the determinants of foreign bank presence, activity and growth  
Grosse and Goldberg (1991) investigate the foreign banking activity in the United 
States by country of origin. Their results show that foreign investment (FDI and foreign 
portfolio investment) into the United States, bilateral trade, and the size of each 
countries’ banking sector (demand deposits and time deposits) are positively correlated 
with that countries’ bank presence in the U.S. Hultman and McGee (1989) find that 
foreign presence of U.S. bank subsidiaries are directly related to FDI and exchange rate, 
and inversely related to P/E ratios. They find the growth of foreign bank branches and 
agencies in the U.S. is directly related to FDI, exchange rate and the passage of 
International Banking Act (IBA) of 1978. Goldberg and Saunders (1981) show that 
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important determinants in foreign banks’ growth in the U.S. are the size of interest 
differentials between U.S. and foreign deposits and loans, the falling P/E ratio for U.S. 
bank stocks, increased size of FDI, the persistent depreciation in the dollar and the 
expectation that the IBA of 1978 would have a restrictive effect on foreign banking 
activity in the U.S. Seth et al. (1998) show that one of the major determinants of financial 
institutions’ growth abroad has been the parallel growth of foreign direct investment and 
foreign trade by globally oriented multinational corporations from the institutions’ home 
country.   
4.4 GLBA and the International Banks1 
Under the GLBA, international banks can engage in commercial banking, 
merchant banking and insurance in ways consistent with their business strategies. If the 
international bank becomes a Financial Holding Company (FHC) there is no limit to the 
revenue generated by its insurance activity, merchant banking activity or investment 
banking activity. To qualify as a FHC, it must notify the Federal Reserve about the 
activities in which it will engage and make certain required certifications of those 
activities. In order to become a FHC, its depository institution must be well capitalized 
and well managed; and no insured institutions within the FHC can have less than a 
satisfactory rating under the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA).  
International banks have to decide whether they want to keep their current 
structure and continue to engage in current activities or to engage in other activities 
permitted under the new regulation. If international banks engage in traditional 
commercial banking in the U.S., via a branch or agency, they may still do so without 
 
1 Adapted from Finch, Macdonald and Walker (2000) 
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changing their structure. But if the U.S. branch or agency engages in certain securities, 
merchant banking or investment banking activities in the U.S., the operation has to cease 
(unless they are grandfathered2). Under the new regulation the activity, and not the entity, 
determines the primary supervisory authority.  
Most international banks that engaged in significant insurance activities did so 
through a domestic bank or through an insurance subsidiary of a domestic bank. Now 
international banks must either operate via an existing licensed insurance subsidiary, or 
establish a new subsidiary and obtain a license from the state insurance department where 
they want to sell the insurance, to take full advantage of the opportunity provided by the 
new regulation. 
Most of the international banks carry out their investment or merchant banking 
activities in U.S. through Section 20 investment subsidiaries. These banks can continue to 
engage in these activities so long as they are grandfathered, but they cannot engage in any 
new activities. Some of the international banks in the U.S. engage in investment banking 
through domestic bank and trust companies. These operations must cease under the new 
law. The GLBA requires international banks to engage in these activities through a U.S. 
registered broker dealer. 
In order to engage in any activity in the U.S., an international bank must be well 
capitalized and well managed by the standards set by the FED. The FED will review 
worldwide operations of an international bank to determine whether they can engage in 
commercial banking, or any other activities in the U.S.  
 
2 Grandfathered means the bank may continue to engage in the activity because it did so before the 
restrictions became law. New activities are not covered by the grandfather provision. 
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4.5 Hypotheses 
We test the following four major hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1: GLBA will have significant spillover effects on international 
banks. 
We expect that banks in developed countries will have significant wealth effects 
due to the passage of the GLBA for three reasons. First, the literature on international 
spillover effects predicts that if the banking sector of a country has exposure to any 
foreign market, then an event in that foreign market can have spillover effects on the 
financial sector of that country. Any bank that wants to have international coverage has to 
have its operation in the U.S.3.  
Table 2: Foreign Banks’ Operation in U.S.: No of Banks, Revenue from U.S. Operation 
and FHC status of Foreign Banks 
Country 
No of 
Banks in 
USA in 
(9/98) 
No of 
Banks in 
USA in 
(9/99) 
Total Asset 
Booked in 
U.S. (9/98) 
$million 
Total Asset 
Booked in 
U.S. (9/99) 
$million 
No. of Banks 
claimed FHC status 
by November 30, 
2001 
Percentage of 
foreign Banks 
claiming FHC 
structure 
Canada 6 6 122,524 125,095 6 100% 
Denmark 2 2 - - 1 50% 
France 14 10 171,358 163,618 2 14% 
Greece 1 1 - - 0 0% 
Germany 14 15 147,458 209,228 2 14% 
Italy 17 15 31,013 26,355 0 0% 
Japan 50 39 279,591 213,625 0 0% 
Spain 5 5 17,651 20,319 1 20% 
Switzerland 8 8 83,336 56,120 2 25% 
UK 11 10 83,540 88,551 1 9% 
All foreign Banks 320 284 1,162,669 1,126,516 21 7% 
Source: Board of Governors Federal Reserve System. 
                                                 
3 Blanden (2000) claims that the “U.S. remains a magnet for foreign banks, with a presence in New York 
essential for any group with pretensions to international coverage”. 
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Table 2 shows that all of the developed countries (included in this study) have 
exposure to the U.S. banking market. So we expect a spillover effect on the international 
banks from the GLBA.  
Second, it is documented in the literature (Goldberg and Saunders (1981) and 
Hultman and McGee (1989)) that the IBA of 1978 influenced the growth of foreign banks 
in the U.S. Similarly, we argue that the GLBA may also impact the growth of foreign 
banks in the U.S.  
Third, Berger et al. (2000) report a growing trend in international banks acquiring 
U.S. banks, which reflects the intention of foreign banks to establish their presence in the 
U.S. In the mid-90s the total value of such consolidations was $10 billion (in 1998 
dollars) and by 1998, that figure had increased to $12 billion. One of the major reasons 
for such mergers is that at least some types of cross-border consolidation are likely to 
improve the risk-expected return tradeoff. Table 1 shows the correlation of bank earnings 
between the U.S. and banks in the countries included in this study from 1988 to 1997. 
The correlation of earnings with the U.S. is quite low and mostly negative, except with 
the UK. This data suggests very strong diversification possibilities and opportunities to 
improve the institutions’ risk-expected return tradeoff through cross-border consolidation 
(Berger et al. (2000)). Given the diversification opportunities, added with the size of the 
market (of the U.S. banking industry), any major regulatory change in the U.S. banking 
industry should have spillover effects on international banks. 
Hypothesis 2: The banking industries of any two countries will not have the same 
impact from the GLBA. 
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 Studies that investigate foreign bank presence, activity and growth in the U.S. 
find that there are country specific characteristics like exchange rate, size of the source 
countries banking sector, P/E ratio and trade with the source country that can explain 
such activities. We argue that since such characteristics, and also exposure to the U.S. 
banking market, are not same for any two countries, the impact on any two countries’ 
banking industry will not be the same from the GLBA.  
Hypothesis 3: The banking industry of developed countries will have negative 
wealth effects from the passage of the GLBA. 
The GLBA creates opportunities for international banks to engage in activities 
that were not possible under previous regulation. Under the GLBA, international banks 
have no revenue limits from any of its investment, merchant banking insurance or 
depository activities, when they choose to become a FHC. But these advantages are also 
available to local banks, insurance and securities firms. So for all the new opportunities, a 
foreign bank still has to compete with local firms who have “home field advantage”4 over 
the foreign firms. Thus we expect that international banks may have negative wealth 
effects from the passage of GLBA.  
Under the new regulation, the insurance activities conducted by foreign banks 
through domestic banks and insurance subsidiaries of domestic banks have to cease. In 
addition, a portion of the investment and merchant banking activities conducted via 
domestic banks and trust companies must also be discontinued. International banks will 
be allowed to retain only the part of their investment and merchant banking activity (the 
most important operation in the U.S.) carried out through Section 20 investment 
 
4 See Berger et al. (2000) for a detailed discussion of the Home Field Advantage hypothesis. 
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subsidiary, and will be restricted to those activities that are grandfathered. The same 
grandfathering provision applies to their traditional commercial banking activity. But for 
all the activities that are allowed, they will still have to comply the FED’s capitalization 
and management standards for their U.S. operations, as well as their worldwide 
operations. In fact, the permissible activity of foreign banks will become more restricted 
under the GLBA unless foreign banks claim a FHC structure. To claim a FHC structure 
foreign banks must meet the FEDs capitalization and management standards for U.S. 
operations as well as worldwide operations. The capital adequacy and management 
standards set by the GLBA can also be a potential reason for negative wealth effects for 
foreign insurance firms. Carow and Heron (2002) argue that many countries impose 
lower capital requirements than the U.S., thus these eligibility requirements impose new 
costs for foreign banks that want to do business in the United States as a FHC, or in any 
other structure.  
Hypothesis 4: The GLBA will reduce the diversification opportunities for 
international banks and thereby increase risk for their stockholders. 
The GLBA will restrict the entry and expansion of international banks in the U.S. 
due to increased competition from the domestic participants in the U.S. banking industry 
who have home field advantage over the foreign banks. This restricts the scope of 
activities permissible to foreign banks, by restructuring the way certain business are 
carried out, and finally and most importantly, due to the FED’s capitalization and 
management standards for U.S. operations as well as worldwide operations. For all of 
these reasons, the GLBA will reduce the opportunities for diversification of foreign banks 
in the most important banking market in the world.  
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
 
Export from  Import to  
Country 
No. of 
firms 
Three bank 
concentrations 
Ratioϕ 
 
Total Asset in 
1999 ⊕∗ 
ROE in 
1999⊕ 
Total no of 
Agencies 
in 1999*** 
 
Total no of 
Branches 
in 1999*** 
 
Total no of 
Representatives 
in 1999*** 
 
Total no of 
Subsidiaries in 
1999*** 
 
No. of FHCs 
in 
11/30/2001ℵ 
 
U.S. 99*ℵ 
  
U.S. 99*ℵ 
Canada 8 65.20% $106,498.89 14.60 3 2 0 1 6 $166,600.00 $198,711.10
Denmark        
        
         
        
       
        
        
         
       
36 63.70% $197,443.91
 
 9.12 0 1 0 0 1 $1,725.60 $2,818.70
France 18 63.60% $69,747.42 12.38 0 3 0 0 2 $18,877.40
 
 $25,708.60
Greece 8 98.30% $16,701.70 25.57 0 0 0 0 0 $995.50 $563.10
Germany
 
11 89.50% $234,317.24
 
 9.66 0 3 0 1 1 $26,800.20 $55,228.40
Italy 17 35.90% $62,000.18 12.13 0 6 2 0 0 $19,436.60 $8,475.00
Japan 73 28.30% $38,019,876.81
 
 -10.87 1 14 6 0 0 $57,465.70 $130,863.90
Spain 15 50.10% $40,494.54 16.21 0 0 0 0 0 $6,133.40 $5,059.20
Switzerland
 
21 79.80% $57,467.31 8.29 0 2 0 1 2 $8,371.30 $9,538.60
UK 8 29.10% $243,770.56 21.32 0 4 0 0 1 $38,407.10 $39,237.20
USA 45 13.30% $66,903.15 1.22**         570     
*In millions of U.S. dollars 
⊕Source: DataSream 
**Source: Compustat 
*** Source: The Banker March 1999 
ℵSource Board of Governors Federal Reserve System. 
ϕBarth, Nolle and Rice (2000) 
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This reduction in diversification benefits will increase risk for stockholders of 
international banks in the developed countries. 
4.6 Data and Methodology 
4.6.1 Data 
This study mainly concentrates on banks from European Union (EU) for several 
reasons. First, the U.S. and the EU are frequently compared in the literature because they 
have roughly equal shares of world population and GDP. Secondly, the EU accounts for a 
larger share of the world’s banking assets compared to that of the USA5. We include 
Japan because, until 1999, Japanese banks had the highest total banking assets in the 
United States and Japan has the most restricted financial services industry in the 
developed world. Canada is included because all of the Canadian Schedule 1 banks have 
large operations in the U.S. and Canada has control over a sizeable amount of assets in 
U.S. operations.  
We test the above hypotheses using daily common stock returns over a period 
from January 1998 to December 2000. Daily stock returns and balance sheet information 
for large banks from Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Spain, 
Switzerland, and the UK are obtained from the DataStream database and BankScope 
database. Daily stock returns for 45 large U.S. banks (over $10 billion total assets in 
1998) are obtained from the CRSP database.  
 
5 See Barth, Nolle and Rice (2000). 
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Table 4: Time line of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. 
Note: The first column ‘Date’ is the event date. If the event occurred after the trading closed for a day then 
that the next trading day is the event date. Event Window is defined as Event Date, -1 day and +1 day. The 
second column 'Event' describes the main event.  
Date Event 
11/4/98 
 
 
1/8/99 
 
2/17/99 
 
4/12/99 
 
4/28/99 
 
 
5/4/99 
 
05/06/99 – 
Midnight 
 
7/1/99 
 
10/15/99 
 
10/22/99 
 
11/02/99 
 
 
11/4/99 
 
11/12/99 
1. (i) Senator Alfonse D’Amato lost his re-election bid (11/03/98 –night). (ii) Senator Gramm 
to take over as a chair of Senate Banking Committee. (11/04/98). 
 
2. Financial Services Reform Bill is reintroduced in Congress. 
 
3. Draft bill was unveiled in the Senate. 
 
4. Senator Gramm meets with Senate Minority leader to work on the bill. 
 
5. Senate Banking Committee formally files the Financial Services Modernization Act in the 
Senate. 
 
6. Clinton raises the privacy issue to be included in the bill. 
 
7. Senate passes S. 900. Senate version of the Bill is passed. 
 
 
8. House version of the bill was passed. 
 
9. Federal Reserve and Treasury announce agreement on the regulation. 
 
10. Gramm makes deal with White House on CRA. 
 
11. Joint House Conference report signed by the majority of the conferees, clearing the way 
for the votes in both the House and the Senate. 
 
12. Senate passes the bill (90-8) and House passes the bill (362-57). 
 
13. President Clinton signs the bill into law. 
 
Table 3 presents the distribution of firms across the countries, some firm specific 
information, information regarding bilateral trade with the U.S. and the home country, 
form of operation of these banks in the U.S. and concentration of the banking sector in 
the respective countries.  
We identify 13 major events from the Wall Street Journal and Lexis-Nexis wire 
service. In Table 5 we summarize these important events.   
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4.6.2 Portfolio Analysis 
First, we adapted the model used by Blinder (1985), then following Wagster 
(1996) we introduce long-term and short term interest rate to control for the interest rate 
risk. We also include return on exchange rate with the U.S. dollar because return on 
foreign investment will depend on return on the assets within its own market and changes 
in exchange rate. We then modify the model following Cornett and Tehranian (1990) and 
introduce the lagged value of the market index for possible nonsynchronous trading 
effects. We use dummy variables to identify the major events that led to the passage of 
the GLBA. The dummy variable is equal to 1 over each event window and zero 
otherwise. The coefficient estimate associated with the dummy variable measures the 
impact of the event on the portfolio. The model we estimate is: 
2 2 2 2
, 2 , 2 2
1 1 1 1
, , ,
' 'i ij i t j ij i t j ij t j ij
j j j j
it i
i i t i i t i i t i it
D m Rm m DRm w Rw w DRwR
l Rrl s Rrs Rf DG e
α β β β βα
δ δ κ γ
+ − + − + − + −
= = = =
+ + + + +
+
=
+ + + +
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
   (1) 
where, Rit is the return on portfolio i (i= 11, each country has one equally weighted 
portfolio) at day t, Rmi,t is the return on market index of country i at day t, Rwt is the 
return on MSCI world equity index at day t, DG is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 
over every event window6 and zero otherwise, γi is the coefficient of a dummy variable 
that captures the impact of GLBA on the banking industry of ith country. Rfi,t represents 
the return on exchange rate between U.S. dollar and the currency of ith country at day t; 
Rrsi,t represents the return on short term interest rate for country i at day t; Rrli,t represents 
the return on long term interest rate for country i at day t.  D is a dummy variable that is 
equal to 1 after the enactment of the regulation and zero otherwise, thus βm’i1-βm’i2 
 
6 Event windows are defined in Table 5. 
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captures the change in exposure to systematic risks between pre-act and post-act time for 
country i with respect to its own country equity index and βw’i1-βw’i2 captures the change 
in exposure to systematic risks between pre-act and post-act time for country i with 
respect to its MSCI world equity index. 
We estimate the model presented in equation 1 using seemingly unrelated 
regression methodology. Schwert (1981) argues that individual asset returns of the firms 
in the same industry measured over a common time-period are contemporaneously 
correlated because the firms will react similarly to any unanticipated event. So in events 
such as regulatory changes the residuals will not be iid. If there is a contemporaneous 
correlation among the disturbances across equations but not correlated over time, SUR 
model estimates will be more efficient than Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).  We use a 
likelihood ratio (LR) test suggested by Berndt and Savin (1977) to test the null hypothesis 
that the off-diagonal elements of the variance-covariance matrix are zero7. We perform 
this test to check for contemporaneous correlation among the disturbances across 
equations. 
The main advantage of using the SUR is that it allows us to test for the interesting 
cross-country restriction (hypothesis 2). In order to test for hypothesis 2 we test the 
following null hypothesis: 
 
7 This test in principal determines whether the off-diagonal elements of the variance covariance matrix (S) 
of error terms are zero or not. Excluding the diagonal elements, there are 1/2m∗(m-1) unknown parameters 
in S that can be arranged in a vector, θ. Here m is the number of equations. The null hypothesis is: 
H0:θ = 0                                                                                         
This test is based on the following statistic: 
2
1
ˆˆ[ log log | |]λ σ
−
= ∑ − ∑mLR i
i
T                                
here  is e from the individual least squares regression and is the maximum likelihood 
estimator of S. This statistic has a limiting χ
2ˆ iσ Teii /′ ∑ˆ
2 distribution with 1/2m∗(m-1) degrees of freedom under the 
null hypothesis. 
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0 1 2 3 1: .....H γ γ γ γ= = = =         (2) 
4.6.3 Cross Sectional Analysis 
In order to test for our fourth hypothesis, we generate average abnormal return, 
i.e. γi (i=1 to 215) for each firm using the model presented by equation 1. We then 
estimate the following model using OLS, where γi is the dependent variable. The cross-
sectional model is: 
, ,( , , , , , , , , , , , , ,i j i j i i if can den fra ger gre ita jap spa swi uk m w Size ROEγ β ′ ′=      (3) 
where, can, fra,…… uk are country dummies, which are equal to one if a firm is from that 
country, and zero otherwise. These dummies will control for country specific variations. 
βm’i,j and βw’i are changes in exposure to systematic risk with respect to a home country 
market index and the MSCI world equity index. Sizei is defined as the log of total asset 
value (in U.S. dollars) in 1998 for firm i and ROEi is the return on equity of firm i in 
1998.   
4.7 Empirical Results 
4.7.1 Portfolio Analysis 
The result of the specification test for our portfolio model shows that the null 
hypothesis that off diagonal elements of the variance-covariance matrix is zero is rejected 
at the 1% level. Statistically that means that coefficient estimates from SUR are more 
efficient as opposed to the OLS estimates.  
Estimates of the parameters of the portfolio model are presented in Table 5. We 
find that for most of the countries the own country equity index is significant and positive 
(except Spain) while we find that MSCI world equity index is positive and significant for 
the U.S. only.  
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Table 5: Estimation results of model parameters of the portfolio model (equation 1). 
The following table presents the estimation results of portfolio model: 
2 2 2 2
, 2 , 2 2 2
1 1 1 1
, , ,' ' 'i ij i t j ij i t j ij t j ij t j
j j j j
it i i i t i i t i i t iD m Rm m DRm w Rw w DRwR l Rrl s Rrs Rf DG eα β β β βα δ δ κ γ+ − + − + − + −
= = = =
+ + + + + += + + + +∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ it     
where, Rit is the return on portfolio i at day t, Rmi,t is the return on own market index of country i at day t, Rwt is the return on MSCI world equity index at day t, DG is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 
over every event window and zero otherwise, Rfi,t represents the return on exchange rate between U.S. dollar and the currency of ith country at day t; Rrsi,t represents the return on short term interest rate 
for country i at day t; Rrli,t represents the return on long term interest rate for country i at day t.  D is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 after the enactment of the regulation and zero otherwise. 
Country Intercept   
Change in 
the intercept   
Own Country 
Equity index    
(1 day lag)   
Own Country 
Equity index   
Change in the Own 
Country Equity index    
(1 day lag)   
Change in the Own 
Country Equity 
index   
MSCI World 
Equity index   
(1 day lag)   
MSCI World 
Equity index    
-126.63  526.89 *** 0.06  1.17 ** 0.27  -0.79  1089.67  578.39  Canada 
-1.48  4.36  0.12  2.33  0.47  -1.39  1.03  0.45  
75.04 *** 77.20 *** 0.05 * 0.07 *** 0.00   -0.04   37.48   14.60   Denmark 
5.72   3.99   1.73   2.76   0.00   -0.97   0.24   0.09   
63.73 *** 28.00 ** 0.02 * 0.02 * 0.00  0.00  -51.97  34.27  France 
13.39  2.47  1.71  1.83  -0.23  -0.18  -0.51  0.30  
31.50   556.67 *** -0.03   0.56 *** 0.00   -0.36 ** -215.32   -107.26   Germany 
1.45   14.79   -0.28   4.73   0.03   -2.24   -1.02   -0.42   
-1140.05 *** 37.75  -0.19  3.30 *** 0.44  -0.65  -231.61  1179.73  Greece 
-31.94  0.35  -0.53  9.11  0.85  -1.25  -0.15  0.78  
-222.91 *** 773.24 *** 0.05   0.30 *** 0.01   -0.16 *** 3.20   147.61   Italy 
-7.94   14.37   1.12   6.80   0.14   -2.63   0.01   0.32   
116.00 *** -29.43 *** -0.08 ** 0.10 *** 0.04  -0.02  49.85 * 4.68  Japan 
75.93  -8.16  -2.34  3.13  0.87  -0.51  1.77  0.16  
763.97 *** 197.86 ** 0.88   -0.14   -1.16   0.52   -284.09   -686.42   Spain 
17.27   2.14   1.50   -0.24   -1.33   0.60   -0.62   -1.23   
-196.94 *** -186.28 *** 0.13 ** 0.34 *** -0.01  0.13  -343.61 *** -112.07  Switzerland 
-18.27  -8.98  2.34  6.29  -0.13  1.38  -3.61  -0.95  
-16605.60 *** 12502.30 *** 0.18   1.38 *** -0.01   -0.70 ** -2275.14   2018.44   UK 
-32.02   7.29   0.76   5.92   -0.02   -2.03   -0.33   0.27   
-7.47   10.64   -3453.68 ** 3342.52 ** 2066.36   -6297.22 *** -418.13   12833.00 *** USA 
-0.98   0.87   -2.31   2.26   1.05   -3.19   -0.33   9.95   
***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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Table 5: Estimation results of model parameters of the portfolio model (equation 1) 
continued. 
Country 
Change in 
the MSCI 
World 
Equity index 
(1 day lag)   
Change in 
the MSCI 
World 
Equity index   
Exchange 
rate with 
U.S.   
Long-term 
Interest rate   
Short-
term 
Interest 
rate   
Average 
return on 
13 events   R 2 
-2514.29  -1115.53  541.26  169.85  -260.16  -148.87 *** 0.39 Canada 
-1.47  -0.56  0.44  0.38  -0.49  -4.01   
-105.15   -28.66   -2.29 * -50.39   20.89   -17.50 *** 0.75 Denmark 
-0.42   -0.12   -1.92   -0.92   0.32   -3.38     
-226.11  -159.42  -9.43  -11.52  -23.00  -1.27  0.87 France 
-1.36  -0.89  -0.13  -0.43  -0.67  -0.35   
-49.47   -93.42   -331.88   -96.11   281.69 * -18.39 ** 0.81 Germany 
-0.15   -0.23   -1.56   -0.72   1.80   -2.52     
-61.13  -123.73  677.00  359.41  266.65  -119.48 ** 0.96 Greece 
-0.02  -0.05  0.51  0.47  0.55  -2.27   
-631.51   -639.23   179.91   94.57   -77.50   7.00   0.89 Italy 
-0.95   -0.88   0.47   0.55   -0.41   0.49     
-52.68  26.54  28.73  -0.41  -0.10  -2.77 *** 0.59 Japan 
-1.13  0.59  1.64  -0.08  -0.66  -2.85   
359.52   673.63   -219.80   -78.55   -191.26   -74.05 *** 0.44 Spain 
0.48   0.78   -0.50   -0.25   -0.95   -4.61     
138.42  -61.17  -117.08  47.52  -9.61  6.19 * 0.94 Switzerland 
0.90  -0.35  -1.41  1.08  -1.01  1.86   
-9792.25   -13370.90   5.05   1274.47   422.93   -97.75   0.67 UK 
-0.87   -1.10   0.00   0.53   0.13   -0.40     
-3415.17 * 2370.45   7555.73 *** -502.58   -1276.00   74.14 *** 0.42 USA 
-1.71   1.17   4.85   -0.64   -1.34   2.62     
***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 
 
We find that 7 out of 10 countries we analyze have significant average abnormal 
returns from the 13 events that we analyze. Banking industries of six countries have 
negative spill over effect from the passage of the GLBA, these are Canadian banking 
industry (it has an average abnormal return of –148.87 which is also significant at 1%), 
Denmark’s banking industry (it has an average abnormal return of –17.50 significant at 
1%), Germany’s banking industry (it has an average abnormal return of –18.39 which is 
significant at 5%), Greece’s banking industry (it has an average abnormal return of 
119.48 which is also significant at 1%), Japanese banking industry (it has an abnormal 
 
 116 
 
 
return of  -2.77 which is significant at 1%), and Spain’s banking industry (it has a 
significant abnormal return of –74.05 significant at 1%). The banking industry of 
Switzerland has an average abnormal return of 6.19 significant at 10%. The banking 
industries of France, Italy and the UK seem to be unaffected by the passage of GLBA. 
These results support our first hypothesis that there are significant spillover effects of the 
GLBA on banking industries of developed countries and the third hypothesis that these 
spillover effects are negative. 
Our second hypothesis that the information produced over these 13 events has the 
same impact on the banking industry of any two countries is rejected at the 1% level. 
This hypothesis is tested using a Wald test (presented by equation 2) with a test statistic 
of 76.78. The underlying distribution under the null hypothesis is χ2(10). 
4.7.2 Cross Section Analysis 
In order to identify the cross sectional variation in average return from the events 
that led to the GLBA we perform a cross sectional analysis. We estimate equation 3 using 
OLS. The result of the estimation is presented in Table 5; the t-statistics are computed 
using the formula suggested by MacKinnon and White (1985). We use country dummy 
variables to control for the country specific effects. The variables that are significant may 
be due to the country specific variables (like trade with the United States, exchange rate, 
size of the source countries financial sector as suggested by the literature on the 
determinants of foreign bank presence, activity and growth in the USA) or due to country 
specific events in those periods, or the exposure to the U.S. market.  
The main hypothesis we want to test is whether GLBA created or reduced the 
diversification opportunity for international banks. We find that βw’i,j is positive and 
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significant. This means diversification opportunities for these banks, with respect to 
world index has been reduced. This complies with our major hypothesis that the GLBA 
reduced diversification opportunities for foreign banking companies.   
Table 6: Cross-sectional analysis of wealth effect on each firm in the banking industries 
of selected developed countries. 
We estimate the following model: 
, ,( , , , , , , , , , , , , ,i j i j i i if can den fra ger gre ita jap spa swi uk m w Size ROEγ β ′ ′=  
We estimate the model using OLS using 215 firms in the sample. Here γi,j is the abnormal return of firm i 
of country j., can, den,….,uk are dummy variables for a particular country, these variables are equal to one 
for that country and zero otherwise. βm’i,j is the change in exposure to systematic risk with respect to home 
country market index. While βw’i,j is the change in exposure to systematic risk with respect to home 
country market index. Size is log of book value of total asset and ROE is return on equity 
Parameter Estimate t-statistic P-value 
CAN 29.02 1.03 [.305] 
DEN 20.77 1.97 [.051] 
FRA 27.50 2.67 [.008] 
GER -1.07 -0.06 [.955] 
GRE -58.51 -2.43 [.016] 
ITA 21.73 1.69 [.093] 
JAP 51.82 2.46 [.015] 
SPA -3.38 -0.17 [.867] 
SWI 25.10 2.56 [.011] 
UK 54.06 3.00 [.003] 
βm’i,j -9.94 -0.79 [.428] 
βw’i,j 0.06 3.27 [.001] 
SIZE -3.41 -1.76 [.080] 
ROE 0.01 0.27 [.791] 
R2 0.54     
F-Statistics 15.36 ***   
 
We use Size and profitability measures in the cross sectional regression because 
Hendershott, Lee, and Tompkins (2002) find that both of these variables can explain the 
cross sectional variation in wealth effects for domestic commercial banks from the 
passage of the GLBA. For international firms we find evidence that larger firms have 
more negative wealth effects. Since larger firms generally would be interested in 
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international diversification and have more U.S. exposure, a reduction of such 
opportunities should affect them more.  
4.8 Conclusion 
We examine the impact of the GLBA, a major regulatory change in U.S. financial 
services industry, on a sample of 215 non-U.S. banks companies from 10 countries. In the 
era of globalization of financial markets it is argued in the literature that deregulation like 
the GLBA, or single market program of EU should have an impact beyond the 
boundaries of the jurisdiction8. In this paper we present further evidence of globalization 
of financial institutions. In our portfolio analysis we find that banking industries of 7 out 
of 10 developed countries have significant wealth effects from the passage of the GLBA 
(of which only Switzerland has a positive, but insignificant impact), a deregulation that is 
designed to deregulate the financial services industry of the United States. We also find 
that the impact of the GLBA is not the same for any two banking industries of foreign 
countries.  
The cross sectional investigation suggests that a part of negative reaction is due to 
country specific attributes in that period. But most importantly, we show that the negative 
wealth effect is due to the reduction in the diversification opportunities for international 
banks that is due to the passage of the GLBA. This reduction in diversification 
opportunity from the GLBA can be due to increased competition from domestic 
participants, restrictions imposed on the scope of activities permissible to foreign banks, 
restructuring the way certain business were carried out, or due to FED’s capitalization 
and management standards for its U.S. operation as well as its worldwide operation. 
 
8 Berger, DeYoung and Udell (2000). 
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Anecdotal evidence also supports the argument that the GLBA adversely affected the 
presence of foreign banks in the U.S. For example, Blanden (2000) reports that the 
number of foreign banks in the U.S. has been declining. In addition, Table 2 shows that 
only 7% of the foreign banks present in the U.S. have adopted the FHC structure, a 
structure through which most of the new opportunities are available to foreign banks. 
Finally, we argue that the GLBA will restrict the expansion and entry of international 
banks in the U.S. 
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 Chapter V 
 Implications of the GLBA on Foreign Insurance Companies 
 
5.1 Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act (GLBA) on the insurance industries of developed countries. We find that the 
insurance industries of most of the developed countries in our sample have significant 
negative spillover effects from the GLBA. Further, we find that this regulation has had a 
different impact on the insurance industries of any two countries in our sample. We find 
evidence that suggests that a reduction in the diversification opportunities due to the 
passage of the GLBA can explain the wealth effect of the individual firms in cross 
section analysis. However, we don’t find any evidence that the impact of the GLBA is 
statistically different for firms that are from a EU member country versus those that are 
not. 
 
5.2 Introduction 
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) of 1999 is the most sweeping deregulation 
of the U.S. financial services industry in the last century.  Current research finds that the 
GLBA has positively affected shareholder value in the U.S. insurance industry. In an era 
  
123 
of globalization of financial markets and institutions, one would expect the impact of 
such extensive deregulation as the GLBA would not be contained by the boundaries of a 
nation. This paper focuses on the insurance industries of developed countries to 
investigate the international impact of the GLBA. 
 
Figure 1: Market Share of foreign controlled companies and branches and agencies of 
foreign companies in the U.S. insurance market (Gross Premium Basis) 
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Source: OECD Insurance Statistics Yearbook 
This study focuses on three important questions; first, does the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act (GLBA) create opportunities or hinder the growth of foreign insurance firms 
in the U.S. Current research finds that the GLBA does not have a uniform effect on the 
financial services industry. However, these studies consistently find that the GLBA has 
positively affected shareholder value in the insurance industry. So it is interesting to 
consider whether this act likewise creates opportunity for non-U.S. insurers. Foreign 
insurers share of the U.S. is rapidly growing. In 1990, only 9.8% of the market share 
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(gross premium) in life insurance and 7.1% the market share (gross premium) in non-life 
insurance in the United States was written by foreign controlled companies,1 or branches 
and agencies of a foreign insurers. However, by 1998 the market share controlled by 
foreign insurers increased to 17.23% of life insurance and 8.67% of non-life insurance. 
Figure 1 shows the trend in foreign insurers market share in the U.S. market since 1990.  
Historically, increases in the activity of foreign financial firms in the U.S. have created 
political pressure on regulators to restrict their growth. For example, Goldberg and 
Saunders (1981) note that rapid growth in foreign banks in the U.S. in the early 70s led to 
restrictions in multi-state operations of all foreign banks, and subsequently led to the 
International Banking Act of 1978. 
Secondly, we investigate if the impact on foreign insurance firms varies across 
countries and firm-specific attributes. Vaughan and Vaughan (1999), and Moshirian 
(1997) predict that U.S. insurance companies will face competition for European insurers 
in the domestic market. Table 1, presents a list of the top 25 insurers in 1998 on the basis 
of the revenue earned in 1998. Interestingly, of the top 25 firms, 11 companies are from 
EU countries and 6 are from Japan, while the U.S. controls more market share than the 
combined market share of all EU member countries2. We investigate whether the impact 
on EU insurers are different from non-EU insurers. We also explore whether firm specific 
variables that can explain the abnormal returns of the domestic insurers from the GLBA 
can also explain the returns of the foreign insurance companies. 
                                                 
1 Companies in the United States whose equity is at least 10% owned by non-U.S. persons (before 1990). 
Thereafter, foreign (non-U.S.) persons that own equity directly, or indirectly through a holding company 
system, 10% or more of the company. 
2 15 countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the UK. 
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Finally, we investigate if the GLBA creates diversification opportunities for 
foreign insurers and thereby reduces exposure to systematic risk. Because Cummins and 
Weiss (2000) suggest that international diversification may improve the risk-expected 
return tradeoff and profit efficiency for the insurance industry. 
 
Table 1: World’s Largest Insurance Companies by Revenues, 1998 
 
Rank Name Country of Domicile 1998 Revenues 
($ millions) 
1. AXA France 78,729 
2. Nippon Life Japan 66,300 
3. Allianz Germany 64,875 
4. ING Group Netherlands 56,469 
5. Assicurazioni Generali Italy 48,478 
6. State Farm USA 44,621 
7. Dai-ichi Mutual Life Japan 44,486 
8. Sumitomo Life Japan 39,535 
9. Zurich Financial Switzerland 39,115 
10. CGNU UK 37,589 
11. TIAA-CREF USA 35,889 
12. Munich Re Group Germany 35,465 
13. Prudential of America USA 34,427 
14. Prudential (UK) UK 33,677 
15. American Int’l Group USA 33,296 
16. Meiji Mutual Group Japan 28,476 
17. Metropolitan Life USA 26,735 
18. Allstate USA 25,879 
19.  Royal and Sun Alliance UK 25,436 
20. CNP Assurances France 24,108 
21. Mitsui Mutual Life Japan 22,226 
22. Loews USA 20,713 
23. New York Life USA 19,849 
24. Asahi Mutual Life Japan 19,418 
25. Aegon  Netherlands 18,727 
Source: Jeremy Kahn, “The Fortune Global 500,” Fortune, August 2, 1999. 
 
In this study we analyze 83 foreign insurance companies from 11 countries, our 
sample includes 8 EU member countries (Austria, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Spain and the UK) and 3 are non-EU countries (Canada, Japan and Switzerland). 
We also have included 31 U.S. insurance firms in this study for the purpose of 
comparison. We find that most of the foreign insurance industries are significantly and 
  
126 
negatively affected by the events leading to the passage of the GLBA. Those negatively 
affected are Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Japan, and the UK. The 
insurance industries of Switzerland is largely unaffected by the regulation. However, 
Spain and Austria has positive impact from the passage of the regulation. We don’t find 
any evidence that the impact of the GLBA is statistically different for firms that are from 
a EU member country versus those that are not. 
Most importantly, we find that the GLBA has reduced the capability of foreign 
insurers to diversify their portfolio risk by restricting their entry and expansion in the 
U.S. market.  
The rest of the study is organized as follows: the second section provides a 
literature review. Section three briefly discusses the GLBA. Section four introduces the 
major hypotheses. Section five describes the methodology, data and lists the major 
events. Section six presents the empirical results and a final section concludes. 
5.3 Literature: 
5.3.1 Literature on the impact of GLBA on domestic Financial Institutions 
Current research finds that the GLBA has not had a uniform affect on the 
financial services industry.  Studies consistently find that the GLBA positively affects 
shareholder value in the insurance industry; however, depending on the sample size and 
number of events investigated the results for other financial services are mixed.  Carow 
and Heron (2002) find that only the insurance industry gains from this law.  Akhigbe and 
Whyte (2001) find that all the sectors of the financial services industry benefit from this 
law, while Hendershott, Lee, and Tompkins (2002) conclude that this law doesn’t impact 
the banking industry.   
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5.3.2 Literature on international spillover effects 
There is evidence in the literature that the impact of GLBA will not be limited to 
the U.S. financial services industry. Bruner and Simms (1987) examine the reaction of 
U.S. banks to Mexico’s loan crisis and find that U.S. banks reacted negatively to the 
news. Musumerci and Sinkey (1990) find that Brazil’s announcement of a debt 
moratorium in 1987 had a negative impact on U.S. money center banks. Madura, Whyte 
and McDaniel (1991) find that Citicorp’s announcement of substantial increase in loan-
loss reserves in 1987 had a significantly negative impact on British banks. In all of the 
above cases the exposure of banks to less developed countries are identified as the reason 
for the negative reactions. Cummins and Weiss (2000) find that international 
diversification can improve both the risk-expected return tradeoff and profit efficiency 
for the insurance industry. 
Carow and Heron (2002) document the only direct evidence of any spillover 
effects from the GLBA. This study primarily focuses on the implications of GLBA on 
domestic financial institutions, but includes a sub-sample of 10 foreign banks that are 
publicly traded in the U.S.. These banks experienced a negative wealth effect from the 
passage of the GLBA. Carow and Heron argue that the less favorable reaction of foreign 
banks (compared to that of U.S. banks) is due to the requirement imposed by the GLBA 
that the entire foreign banking organization has to be well capitalized. Although the 
sample size in this study is very small, it provides us with evidence of spillover effects of 
the GLBA on foreign banks. In addition, Berger et al. (2000) predict that cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions may be motivated by the GLBA. 
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5.3.3 Literature on FDI in Insurance & Banking Industry 
There are several studies that investigate foreign direct investment (FDI) in the 
U.S. insurance industry. Moshirian (1997) finds that demand for insurance services in the 
U.S., along with the relative rate of return, labor cost, exchange rate, size of the source 
countries’ insurance sector, bilateral relations and trade between the U.S. and the host 
countries are the major determinants of FDI in the insurance industry in the U.S. Grosse 
and Goldberg (1991) investigate foreign banking activity in the United States by country 
of origin. Their results show that foreign investment (FDI and foreign portfolio 
investment) in the United States, bilateral trade, and the size of each countries’ banking 
sector (demand deposits and time deposits) are positively correlated with each countries 
bank presence in the U.S. Seth et al. (1998) show that one of the major determinants of 
financial institutions’ growth abroad has been the parallel growth of foreign direct 
investment and foreign trade by globally oriented multinational corporations from the 
institution’s home country.   
5.4 GLBA and the Insurance Industry 
Under the new law (GLBA), insurance remains a state-regulated business (the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act remains in place). The GLBA repeals sections of the Banking 
Act of 1933, including sections 20 and 32, which prohibits national banks from 
maintaining securities firms and bank officials from sitting on corporate boards of 
insurance companies. It also amends the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 and creates 
a new entity known as a Financial Holding Company (FHC). The FHC is the centerpiece 
of this financial modernization. FHCs may engage in activities that are financial in nature 
including banking, securities, insurance (underwriting as well as sales as an agent), and 
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merchant banking. To qualify as an FHC each subsidiary has to be well managed and 
well capitalized. In addition, the depository subsidiary of the FHCs has to comply with 
the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) rating requirement. 
The GLBA also creates a new type of subsidiary, known as a ‘financial 
subsidiary’, through which banks can conduct many of the same activities as that of a 
subsidiary of an FHC3. A significant exception is that insurance underwriting may not be 
conducted in a financial subsidiary. However, to own such a financial subsidiary, the 
GLBA requires that the bank and each of its depository subsidiaries be well managed and 
well capitalized.  
The GLBA also repeals Title VI of the Garn-St. Germain Act, which states that 
the sale or underwriting of insurance is “not closely related” to banking, which had 
effectively preventing bank holding companies from selling and underwriting insurance. 
The GLBA also preempts anti-affiliation laws. Any attempt by a state to deny a 
depository institution from trying to affiliate an insurer can be nullified since states are 
forbidden from discriminating against such entities. Hence, the GLBA allows cross 
industry mergers that were not previously allowed under the OCC rulings. 
In order to engage in any activity in the U.S., any financial intermediary must be 
well capitalized and well managed by the standards set by the Federal Reserve (FED). 
The FED will review worldwide operations of the financial intermediary to determine 
whether or not they can engage in business in the U.S.  
5.5 Hypothesis 
We test the following four major hypotheses. 
                                                 
3 Broome and Markham, 2001. 
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Hypothesis 1: The GLBA will have a significant spillover effect on the insurance 
industry of developed countries. 
We expect that insurance industries of developed countries are going to have 
significant wealth effects due to the passage of the GLBA for two reasons. First, Bruner 
and Simms (1987), Musumerci and Sinkey (1990) and Madura, Whyte and McDaniel 
(1991) predict that if the financial sector of a country has exposure to any foreign market 
then an event in that foreign market can have spillover effects on the financial sector of 
that country. In 1998, foreign controlled companies, or branches or agencies of foreign 
companies, controlled 17.23% of the U.S. life insurance market and 8.67% of non-life 
insurance market in the U.S., and the lion share of these foreign companies are from 
developed countries.  
Second, the insurance industry depends upon diversification of risk for its 
survival4. Traditionally, the United States has been the largest insurance market in the 
world. In 1990, the market share of the U.S. insurance industry was 44.39% and in 1998 
it was 45.14% (on gross premium basis) of all OECD countries combined5. The size 
domination of the U.S. market exists both in life and non-life insurance. For example, in 
1998 the U.S. insurance industry had 34.20% of the market share in life insurance and 
57.23% of the market share in non-life insurance of OECD countries6. The size of the 
market share makes the U.S. insurance market a natural target for the foreign insurers to 
diversify their portfolio risk and also to expand their business in the U.S. insurance 
                                                 
4 Pfeffer (1976) argues that no country has sufficient private insurance capacity to absorb all the insurable 
risk in its territory. 
5 OECD publications. 
6 OECD publications. 
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market. Due to the size of the U.S. market, any major regulatory change like the GLBA 
should have an impacts on other insurance industries of other countries.  
Hypothesis 2: The impact of the GLBA on the insurance industries of any two 
countries will not be the same.  
 Studies find that country specific characteristics such as exchange rate, size of the 
source countries insurance sector, and trade with the source country may explain FDI in 
the U.S. Thus we argue that since such characteristics, or the exposure to U.S. insurance 
market, are not same for any two countries, the impact of the GLBA on any two 
countries’ insurance industries will not be the same.  
Hypothesis 3: The insurance industries of foreign countries will have a negative 
impact from the passage from the GLBA. 
The GLBA increased competition in the U.S. insurance industry. Under this 
regulation, an FHC is allowed to underwrite insurance and also work as agents. So newly 
created FHC will increase competition. One possible way holding companies may enter 
the insurance business is through acquisitions. Hendershott, Lee, and Tompkins (2002) 
and Mamun et al. (2003) predict that banks will acquire insurance firms and enter the 
insurance business. In addition, competition in the U.S. insurance industry may increase 
because banks can now enter the insurance business (working as agents) using a newly 
created financial subsidiary. These new domestic participants in the insurance business 
will have a “home field advantage”7 over foreign firms; and thus, we expect that foreign 
insurance companies may have negative wealth effects from the passage of GLBA. 
Furthermore, capital adequacy and management requirements by the FED under 
the GLBA can also be a potential reason for negative wealth effects for foreign insurance 
                                                 
7 See Berger et al. (2000) for details discussion of the Home Field Advantage hypothesis. 
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firms. Carow and Heron (2002) argue that many countries impose lower capital 
requirements than the U.S. These eligibility requirements impose new costs for foreign 
banks that want to do business in the United States, whether as a FHC or under any other 
structure.  
Hypothesis 4: The GLBA will reduce the diversification opportunities of foreign 
insurance firms, and thereby increase risk for their stockholders. 
The GLBA will restrict the entry and expansion of foreign insurers in the U.S. 
insurance industry due to increased competition from domestic participants in the U.S. 
insurance industry who have “home field advantage” and also to tough capital adequacy 
and management requirements. This will reduce the diversification opportunities for 
foreign insurers in the largest insurance market in the world. This reduction in 
diversification benefits will increase risk for stockholders of foreign insurance firms in 
developed countries. 
5.6 Data & Methodology 
5.6.1 Data and Events 
We test the above hypotheses using daily common stock returns over a period 
from January 1998 to December 2000. Daily stock return and balance sheet information 
for major insurance companies from Austria, Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Spain, Switzerland, and the UK are obtained from the Datastream database. 
The daily stock returns for 31 major U.S. insurance firms are obtained from the CRSP 
database. The distribution of these firms across countries, along with some firm specific 
information and information regarding bilateral trade with the U.S., is presented in Table 
2.  
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of foreign insurance firms. 
Country 
No. of 
firms 
Total Asset in 
1999* ⊕ ROE in 1999⊕ 
Export from  
U.S. 99*ℵ 
Import to  
U.S. 99*ℵ 
Austria 4 $7,361.03 5.85 $2,588.20 $2,909.30 
Canada 8 $13,581.62 5.53 $166,600.00 $198,711.10 
France 5 $121,844.71 19.00 $18,877.40 $25,708.60 
Germany 10 $83,787.01 14.88 $26,800.20 $55,228.40 
Greece 2 $788.53 12.85 $995.50 $563.10 
Ireland 2 $21,395.57 7.82 $10,090.60 $22,356.50 
Italy 7 $35,842.49 16.84 $19,436.60 $8,475.00 
Netherlands 2 $356,892.93 13.18 $57,465.70 $130,863.90 
Spain 3 $3,998.56 19.14 $6,133.40 $5,059.20 
Switzerland 7 $48,517.03 9.82 $8,371.30 $9,538.60 
UK 23 $60,554.09 20.33 $38,407.10 $39,237.20 
USA 31 $91,216.92    
*In millions of U.S. dollars  
⊕Source: Data stream 
ℵSource Board of Governors Federal Reserve System. 
 
We identify 13 major events from the Wall Street Journal and Lexis-Nexis wire 
service. In Table 3, we summarize the important events.   
5.6.2 Portfolio Analysis: 
We first adapt the model used by Blinder (1985), and then following Wagster 
(1996), we introduce long-term and short-term interest rates to control for interest rate 
risk. We also include returns on the exchange rate with the U.S. dollar because returns on 
foreign investment will depend on returns on the assets within each market and changes 
in the exchange rate. We then modify the model following Cornett and Tehranian (1990) 
and introduce the lagged value of the market index for possible nonsynchronous trading 
effects. We use dummy variables to identify the major events that led to the passage of 
the GLBA. The dummy variable is equal to 1 over every event window and zero 
otherwise. The coefficient estimate associated with the dummy variable measures the 
impact of the event on the portfolio. The model we estimate is: 
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Table 3: Time line of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. 
 
Note: The first column ‘Date’ is the event date. If the event occurred after the trading closed for a day then 
that the next trading day is the event date. Event Window is defined as Event Date, -1 day and +1 day. The 
second column 'Event' describes the main event.  
Date Event 
11/4/98 
 
 
1/8/99 
 
2/17/99 
 
4/12/99 
 
4/28/99 
 
 
5/4/99 
 
05/06/99 – 
Midnight 
 
7/1/99 
 
10/15/99 
 
10/22/99 
 
11/02/99 
 
 
11/4/99 
 
11/12/99 
1. (i) Senator Alfonse D’Amato loses his re-election bid (11/03/98 –night). (ii) Senator 
Gramm to take over as a chair of Senate Banking Committee. (11/04/98). 
 
2. Financial Services Reform Bill is reintroduced in Congress. 
 
3. Draft bill is unveiled in the Senate. 
 
4. Senator Gramm meets with Senate Minority leader to work on the bill. 
 
5. Senate Banking Committee formally files the Financial Services Modernization Act in the 
Senate. 
 
6. Clinton raises the privacy issue to be included in the bill. 
 
7. Senate passes S. 900. Senate version of the Bill is passed. 
 
 
8. House version of the bill passes. 
 
9. Federal Reserve and Treasury announce agreement on the regulation. 
 
10. Gramm makes deal with White House on CRA. 
 
11. Joint House Conference report signed by the majority of the conferees, clearing the way 
for the votes in both the House and the Senate. 
 
12. Senate passes the bill (90-8) and House passes the bill (362-57). 
 
13. President Clinton signs the bill into law. 
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where, Rit is the return on portfolio i (i= 12, each country has one equally 
weighted portfolio) at day t, Rmi,t is the return on market index of country i at day t, Rwt 
is the return on MSCI world equity index at day t, , Dkt is the dummy variable which is 
equal to one on event window k and zero otherwise, so γik captures the average impact of 
kth announcement on ith country. Rfi,t represents the return on the exchange rate between 
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the U.S. dollar and the currency of the ith country at day t; Rrsi,t represents the return on 
the short term interest rate for country i at day t; Rrli,t represents the return on the long 
term interest rate for country i at day t.  D is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 after the 
enactment of the regulation and zero otherwise. Thus βm’i1-βm’i2 captures the change in 
exposure to systematic risk between pre-act and post-act for country i with respect to its 
own country equity index, and βw’i1-βw’i2 captures the change in exposure to systematic 
risk between pre-act and post-act for country i with respect to its MSCI world equity 
index. 
We estimate the model presented in equation 1 using seemingly unrelated 
regression. Schwert (1981) argues that individual asset returns of the firms in the same 
industry measured over a common time-period are contemporaneously correlated since 
firms will react similarly to any unanticipated event. So in events such as regulatory 
changes the residuals will not be iid. If there is a contemporaneous correlation among the 
disturbances across equations but not correlated over time, SUR model estimates will be 
more efficient than Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).  We use a likelihood ratio (LR) test to 
test the null hypothesis that the off-diagonal elements of the variance-covariance matrix 
is zero. We perform this test to check for contemporaneous correlation among the 
disturbances across equations. 
The main advantage of using SUR is that it allows us to test interesting cross-
country restrictions. In order to test for hypothesis 2 we test the following null hypothesis 
(here aγi is average abnormal return from 13 events): 
0 1 2 3 12: .....H a a a aγ γ γ γ= = = =        (2) 
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5.6.3 Cross Sectional Analysis 
In order to test for our fourth hypothesis, we generate average abnormal returns 
from all 13 events for each firm using the model presented in equation 1. We then 
estimate the following model using OLS, where γi is the dependent variable. The cross-
sectional model is: 
,
,
i j aus can fra ger gre ire ita
spa swi uk m i j w i size i ROE i i
aus can fra ger gre ire ita
spa swi uk m w Size ROE
γ θ θ θ θ θ θ θ
θ θ θ θ β θ β θ θ ε
= + + + + + +
′ ′+ + + + + + + +      (3) 
where, aus, can, fra,…… uk are country dummies, equal to one if a firm is from 
that country and zero otherwise. As mentioned in hypothesis 2 these dummies shall 
control for country specific variations. βm’i,j and βw’i are changes in exposure to 
systematic risk with respect to a home country market index and MSCI world equity 
index. Sizei is defined as the log of total asset value (in U.S. dollar) in 1998 for firm i and 
ROEi is the return on equity of firm i in 1998.   
5.7 Empirical Results 
5.7.1 Portfolio Analysis 
The result of the specification test for our portfolio model shows that the null 
hypothesis that the off-diagonal elements of the variance-covariance matrix is zero is 
rejected at the 1% level. Statistically that means that estimating the model with SUR is 
asymptotically more efficient as opposed to OLS.  
Estimates of model parameters of the portfolio model are presented in Table 4. 
We find that for most of the countries the own country equity index is significant and 
positive while we find that MSCI world equity index is positive and significant for the 
U.S. only.  
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Table 4: Estimation results of model parameters of the portfolio model (equation 1). 
Parameters Austria Canada France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Japan Spain Switzerland UK USA 
Intercept 0.000  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.003 *** 0.000  0.000  -0.001 ** -0.001  0.000  0.000  -0.005  
Change in the 
intercept -0.001  0.001  0.000  0.001  -0.003 ** 0.000  0.001 * 0.001 * 0.002 * 0.000  0.001  0.014 * 
Own Country 
Equity index   (1 
day lag) 0.136 *** 0.027  0.069  0.081 ** 0.003  0.030  0.057 * 0.033  0.111 *** 0.031  0.047  -1.968 ** 
Own Country 
Equity index 0.575 *** 0.587 *** 0.579 *** 0.567 *** 0.712 *** 0.451 *** 0.927 *** 0.768 *** 0.763 *** 0.956 *** 0.394 *** 4.706 *** 
Change in the 
Own Country 
Equity index   (1 
day lag) -0.100  -0.062  -0.138 * -0.053  0.018  -0.015  -0.169 *** -0.145 ** -0.027  0.029  -0.074  0.016  
Change in the 
Own Country 
Equity index -0.179 * -0.238 ** -0.219 *** -0.227 *** 0.312 *** -0.117 * -0.449 *** -0.542 *** -0.588 *** -0.386 *** -0.066  -5.392 *** 
MSCI World 
Equity index   (1 
day lag) -0.052  0.016  0.144 ** 0.083  -0.003  -0.040  0.063  -0.015  0.164 ** 0.064  0.119 *** 0.595  
MSCI World 
Equity index  0.054  0.061  0.092  -0.033  -0.117  0.052  0.119 ** -0.005  0.018  0.007  -0.051  7.572 *** 
Change in the 
MSCI World 
Equity index   (1 
day lag)   0.044  0.151  0.101  -0.120  0.026  0.130  0.036  -0.126  -0.173  -0.120 * -0.010  -2.569 ** 
Change in the 
MSCI World 
Equity index  -0.010  -0.120  -0.158  -0.005  0.198  -0.092  -0.099  0.071  0.053  0.020  -0.065  2.509 * 
Exchange rate 
with U.S. 0.008  0.098  -0.118 * 0.018  0.018  0.050  -0.022  0.028  -0.049  -0.045  -0.056  2.365 ** 
Long-term 
Interest rate -0.009  -0.003  0.009  0.029  0.033  0.010  0.012  -0.001  -0.016  0.014  0.019  -1.273 ** 
Short-term 
Interest rate -0.006   -0.025   0.029   0.011   -0.040   -0.026   0.026   0.000   0.024   0.001   0.013   0.517   
 ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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Table 4: Estimation results of model parameters of the portfolio model (equation 1) continued. 
 
Events Austria Canada France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Japan Spain Switzerland UK USA 
Event1 -0.006  -0.012 * 0.005  -0.002  -0.002  -0.001  0.001  0.006  -0.010  0.003  -0.004  0.002  
Event2 0.004  0.007  -0.018 *** -0.002  -0.006  0.010  -0.011 ** 0.000  0.014 ** -0.006  0.000  -0.062  
Event3 0.030 *** -0.003  -0.002  0.000  0.006  0.004  -0.019 *** -0.007  0.004  -0.004  -0.001  0.110  
Event4 -0.001  -0.011  -0.009  -0.004  -0.020 * 0.003  0.003  0.006  -0.003  0.002  0.000  0.018  
Event5 -0.002  0.009  0.008  0.003  0.000  0.007  0.006  0.002  0.001  0.004  -0.001  0.084  
Event6 -0.001  -0.005  0.004  0.001  -0.005  -0.001  0.000  0.001  -0.013  -0.001  0.001  0.089  
Event7 0.002  -0.007  -0.002  -0.008  0.000  0.001  -0.002  0.015 ** -0.001  -0.002  0.001  0.029  
Event8 -0.004  -0.006  0.008  -0.003  -0.001  0.004  0.003  -0.001  0.002  -0.002  -0.003  -0.042  
Event9 -0.001  -0.002  -0.006  0.002  -0.036 *** 0.010  0.000  0.041 *** -0.006  0.006  0.001  0.070  
Event10 -0.002  -0.007  0.007  -0.008 * 0.013  -0.012 * -0.004  -0.009  -0.004  -0.002  -0.007 * 0.179 *** 
Event11 -0.003  -0.020 ** -0.004  0.004  -0.005  0.010  -0.002  0.003  -0.005  -0.004  -0.008 * 0.010  
Event12 -0.004  -0.024 *** -0.004  0.000  -0.005  -0.003  -0.001  -0.006  -0.006  0.003  0.002  0.139 ** 
Event13 0.000   0.005   -0.007   -0.003   -0.010   -0.003   -0.004   -0.024 *** 0.000   -0.001   -0.009 ** -0.031   
R 2 0.254   0.212   0.385   0.465   0.508   0.235   0.656   0.414   0.431   0.705   0.287   0.496   
 ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
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We find that for Canada events 1, 11 and 12 create significantly negative average 
abnormal return, for France event 2 create significantly negative average abnormal 
return, for Germany event 10 create significantly negative average abnormal return, for 
Greece events 4 and 9 create significantly negative average abnormal return, for Ireland 
event 10 create significantly negative average abnormal return, for Italy events 2 and 3 
create significantly negative average abnormal return, for Japan event 13 create 
significantly negative average abnormal return, while events 7 and 9 create significantly 
positive average abnormal return, for the UK events 10, 11 and 13 create significantly 
negative average abnormal return.  However for Austria and Spain one event each create 
significantly positive abnormal return. Switzerland seems to remain unaffected from the 
events leading to the passage of the GLBA.  
Our second hypothesis, that the information produced over these 13 events has the 
same impact on the insurance industry of any two countries, is rejected at 1%. This 
hypothesis is tested using a Wald test (presented in equation 2). 
5.7.2 Cross Section Analysis 
In order to identify the sources of the variation in returns around the events that 
led to the GLBA, we perform a cross sectional analysis. We estimate equation 3 using the 
OLS. The results of the estimation are presented in Panel A of Table 5; the t-statistics are 
computed using the formulas suggested by MacKinnon and White (1985). We use 
country dummy variables to control for the country specific effects.  
We find that βm’i,j is not significant. This result is expected because there is no 
major regulatory change in these countries that should impact the diversification 
opportunity of these insurance firms. βw’i,j on the other hand is positive and significant. 
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This means that the diversification opportunities of these firms with respect to a world 
index has been reduced. This complies with our major hypothesis that the GLBA reduced 
the diversification opportunities of foreign insurance companies in the largest insurance 
market in the world. 
Coefficient estimates for Size and ROE are not significantly different from zero, 
as expected. However, we use them for the purpose of comparison with the literature 
because Hendershott, Lee, and Tompkins (2002) find that size is significant and positive, 
and Mamun et al. (2003) find both size and ROE to be significant explanatory variables 
in analyses of the impact of the GLBA on domestic insurance firms.  
We use the bootstrap method to test for the precision of our estimators due to the 
small number of observations. One may argue that asymptotic theory may provide a poor 
guide to the significance of the estimator. We can express equation 3 as follows: 
i i iy X θ ε= +  
We then use the following procedure: 
1. We sample with replacement from the original (y, X) sample in pairs. 
2. Then we estimate θ j and pseudo t-statistics for the each θ j, we also compute 
95% confidence internal for θ j and pseudo t-statistics for the each θ j. 
3. Repeat steps 1 and 2 for 1000 times.   
4. Then compare the estimates and statistical significance with the normal OLS 
regression. 
The bootstrap results are presented in Table V panel B. Using the bootstrap t-
statistics, none of the country dummy variables are significantly different from zero, and 
coefficient estimates for βm’i,j , Size and ROE  are also not significantly different from 
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zero. Bootstrap results for βw’i,j show that that coefficient estimate is positive significant 
(Figure 2 provides that distribution of θw). 
Table 5: Cross-sectional analysis of wealth effect on each firm in the insurance industries 
of selected developed countries. 
We estimate the following model: 
,
,
i j aus can fra ger gre ire ita
spa swi uk m i j w i size i ROE i i
aus can fra ger gre ire ita
spa swi uk m w Size ROE
γ θ θ θ θ θ θ θ
θ θ θ θ β θ β θ θ ε
= + + + + + +
′ ′+ + + + + + + +  
We estimate the model using OLS for 71 firms in the sample. Here γi,j is the abnormal 
return of firm i of country j. aus, can,….,uk are dummy variables for a particular country, 
these variables are equal to one for that country and zero otherwise. βm’i,j is the change in 
exposure to systematic risk with respect to home country market index. While βw’i,j is the 
change in exposure to systematic risk with respect to home country market index. Size is 
log of book value of total assets and ROE is return on equity. Bootstrap p-values are based 
on 1000 replications. 
  Estimation Method: OLS  Estimation Method: Bootstrap 
         Coefficient Estimates   t-statistic 
Variables 
Coefficient 
Estimates t-statistic   E(θˆ ) 2.5th percentile 97.5th percentile   E(t-stat)  2.5th percentile 97.5th percentile 
θaus -246.29  -0.25  -18.40 -1657.79 2708.13  -0.40 -4.63 3.75 
θcan -588.80  -0.58  -349.71 -2010.80 2340.02  -1.19 -5.94 3.55 
θfra -60.25  -0.06  162.15 -1415.80 3163.75  -0.12 -4.24 3.99 
θger -196.80  -0.19  7.97 -1722.58 2967.50  -0.40 -4.86 3.93 
θger -273.12  -0.30  -119.17 -1538.25 2040.68  -0.48 -4.20 2.98 
θire -69.57  -0.07  132.46 -1298.60 2809.47  -0.07 -3.49 3.45 
θita -79.37  -0.08  116.53 -1467.11 2906.41  -0.24 -4.73 4.12 
θspa -148.19  -0.16  52.42 -1339.01 2605.55  -0.25 -4.15 3.64 
θswi -201.80  -0.19  36.45 -1599.84 3010.91  -0.41 -4.98 3.89 
θuk -255.18  -0.31  -14.87 -1139.64 2293.52  -0.54 -4.87 3.64 
θm -8.85  -0.16  -23.69 -161.99 85.76  -0.45 -3.61 2.75 
θw 0.12 *** 5.61  0.12 0.05 0.23  10.43 3.27 24.69 
θsize 2.65  0.04  -11.15 -185.94 81.01  0.21 -4.39 5.27 
θROE 3.28  1.64  3.26 -0.65 8.82  0.97 -0.20 2.16 
R2 0.658                     
F-Statistics 8.425 ***                   
*** Significant at 1% 
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Figure 2: Distribution from bootstrap of θw 
Empirical distribution of θw for 1000 bootstrap samples. 
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We also test whether EU firms have a different impact from the GLBA than non-
EU firms. We modify equation 3, and then replace all the country dummy variables with 
one dummy, which is 1 if it is a EU country and zero otherwise. The modified model is 
presented in equation 4 as: 
 , ,i j eu m i j w i size i ROE i iIntercept eu m w Size ROEγ θ θ β θ β θ θ ε′ ′= + + + + + +  (4)
 Here we test the hypothesis, 0 : 0euH θ = . The result, as presented in Table 6, 
shows that the null hypothesis is maintained; i.e. insurance companies from EU member 
countries are not affected differently from those in non-EU countries. 
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Table 6: Cross-sectional analysis of wealth effect on each firm in the insurance industries 
EU vs. Non-EU countries. 
We estimate the following model: 
, ,i j eu m i j w i size i ROE i iIntercept eu m w Size ROEγ θ θ β θ β θ θ ε′ ′= + + + + + +  
We estimate the model using OLS for 83 firms in the sample. Here γi,j is the abnormal 
return of firm i of country j. eu is a dummy variable which is 1 if it is a EU member country 
and zero otherwise. βm’i,j is the change in exposure to systematic risk with respect to home 
country market index. While βw’i,j is the change in exposure to systematic risk with respect 
to home country market index. Size is log of book value of total asset and ROE is return on 
equity.  
 
Parameter  Estimate  t-statistic 
Intercept 228.656  0.271 
θeu 229.861  1.014 
θm -17.292  -0.301 
θw 0.121 *** 6.178 
θsize -37.262  -0.690 
θROE 2.461  1.468 
R2 0.646   
F-Statistics 23.382 ***  
***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 
5.8 Conclusion 
We examine the impact of the GLBA, a major regulatory change in the U.S. 
financial services industry, on a sample of 83 non-U.S. insurance companies from 11 
countries. In an era of globalization of financial markets, it is argued in the literature that 
deregulations like the GLBA or the single market program of EU should have an impact 
beyond the boundaries of the jurisdiction8. In this paper we present further evidence of 
the globalization of financial institutions. In our portfolio analysis we find that insurance 
industries of 8 out of 11 developed countries have significant negative wealth effects 
from passage of the GLBA, a deregulation that was designed to impact the financial 
services industry of the United States. We also find that the impact of the GLBA is not 
                                                 
8 Berger, DeYoung and Udell (2000). 
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the same for any two foreign insurance industries. And the impact of the GLBA is 
statistically not different for firms from a EU member country or not. 
Fig 3: Acquisition of the US insurance companies by foreign insurers. 
 
Most importantly, we show that the negative wealth effects are due to the 
reduction in the opportunities for risk diversification by foreign insurance firms. This 
reduction in diversification opportunities in the largest insurance market results from the 
GLBA. Because the GLBA requires that the entire foreign financial institution be well 
capitalized, it may be difficult for many foreign firms to meet the new standards. In 
addition, the GLBA creates more competition in the insurance market by allowing 
domestic commercial banks to participate in this market as insurance agents and FHCs to 
operate a full range of insurance businesses. Further, these domestic firms have a home 
field advantage over the foreign firms. Anecdotal evidences also support the argument 
that the GLBA created barriers to entry in the U.S. insurance industry for foreign 
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insurance firms. Figure 3 shows that after 1998, the number of acquisitions by foreign 
firms of U.S. insurance firms fell to less than half. Blanden (2000) also reports that the 
number of foreign banks in the U.S. has been declining, offering further evidence of 
barriers to entry in U.S. financial markets.    
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